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Abstract 
A scalar implicature is the use of a weak term from a scale to implicate that a 
stronger term in the scale is not the intended meaning. For example, some is often 
interpreted as meaning some but not all, whereas logically its meaning is at least one. 
It is only in recent years that scalar implicature has progressed from its role as an 
explanation for poor reasoning performance in adults to its current status as the 
subject of experimental investigation. As a result, relatively little is known about 
scalar implicature and the literature contains seemingly contradictory findings and 
untested assumptions. The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the quantifier 
some in order to clarify and extend our existing knowledge of the scalar implicature 
associated with the term. In Chapter 1 the literature is reviewed and three research 
questions are identified in relation to the implicature: What is the developmental 
trajectory of sensitivity to the implicature? What contexts facilitate sensitivity to the 
implicature? And which contemporary theory best captures the processing of the 
scalar term? The experiments in Chapter 2 primarily examined how sensitivity to 
scalar implicature develops. The results revealed that contrary to assumptions in the 
literature, sensitivity does not develop linearly but in a U-shaped fashion. 
Consequently children can be more pragmatic than adults. In addition, sensitivity 
was seen in 3-year-old children, which is earlier than has previously been shown in 
the literature. Chapter 3 explored the role of context in facilitating sensitivity to 
scalar implicatures in children. It focused on Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth and 
Handley’s (2004) claim that deception contexts help children to detect implicatures. 
The findings revealed that deception contexts can aid sensitivity but an important 
factor is the motivation behind the deception attempt. Thus, the highest rates of 
sensitivity to the implicature were observed in conditions where there was an 
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obvious benefit to the speaker if her attempted deception was successful. Chapter 4 
compared how some is processed by children and adults, and the experiments 
revealed that adults may be subject to processing difficulties that the children appear 
not to be. Sensitivity in adults was affected by a secondary task, their logical 
response times on infelicitous some trials were longer than on control trials and they 
appeared to experience difficulties in resolving response conflicts. Contrary to 
assumptions in the literature, a logical response in adults is not necessarily indicative 
of failure to detect an implicature but could represent either cancellation of the 
implicature or the detection of conflict between two possible interpretations. In all 
the experimental chapters, the findings are discussed in relation to theoretical 
accounts of scalar implicature, with the conclusion that no current theory in its 
present form fully captures the nature of the phenomenon. Overall, it is concluded 
that there are assumptions in the literature which appear to be incorrect and therefore 
future research must be mindful of using untested assumptions to interpret new 
results. In addition it is argued that theoretical explanations of scalar implicature 
need to be revised and should be used as a way of generating hypotheses rather than 
the tool by which results are interpreted. Some is interesting not only for what it can 
tell us about the interface between semantics and pragmatics but also for what it 
reveals about the relationship between inference and reasoning.      
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
1.1. Introduction 
Human communication is a sophisticated process and is often seen as that 
which sets us apart from other animals. As Sperber (1995) has pointed out, our 
exchanges about hopes, fears and knowledge are far more complicated than the 
rudimentary codes of bees and monkeys. For us, verbal communication is a lot more 
than simple sound to meaning pairings, it typically involves inference. Inference 
involves going from the grammatical content of an utterance to its pragmatic 
content; in other words from what is literally said to what is actually meant. Thus, 
understanding an utterance involves understanding what the speaker intended to 
communicate. There are many occasions in conversation where inferences have to be 
made in order to understand the speaker’s intended meaning, such as the 
interpretation of irony or metaphor. However this thesis focuses on one particular 
form of conversational inference, that of scalar inference, and more specifically the 
scalar implicature associated with that inference. 
A scalar inference involves a listener evaluating a speaker’s utterance against 
a set of informationally ordered alternatives, for example a scale, in order to draw a 
conclusion that was not specifically stated. A scalar implicature, on the other hand, is 
the speaker’s use of a weak term from that set to convey the information that a 
stronger term in the scale is not the intended meaning (Bach, 2006; Horn, 1972, 
2004). Implicatures are associated with a variety of scales such as connectives, 
where the set is <and, or>, modals <must, might be>, numerals <…three, two one>, 
and quantifiers <all, some>, the latter of which is the primary focus of this thesis.  
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The implicature associated with some, and also or, was recognised as far 
back as 1867 by Mill (as cited in Horn, 2004) and much has been written about it, 
especially within the field of linguistics where people have sought to identify the 
nature of the implicature (e.g. Geurts, 2009; Hirschberg, 1991; Recanti, 2003; 
Russell, 2006; Saurland, 2004; Spector, 2007). The presence of scalar implicatures 
has also been acknowledged within the reasoning field with regards to the ability of 
people to reason according to the laws of logic (Begg & Harris, 1982; Polizter, 1986; 
Wilkins, 1928). However, the field of experimental pragmatics, in which scalar 
implicatures are the direct focus of study, has only really emerged as a discipline this 
century (Noveck & Sperber, 2004). Consequently experimental investigations of 
scalar implicatures are in their infancy, and much of our understanding of the nature 
of scalar implicatures comes from a somewhat limited empirical data base. In 
addition, comparisons between studies have been difficult as they have been 
conducted in different languages, required different responses, used different tasks, 
and tested different ages, or a number of variables have been manipulated within the 
same study. This has led to two problems; there are seemingly contradictory findings 
for a number of research questions, and there is a reliance on untested assumptions to 
interpret new results, assumptions which may prove to be incorrect.  
The primary concern of this thesis is the scalar implicature associated with 
the quantifier some, and the thesis’s aim is to examine experimentally three areas 
where there are contradictory findings or untested assumptions in order to clarify our 
existing knowledge about the scalar implicature, and thus to extend that knowledge. 
Before the specific aims of each experiment and the layout of the rest of the thesis 
are presented, this chapter begins with an appraisal of the phenomena of scalar 
implicature. This appraisal starts with an overview of scalar implicature, where the 
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definition of the term is clarified with examples. The overview continues with the 
charting of the origins of the term scalar implicature from Grice’s (1989) seminal 
work on conversational inference, to the work of Horn (1972), who coined the term 
scalar implicature to reflect the notion that these implicatures rely on a 
quantificational scale for their derivation. Following this overview, two opposing 
contemporary accounts of scalar implicature processing are described; the default 
account and the relevance account. The appraisal ends with the presentation and 
evaluation of the current empirical findings concerned with the scalar implicature 
associated with some. 
    
1.2. Overview of Scalar Implicature 
 As we have already seen, a scalar implicature is the use of a weak term from 
a scale to implicate that a stronger term in the scale is not the intended meaning. For 
example consider the following utterances:   
(1) Some of Paul’s children are girls 
(2) Bring a savoury dish or a pudding  
Logically speaking the scalar terms used in the utterances, some and or, are 
compatible with the stronger terms in their respective scales; some is defined as 
meaning more than one so it does not preclude all, whilst or is considered to be true 
if at least one of the disjuncts is true, and so does not preclude both disjuncts being 
true (Copi & Cohen, 1994). Therefore fellow interlocutors would be entitled to 
interpret the utterances as: 
 (3) Some, maybe all, of Paul’s children are girls 
 (4) Bring a savoury dish or a pudding, maybe both 
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However uttering (3) or (4) when you know that the stronger term in each set is the 
case, whilst not logically fallacious, could be considered to be pragmatically 
infelicitous. So the utterances are often interpreted as meaning: 
 (5) Some, but not all, of Paul’s children are girls 
 (6) Bring a savoury dish or a pudding, but not both 
In each case the listener has inferred that the speakers’ use of a weak term implicates 
that the stronger term is not the case. If all and and were the intended meanings the 
speakers would have used those terms. As all and and have not been used, not all 
and not both must be the case.  
1.2.1. Grice  
Paul Grice (1989) was the first person to systematically explain how 
inferences in conversation are derived, and coined the term conversational 
implicature to describe this process. For Grice, communication is made up of two 
elements; what is said and what is implicated. Although he did not deal with scalar 
implicatures particularly, one of his aims was to reconcile the differences in meaning 
between formal logical expressions, such as ∃ and V, and their counterparts in 
natural language, such as some and or.  
 According to Grice, conversation is rarely a series of disconnected remarks, 
there is generally a sense of cooperation on the part of each participant, with each 
recognising a common purpose or mutually accepted direction. He developed a 
Cooperative Principle, which required participants to: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. (Grice, 1989, p. 26) 
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Grice (1989) also proposed that discourse is conducted according to a 
number of maxims, or rules, which govern expectations of quantity, quality, relation 
and manner. The purpose of spelling out these maxims was to show that a speaker 
can convey information indirectly by saying something which, on the face of it, may 
appear irrelevant, but given the nature of the discourse, is highly meaningful.  In 
order to preserve the cooperativeness of the statement the listener adds additional 
information to interpret the sentence according to what the speaker actually meant 
rather than what the speaker literally said.  
The implicatures in (5) and (6) arise out of the maxim of quantity. 
Maxim of Quantity  
 (i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
 purposes of  the exchange). 
 (ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (Grice, 
 1989, p. 26) 
On hearing (1) some of Paul’s children are girls, or (2) bring a savoury dish or a 
pudding, the listener assumes that the speaker is adhering to the Cooperative 
Principle and observing the maxim of quantity. Therefore they infer that as the 
speaker chose to use the quantifier some instead of all, and the connective or instead 
of and, the more informative terms must not be the case. So the sentences are 
interpreted as (4) some, but not all, of Paul’s children are girls, and (5) bring a 
savoury or a pudding, but not both. Thus the literal meaning of the sentence is 
computed, found wanting, and then added to; it is this additional information, the 
conversational implicature associated with the original utterance and the inference 
drawn from it, that preserves the cooperative nature of the discourse. 
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There is one further point relating to Grice’s theory which is worth noting, as 
it links to the contemporary pragmatic theories which are discussed in section 1.3 of 
this chapter. According to Grice (1989) there is a distinction to be made between 
particularised and generalised implicatures. Particularised implicatures are those 
implicatures that are made only on a particular occasion by virtue of the context in 
which the utterance occurs, whereas generalised implicatures are those associated 
with certain words regardless of the context in which the utterance occurs. 
Unfortunately Grice offers only one example to make this distinction; the indefinite 
article (p.37). The indefinite article a normally carries the assumption that the 
speaker is not in a position to be more specific, so the utterance X is meeting a 
woman this evening carries the generalised implicature that the woman is not his 
wife/girlfriend/daughter. As we will see in section 1.3, the debate over whether the 
quantifier some normally carries the implicature not all regardless of context is still 
going on today.  
1.2.2. Horn       
The implicatures in (5) and (6) came to be known as a scalar implicatures 
through the work of Larry Horn (1972). He suggested that terms such as all and 
some and  and and or lie on a scale of informativeness where the initial term in the 
scale is the more informative term. This informativeness arises from one-way 
entailment relations; strong terms entail weaker terms but not vice-versa. Thus 
strong terms are more informative because if you are in a situation where you know 
a strong term to be true you also know that the weak term is true. Implicatures arise 
from these entailment relationships and the logical relationships in the traditional 
square of opposition (see Figure 1.1; also Horn 1972, p.207 and Parsons, 2008). 
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Every S is P                                                                      No S is P 
A                                         contraries                                      E 
 
 
 
 
 
subalterns                         contradictories                         subalterns 
 
 
 
 
 
I                                     subcontraries                                     O 
Some S is P                                                                       Some S is not P 
 
 
The four corners of the square represent four logical forms: 
A is a universal affirmative of the form every S is P 
E is a universal negative of the form no S is P 
I is a particular affirmative of the form some S is P 
O is a particular negative of the form some S is not P 
Corresponding A and E statements are contrary: they can both be false at the 
same time but they cannot both be true. 
Corresponding A and O, and E and I statements are contradictory: members 
of each pair cannot be true or false simultaneously.  
An I statement is unilaterally entailed by an A statement; the same applies to 
O of E.  
Corresponding I and O statements are subcontrary: they can be 
simultaneously true but they cannot be simultaneously false. 
 
Figure 1.1. Traditional Square of Opposition 
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Horn (1972, 2004) points out that the assertion of either of the two 
subcontraries, I or O, quantity implicates the other. Therefore, whilst some is 
entailed by all and so is logically compatible with it, it implicates not all. Therefore 
although the I statement, some of Paul’s children are girls, is logically distinct from 
the O statement, some of Paul’s children are not girls, what is communicated by 
both statements is essentially the same, some of Paul’s children are girls and some 
aren’t. So, scalar terms are lower-bounded by their semantic meaning and upper-
bounded by a quantity implicature. This applies not just to quantifiers and 
connectives but generalises to all operators in entailment scales, such as modals 
<necessarily, possibly>, <must, may>, adverbs <always, often, sometimes>, 
adjectives <hot, warm> and numerals <three, two, one>.1   
 
1.3. Contemporary Theories 
      A number of contemporary theories of pragmatics have been applied to the 
phenomena of scalar implicatures in order to explain their derivation. In 
experimental pragmatics these theories tend to be divided into two main camps; 
default (Chiercha, 2004: Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 1972, 2004, 2009; Levinson, 1983, 
2000) and relevance based accounts (Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson 1985/1995).  
1.3.1. Default theories       
One of the main proponents of the notion of scalar implicatures as default is 
Levinson (1983, 2000). Levinson’s account of implicatures develops from, and 
extends, the Gricean framework of communication. He proposes that instead of 
thinking about Grice’s maxims as behavioural norms or rules, they should instead be 
                                                 
1 Although in later work, Horn (2009) acknowledges that numerals may be a special case. 
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viewed as “inferential heuristics” (2000, p.35). He identified three heuristics; I, M 
and Q. 
 The I heuristic can be thought of as standing for informativeness and relates 
to Grice’s second maxim of quantity, “do not make your contribution more 
informative than necessary” (Grice, 1989, p. 26). The relevant heuristic is “what is 
expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified” (Levinson, 2000, p. 37). In other 
words, simple expressions are interpreted according to what is most typical. For 
example, the conditional if is interpreted as the biconditional iff, as in the statement 
if, and only if, you mow the lawn I will give you 5 pounds.  
 The M heuristic relates to Grice’s maxim of manner, “be perspicuous” 
(Grice, 1989, p. 27). The relevant heuristic is “what’s said in an abnormal way isn’t 
normal” (Levinson, 2000, p. 38). This heuristic is complimentary and opposite to the 
I heuristic, in that if a statement is marked in some way then the stereotypical 
interpretation should be avoided. Using Levinson’s example, the simple expression 
Bill stopped the car carries the I implicature that he did so in the typical fashion, by 
using the foot brake, whereas Bill caused the car to stop carries the M implicature 
that the car was stopped in an unusual way, such as by the application of the 
handbrake. 
 The Q heuristic relates to Grice’s first maxim of quantity, “make your 
contribution as informative as is required” (1989, p. 26). This heuristic, considered 
to be the most important and the one responsible for scalar implicatures, is “what 
isn’t said, isn’t” (Levinson, 2000, p.35). In other words, reference is made to what 
might have been said but it is taken that it is not the case. For example, the statement 
some boys came to the party Q-implicates that not all boys came through the 
heuristic that as all was not said it cannot be so.      
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 Although accepting Grice’s two levels of communication, the “said” and the 
“implicated” (Grice, 1989, p. 118), Levinson (1983, 2000) proposes that there is a 
third layer, what he terms “utterance- type-meaning” (2000, p. 22). This additional 
layer represents Generalised Conversational Implicatures (GCI’s), and comes before, 
and is distinguished from, the other class of conversational implicatures, the 
Particularised Conversational Implicatures (PCI’s). The meaning of a GCI is not 
based on the semantics of the utterance or, as is the case for PCI’s, on the context-
driven speaker’s intentions, but on a general expectation of how language is 
normally used. Levinson illustrates the difference between GCI’s and PCI’s with the 
following example (2000, p. 16-17): 
Consider the sentence some of the guests are already leaving, and consider 
that it might be uttered in two rather different contexts; 
Context 1 
A:    “What time is it?” 
B:    “Some of the guests are already leaving” 
        PCI: ‘It must be late.’ 
        GCI: ‘Not all the guests are already leaving.’ 
Context 2 
A: “Where’s John?” 
B: “Some of the guests are already leaving.” 
     PCI: ‘Perhaps John has already left.’ 
     GCI: ‘Not all the guests are already leaving’ 
As can be seen from the example, the different contexts produce two different PCI’s, 
but there is also a GCI which is common to both. This GCI arises from the general 
13 
 
expectations of how language is normally used, given the structure of the language, 
and it is these expectations that give rise to default inferences. 
 So, according to Levinson (1983, 2000) scalar implicatures are part of a 
whole group of GCI’s, which are so readily inferred that they are the preferred or 
default interpretation. These implicatures automatically go through unless they are 
cancelled. Thus the mere presence of a weak scalar term will result in a scalar 
inference regardless of context. Therefore any statement of the form some a’s are b’s 
will, all other things being equal, have the default interpretation not all a’s are b’s. 
According to Levinson, the ubiquitous nature of scalar implicatures in everyday 
conversation can only be accounted for by this default interpretation.  
Although the experimental findings of  this thesis are compared with 
predictions made by Levinson’s default account, there is another default account that 
has received attention within the literature, Chierchia’s (2004) Sematic Core Model 
(see also, Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini & Meroni, 2001; Chierchia et al. 2004; 
Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia, & Guasti, 2001; Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, 
Foppolo, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2005). Given its relevance to language processing an 
overview of the model will now be given. Although Chierchia is in agreement with 
Levinson regarding the general interpretation of the term some, his mechanism 
underpinning the default status is very different. He proposes that the semantic and 
pragmatic processing of a sentence occur alongside one another. That is, the literal 
meaning and pragmatic meaning are assigned phrase by phrase with implicatures 
being factored in recursively as soon as they occur. This local processing contrasts 
sharply with the standard neo-Gricean view where scalar implicatures are processed 
globally, that is pragmatic enrichment takes place after semantic processing has 
assigned a literal meaning to the whole sentence. According to Chierchia, a different 
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model is needed from that of the standard neo-Gricean account to explain the 
presence of embedded implicatures and the absence of scalar implicatures in certain 
linguistic contexts.  It should be noted that there is evidence that negation blocks 
scalar implicatures (see Horn, 1989; also Gualmini, 2004; Musolino, Crain & 
Thornton, 2000; Musolino & Lidz, 2006) but this line of enquiry is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
 Chierchia (2004) suggests that embedded implicatures are a problem for the 
traditional neo-Gricean account. He argues that as scalar implicatures place 
statements against a background of alternates, and the choice of statement from those 
alternates implicates the negation of all informationally stronger alternates, 
embedded implicatures should not exist because implicatures come about from the 
negation of the whole sentence. However, if a whole sentence is negated with an 
embedded scalar term then contradiction can occur. For example, consider the 
following statement taken from Chierchia et al. (2004, p. 286):  
 (7) Mary is either reading a paper or seeing some students. 
The negated stronger alternate is  
(8) It is not the case that (Mary is either reading a paper or seeing every 
student) 
which entails 
 (9) Mary is not reading her paper 
which contradicts the original statement in (7). The only way for contradiction not to 
occur, Chierchia suggests, is if implicatures are dealt with phrase by phrase. In that 
way the negation applies only to the second disjunct, the phrase in which the scalar 
term occurs.  
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 Chierchia (2004) proposes that the absence of scalar implicatures in 
downward entailing (DE) contexts, that is contexts that license inferences from super 
sets to their subsets, also necessitates a model which has interacting semantic and 
pragmatic modules. According to Chierchia, there is a relationship between contexts 
where scalar implicatures fail to arise and those linguistic contexts which license the 
negative polarity item any; contexts that are DE. Both the addition of scalar 
implicatures and the licensing of any are driven by a need to be more informative 
than the relevant alternates allow. But informativeness is relevant to the polarity of 
the context. When a scalar term is encountered in a DE context, its implicature is not 
more informative than the literal meaning and so it is automatically removed. 
Consider the following examples taken from Chierchia et al. (2004, p. 288): 
(10)  Paul invited John and Bill 
Situation 1 = Paul invited John and Bill 
(11)  Paul invited John or Bill 
 Situation 1 = Paul invited John and Bill 
 Situation 2 = Paul invited John 
Situation 3 = Paul invited Bill 
Examples (10) and (11) are non-DE contexts. The implicature arises in (11) because 
this statement is less informative than (10); (10) is true for only one situation 
whereas (11) is true for three situations. However in DE contexts, (12) and (13), the 
situation is reversed and the statement containing or is more informative than the one 
involving and, thus there is no reason to compute the implicature associated with or.
 (12)  Paul didn’t invite John or Bill 
  Situation 1 = Paul invited neither John nor Bill 
 (13)  Paul didn’t invite John and Bill 
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  Situation 1 = Paul invited neither John nor Bill 
   Situation 2 = Paul invited John 
  Situation 3 = Paul invited Bill 
Therefore a mechanism is needed which allows embedded scalar implicatures to be 
computed but removes them in DE contexts. DE contexts are structurally 
determined, whilst implicatures are pragmatically determined, therefore a model is 
needed which is sensitive to both modules. 
As can be seen from the above accounts, Chierchia (2004) and Levinson 
(1983, 2000) agree on the default status of the term some, but disagree on the 
mechanism by which the implicature is processed. Although this difference is 
interesting, the experiments to be described in this thesis were not designed to 
arbitrate between the accounts. As Levinson’s default account has received most 
attention in the literature, it will be the one focused on in this thesis.       
1.3.2. Relevance theories 
 Standing in opposition to default theories are relevance based accounts, the 
best known of which, Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (RT) (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1985/1995; see also Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Sperber, 1994; Sperber & 
Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, 2004), will be described here.  
 RT shares some assumptions with Gricean and Neo-Gricean theories, namely 
that the whole point of human communication is the expression and recognition of 
intentions, and that listeners are guided towards speakers’ meanings by the 
expectations that the speakers’ utterances create. However RT substantially departs 
from these theories on at least three points; points that have implications for the 
processing of scalar implicatures. The first departure concerns Grice’s (1989) 
cooperative principle or maxims; according to Sperber and Wilson (1985/1995) there 
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is no need for these as communication can be fully explained in terms of relevance. 
Secondly, comprehension does not involve global processing; it is an online process 
whereby the explicit and implicit meanings of an utterance are developed in parallel. 
Following on from this, the last point concerns literal interpretation. According to 
RT, unlike Grice, arriving at the most relevant interpretation of an utterance does not 
mean that the literal interpretation has to be accessed. These points will be expanded 
on and illustrated below.  
 According to RT, human cognition, in its desire for increasing efficiency, has 
evolved to detect stimuli that are most relevant to us. That is stimuli whose 
processing makes a worthwhile difference to our view of the world. Linguistic 
utterances are particularly relevant because they carry an assumption of their own 
relevance. This is because in conversing with someone we are laying claim to their 
attention, and in doing so are overtly signalling our intention to provide relevant 
information. How relevant an input is for a listener is a function of the effect gained 
from its processing and the effort required to carry out that processing. All other 
things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects the greater the 
relevance, but the greater the processing effort expended the lower the relevance. It 
is these expectations of relevance, not Grice’s (1989) maxims, which guide a listener 
to a speaker’s meaning. 
With regards to the processing of utterances, RT proposes that an utterance 
can only be fully understood in conjunction with the context in which it occurs. So 
unlike default theory, scalar terms do not have an automatic interpretation. RT 
proposes that the goal of a listener is to construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s 
meaning which satisfies the expectation of relevance raised by the utterance. The 
listener achieves this by constructing appropriate hypotheses about the explicit 
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content, the intended contextual assumptions, and the intended contextual 
implications. However these steps are not carried out sequentially, but in parallel, 
against a backdrop of assumptions and expectations of how relevant the utterance 
will be for the listener. Additionally, revision can occur as the utterance unfolds. So, 
during the comprehension process the listener takes the linguistically encoded 
sentence meaning and follows the path of least effort to compute cognitive effects 
and stops when conditions of relevance are met. However, people can differ in terms 
of their interpretation strategy. Sperber (1994) proposes that the level of 
understanding a listener has about a speaker’s intention towards them regarding 
benevolence and competence determines which interpretation the listener settles on. 
Sperber identifies three different levels, which have in common the path of least 
effort; a naïve optimist assumes benevolence and competence and stops at the first 
relevant interpretation, a cautious optimist assumes only benevolence and stops at 
the first relevant interpretation that he considers the speaker would have thought 
relevant to him, whereas a sophisticated communicator, who assumes neither 
benevolence or competence, stops at the first relevant interpretation that he considers 
that the speaker would have thought seemed relevant to him.  
With regards to literal interpretations versus pragmatic interpretations, RT 
proposes that the literal interpretation of a scalar term need not be accessed if it is 
not relevant. Consider the utterance “John is a soldier” in the following example 
taken from Sperber and Wilson (2002, p. 20).  
Peter:  Can we trust John to do as we tell him and defend the interests of the 
Linguistic Department in the University Council? 
Mary:  John is a soldier! 
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Whilst Peter might have a mental representation of the concept of a soldier, not all 
the qualities and characteristics attributed to that concept will be equally activated. 
Interpretations are arrived at in order of accessibility and the degree to which they 
satisfy his expectations of relevance. So Peter might access representations relating 
to duty and following orders before settling on the interpretation John identifies with 
the goals of the team. Once this interpretation is reached other interpretations are not 
even considered, especially the literal interpretation, John is a member of the 
military. Whilst the military interpretation may be literally true it is not relevant to 
Peter’s understanding of Mary’s utterance and therefore it is not computed. If Peter’s 
question had been about John’s profession then the literal interpretation of Mary’s 
reply would have computed because in that case it would have been relevant. In fact 
Wilson and Sperber (2002b) go so far as to argue that language use is not governed 
by truthfulness. Thus a term may be broadened out or narrowed down from its literal 
interpretation to suit the purposes of the interaction. 
  So according to RT scalar terms are always interpreted in context with 
consideration being given to the speaker’s intentions. Therefore the scalar term some 
can be interpreted as may be all, not all or even just one, depending on what is 
relevant to the hearer (Noveck & Sperber, 2007). This interpretation in turn is 
dependent on the size of the cognitive effect achieved in relation to the amount of 
effort required. Even though it may appear that some has more than one meaning, 
only one will be available at one time because forcing the listener to choose between 
interpretations would cause unnecessary effort and would go against the principle of 
optimal relevance. Therefore it is not a case of processing the literal meaning of a 
term, finding it wanting and therefore enriching it to achieve the intended meaning, 
listeners access  the most relevant interpretation and settle on it. If the context does 
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not prime the enriched interpretation of a scalar term, then RT predicts that a literal 
interpretation should take less time and effort to arrive at than an enriched one, 
because an enriched interpretation always involves the processing of meaning 
construction (Noveck & Sperber, 2007). 
 So it can be seen from the description of the theoretical accounts above, that 
default theories and relevance based accounts make very different predictions 
regarding the processing of the scalar term some. These differences are illustrated in 
Table 1.1, taken from Noveck and Sperber (2007). 
Table 1.1 
Contrasting predictions of Generalised Conversational Implicature Theory and 
Relevance Theory regarding the speed of processing of the scalar term some 
according to Noveck and Sperber (2007)  
Interpretation     
of Some 
Generalised Conversational 
Implicature Theory 
Relevance Theory 
Literal  Default enrichment + context 
sensitive cancellation 
hence slower 
No enrichment 
                             
hence faster 
Enriched  Default enrichment             
hence faster 
Context-sensitive enrichment 
hence slower 
 
In section 1.4.3. of this chapter we will take a closer look at how the predictions 
regarding processing times have been tested.  
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1.4. Empirical Studies of the Scalar Implicature Associated with Some 
A “cottage industry” (Noveck, 2004, p. 305) has sprung up in recent years 
intent on furthering our knowledge of the scalar implicature associated with the 
quantifier some, and it has undoubtedly had a fruitful start; new methodologies have 
been devised, existing ones normally associated with other disciplines have been 
utilised, and theories have been experimentally tested. But whilst our understanding 
of the phenomena has increased, key questions still remain unanswered. This 
literature review will be organised around three such questions. It will consider why 
the questions remain unanswered and explain why it is important that they are 
answered. In order to do this, the literature review will be primarily concerned with 
the implicature associated with some, although as scalar implicatures are regarded as 
universal in nature, experimental evidence will also be considered from other scalar 
terms. In addition, whilst most of the work surveyed is drawn from the area of 
experimental pragmatics, consideration will also be given to other areas of study 
where the presence of scalar implicatures has also been documented.   
Experimental investigations involving the scalar implicature associated with 
some have tended to pursue three lines of enquiry; establishing when sensitivity to 
the implicature emerges, establishing in what contexts sensitivity is seen, and 
adjudicating between default and relevance based accounts of implicature 
processing. These three questions form the structure of the review.  
1.4.1. What is the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to the scalar implicature 
associated with some? 
Within the field of experimental pragmatics there has been a debate as to 
whether children are insensitive to scalar implicatures following Noveck’s (2001) 
claim that weak scalar terms “tend to be treated logically by young competent 
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participants and more pragmatically by older ones” (p. 165). Adults’ ability to detect 
scalar implicatures are generally never questioned (Guasti et al, 2005; Hurewitz, 
Papafragou, Gleitman, & Gelman, 2006; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 
2003), and the implicit assumption within the literature has been that as age 
increases logical interpretations of scalar terms decrease, so children’s logical 
responding should decrease linearly until it reaches adult levels of pragmatic 
responding. Consequently even if children show sensitivity to scalar implicatures it 
should never be at a rate greater than that of adults (Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 
2004; Noveck & Reboul, 2008; Noveck & Sperber; 2007; Papafragou & Musolino, 
2003). However given that no study has investigated a wide range of children’s ages 
this assumption may be ill founded. 
Knowing the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to the scalar implicature 
associated with some, at what age it appears, how it develops and whether the 
development is linear, is necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, if meaningful 
comparisons are to be made between age groups, the assumption of linearity is not 
enough, it needs to be established. Secondly, knowing who shows sensitivity will 
also help with understanding how scalar implicatures are processed and what 
cognitive demands they place on an individual. Finally, knowing the trajectory will 
also help resolve the issue which is often discussed alongside this topic, namely what 
factors facilitate the detection of scalar implicatures. Before considering the evidence 
from studies of scalar implicature let us first turn to the reasoning literature, which 
has long acknowledged the presence of scalar implicatures.  
The idea that adults reliably interpret some as meaning not all has been 
documented in the adult reasoning literature since the turn of the last century 
(Wilkins, 1928) and is often the reason advanced as to why they do so badly on 
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certain reasoning tasks (Begg & Harris, 1982; Ceraso & Provitera, 1971; Johnson-
Laird, 1975; Neimark & Chapman 1975; Newstead, 1989; Politzer, 1986). 
According to Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993) “there is ample evidence that 
people interpret quantifiers according to conversational implicatures rather than 
logic” (p. 221). 
 Begg and Harris (1982) suggest that adults use the rules of conversation to 
interpret some rather than the rules of formal logic. In the case of syllogistic 
reasoning the authors propose that adults treat the syllogism as an obscure attempt at 
conversation rather than an isolated logical proposition, and because they are more 
adept at communicating than they are at reasoning, they choose to reason according 
to conversational principles. Begg and Harris asked adults to interpret categorical 
propositions of the type used in syllogisms, by choosing appropriate set-theoretical 
relations. The authors found that some and some not were given similar 
interpretations, both being interpreted to mean some but not all, even though 
participants had been instructed that some did not preclude all. 
Begg (1987), following on from his previous work (Begg & Harris 1982), 
investigated why people interpret some as meaning not all. He hypothesised that 
some serves a communicative function of restricting attention to the minority rather 
than the majority. He gave adult participants information about the occupations of 
fifty men and fifty women. Regardless of the occupation, such as writer or artist, 
there were equal numbers of both male and female representatives; however the 
occupations were not equally represented, there were more writers than artists. The 
results revealed that in relation to the phrase some men are ...: the phrase was 
considered to be more misleading, as determined by assigned numerical grades, 
when the occupation that followed was writers, as opposed to artists; the term artists 
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was chosen above writers on forced choice statements; and artist was chosen over 
writer for tasks that required completion of the sentence. Begg concluded that there 
was a strong preference for those statements that directed attention to the smaller 
rather than larger subset of those named individuals (for other work that has looked 
at the focusing properties of quantifiers see the large corpus of work by Moxey & 
Standford [e.g. Moxey & Sanford, 1993a, 1993b, 2000; Paterson, Sanford, Moxey & 
Dawydiak, 1998; Sanford & Moxey, 2003, 2004: Sanford, Moxey & Paterson, 
1996]).  
Bara, Bucciarelli, and Johnson-Laird (1995) also found that adults favoured a 
not all interpretation of some when asked to choose a set that represented the 
quantifier. In addition, when asked to say what conclusion followed from a 
syllogism, the adults’ answers revealed that the majority did not consider that some 
could mean possibly all. For example, when given a syllogism of the form some A 
are B, some B are C and asked what conclusion followed, the majority of adults, 
instead of replying that there was no valid conclusion, answered some A are C, 
suggesting that they had not considered the logical interpretation of some which 
would allow the conclusion all A are C.  
However there is evidence that this issue may not be as clear cut as first 
thought. In a follow up on previous work (Newstead, 1989), Newstead (1995; 
Roberts, Newstead & Griggs, 2001) challenges the idea that interpretational errors 
manifest themselves in syllogistic reasoning. He acknowledges that people make 
interpretational errors when faced with quantifiers on simple interpretational tasks 
but feels  that “there is very little empirical evidence to support the claim that 
Gricean errors of this kind are a major determinant of syllogistic reasoning 
performance” (Newstead, 1995, p. 645). He substantiates this claim by reviewing 
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previously published data in relation to whether Gricean interpretations of 
quantifiers can account for performance in syllogistic reasoning. He extended his 
review to carry out a series of experiments to determine when Gricean errors occur. 
The tasks he set for participants involved the interpretation of quantifiers, and both 
the construction and evaluation of syllogisms. He found that in the simple 
interpretational tasks Gricean errors were common, however they became less 
common as the logical demands of the task increased, and with regards to syllogisms 
they appeared to be virtually non-existent. Newstead interpreted these results as 
indicating that an increase in task complexity leads participants to consider 
alternatives. So it would appear that whilst there is ample evidence that adults in 
reasoning tasks can and do interpret some to mean not all it is by no means certain 
that they always do so. It appears that for adults the cognitive demands of the 
reasoning task can affect the interpretation of some that is given. 
The results in the reasoning literature regarding children’s interpretation of 
some are also not clear cut, and there is evidence for both pragmatic and logical 
interpretations. Badzinski, Cantor and Hoffner (1989) examined 4- to 11-year-old 
children’s comprehension of relational quantifiers. The participants heard sentences 
relating to the activities of a group of children, such as one day after school, some of 
the children went to the park.  Seven cardboard figures of boys or girls and a board 
that was divided in two with tape were placed in front of the participants. The 
participants’ task was to place on one side of the board the number of figures they 
thought had participated in the activity, and on the other side the number of figures 
who had not. The mean number of figures chosen as having participated in the 
activity was 3.7 across the age groups, and by three of the four age groups. In 
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addition, no child from any of the age groups assigned all seven figures when the 
quantifier used in the sentence was some.  
Similarly, Neimark and Chapman (1975), investigating the interpretation that 
students from 7th grade through to college (age 13 years and upwards)  favoured for 
the quantifiers all and some, found that all and no were interpreted logically whereas 
some and some not were interpreted pragmatically. Using a mimeographed task, 
participants had to consider set relations that were described in classical 
propositional form, such as some A are B, and then encircle all the appropriate 
alternatives, which were depicted in Venn diagram form. The results revealed that as 
age increased so did the frequency with which some was interpreted according to 
logical convention.  
However in a contradictory finding, Bara et al. (1995) found that whilst 
adults did not consider the possibly all meaning of some (as was mentioned earlier) 
children appeared to do so. Children aged 9 and 10 years when asked what 
conclusion followed from some A are B, some B are C overwhelmingly replied all A 
are C, which is compatible with interpreting some to mean possibly all.  
With regards to the question of what the developmental trajectory of 
sensitivity to the scalar implicature associated with some is, the assumption that 
adults routinely make pragmatic interpretations of some seems to be quite entrenched 
in the reasoning field, even though, as we have seen, the empirical evidence for 
certain reasoning tasks does not always support this view. As for children’s 
interpretations the evidence is mixed. There is support for Noveck’s view that some 
is first treated logically before pragmatic interpretations emerge (Bara et al., 1995) 
but there is also evidence of children being pragmatic in their interpretations 
(Badzinski et al., 1989) and perhaps more importantly of children being more 
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pragmatic than adults (Neimark & Chapman, 1975). However, it must be 
remembered that the focus of these studies, and the other reasoning studies reviewed, 
was not the scalar implicature associated with some (the possible exceptions being 
Newstead [1995] and Roberts et al. [2001]), and so it is not necessarily the case that 
these results will generalise to situations were the scalar term is manipulated. To 
examine the evidence from such cases we turn to the experimental pragmatics 
literature.  
As was mentioned previously, it was Noveck’s (2001) claim that logical 
interpretations are supplanted by pragmatic interpretations that sparked the debate 
over whether children are insensitive to scalar implicatures. In support of this claim 
Noveck, using a sentence evaluation task, found that adults rejected infelicitous 
statements, such as some elephants have trunks, 57% of the time whereas 8- and 10-
year-old children did so only 11% and 15% of the time respectively.  The task 
required participants to say whether they agreed or disagreed with a set of 
statements. The statements were based on three types of information; factually 
universal information that is best described by all, such as cats have ears, factually 
existential information that is best described by some, such as dogs have spots, and 
absurd information where neither quantifier would be suitable, such as garages sing.  
Each statement was preceded by some or all, which resulted in six subgroups; true 
all, false all, absurd all, felicitous some, infelicitous some and absurd some. The 
statements that were not infelicitous acted as controls to ensure that the participants 
had a good understanding of the quantifiers. The children’s ability to deal with some 
statements that were not pragmatically infelicitous, such as some children are blonde 
and some fish are made of leaves, ruled out the possibility that the children were 
randomly choosing one interpretation over another. Instead, Noveck suggested that 
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although the children were linguistically competent, pragmatic interpretations of 
scalar terms were generally not yet available to them at these ages.  
Noveck’s (2001) claim was strengthened with the additional finding that 7- 
and 9-year-old children treated the modal term might logically. The children and a 
group of adults were shown three boxes; one was open and contained a toy parrot 
and a toy bear, one was open and contained a parrot, and one was closed. The 
participants were told that the closed box had the same contents as one of the open 
boxes. When faced with the statement there might be a parrot in the box, the 
children overwhelmingly chose to accept the statement 80% and 69% of the time 
respectively, as opposed to the adults who chose to accept it only 35% of the time. 
 Although Noveck (2001) pointed out that he wished to avoid making the 
claim “that the general capacity to infer implicatures is linked to a particular 
chronological age” (p. 184), as his was the initial study, the ages of the child 
participants and the method used have acted as benchmarks against which others 
have tested.  
The statement evaluation task has also been used with 7-year-old children in 
both English (Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth & Handley, 2004) and Italian (Guasti et 
al., 2005). The children in these studies also favoured a logical interpretation of 
some, with 66% and 87% logical response rates respectively, in tasks using 
statements based on those used by Noveck (2001). The children’s near ceiling 
responses on the control statements suggested that they generally had a good 
understanding of the quantifiers all and some, therefore their logical responses to the 
infelicitous some statements implied that they had failed to detect the implicature. 
However the adults’ logical response rates in these studies were also quite high, 65% 
and 50%, and it is difficult to imagine that the adults were unable to detect the 
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implicature. This would suggest that even if adults have the ability to detect the 
implicature it can at times go undetected. So by the same token, maybe children have 
the pragmatic ability to detect the implicature, it is just not being demonstrated with 
this methodology. 
On the other hand, studies involving a change in methodology have also 
found that children appear to be insensitive to the scalar implicature associated with 
some. Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, and Bastide (2007) found that 9-year-old 
French children agreed with a puppet’s statement some turtles are in the boxes, 91% 
of the time, when all the turtles were in boxes, compared with a 53% response rate in 
adults. Similarly, in a study involving toy horses jumping over a log, Papafragou and 
Musolino (2003) found that 5-year-old Greek children thought that a puppet had 
answered well when she said some of the horses jumped over the log when all the 
horses had. In addition these children also accepted the use of the term start in a task 
when finish would have been more appropriate, such as the little girl started making 
the puzzle, when she had been seen to finish it. It has been suggested that the failure 
to elicit a pragmatic interpretation of some may be due to the meta-linguistic 
judgement that is required in many of the studies (Pouscoulous, et al., 2007), 
however Huang and Snedeker (2005) found that 5-year-old children failed to 
calculate scalar implicatures in a study using an eye tracking paradigm to examine 
the on-line comprehension of scalar terms. In a visual world task children were 
asked to point to a character with some of a set of objects, where there were two 
possible referent points; a girl with a half share of one set of objects (e.g. socks) and 
a girl with a whole set of different objects (e.g. soccer balls). The reference points 
were semantically ambiguous for the onset of the noun (e.g. soc...) and the children 
only looked at the target after it had been lexically disambiguated, suggesting that 
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their interpretation of some was compatible with all. And in a task involving the use 
of stickers to signify the interpretation of scalar terms, Hurewitz et al. (2006) report 
that 3- and 4-year-old children were no better than chance at choosing a picture to   
represent the statement the alligator took some of the cookies. Children were just as 
likely to choose a picture showing the alligator with 4/4 cookies as they were to 
choose the picture were he had 2/4 cookies. Interestingly though, the same children 
were well above chance in choosing an exact interpretation of the number term two.         
Given these findings the conclusion might be drawn that in general children 
between 3- and 10-years-of-age do not reliably detect the implicature associated with 
some. Furthermore there is evidence of some being interpreted logically from work 
looking at how children determine which noun phrase is quantified. Smith (1980), 
whose work formed the basis for Noveck’s methodology, found that children aged 
between 4 and 7 years answered affirmatively when faced with an infelicitous 
question, such as do some birds have wings? And with regards to other scalar terms 
there is evidence that children appear insensitive to the implicature associated with 
or (Braine & Rumain, 1981; Paris, 1973), and additional evidence for the scalar term 
might (Noveck, Ho & Sera, 1996).  
However what is not always commented on is the pattern of responding by 
individual participants. Although not reported in the paper, the children in the 
Feeney et al. (2004) study were not equivocal in their responses. Thus they tended to 
be consistently pragmatic or consistently logical. Therefore although the pragmatic 
interpretations could have involved some noise, in that the children who favoured a 
logical response occasionally gave a pragmatic interpretation, 7 of the 24 children 
consistently gave a pragmatic interpretation, accounting for 28% of the data. Hence 
over a quarter of the children were in fact showing sensitivity to the scalar 
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implicature. Papafragou and Musolino (2003) and Pouscoulous et al. (2007) do not 
report the distribution of the participants’ scores, but 10% of the children in the 
Guasti et al. (2005) study and 13% of the children in Noveck (2001) study also 
consistently gave a pragmatic response. More surprisingly, 9 out of the 24 children 
(3- and 4-years-of-age) in the Hurewitz et al. (2006) study chose the partial set two 
out of three times. 
Similarly, if the nature of the distributions of the adult responses is examined 
then it reveals that adult responses to scalar terms are bi-modally distributed. Whilst 
Noveck (2001) stated that his adults were equivocal, with logical response rates of 
41%, the distribution reveals that participants tended to be consistent in their 
interpretations; two thirds of his participants tended to favour a pragmatic 
interpretation whilst the other third always gave a logical response. Guasti et al. 
(2005) also found a bi-modal distribution, with the same number of adults 
consistently accepting the infelicitous statements as rejecting them. Therefore there 
is evidence of adults not giving pragmatic interpretations and of children being able 
to detect scalar implicatures.    
There are also studies whose methodology has made them more successful in 
eliciting sensitivity to scalar implicatures in children. Guasti et al. (2005) gave 7-
year-old Italian children a Truth Value Judgement Task (TVJT) where they had to 
decide whether a puppet’s statement was a good or bad description of a scenario that 
had been acted out in front of them. They found that on 75% of occasions the 
children rejected the puppet’s infelicitous statement, some soldiers are riding a 
horse, when all the soldiers were seen riding horses. In addition, 11 of the 15 
participants consistently rejected the statement suggesting that they had detected the 
scalar implicature. It is also worth noting that the children’s response rate was not 
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significantly different from the adults’ 83% logical response rate. High sensitivity 
rates to scalar implicatures were also seen in children in a study carried out by 
Pouscoulous et al. (2007). These authors used action-based tasks involving boxes 
and tokens with 4-, 5- and 7-year-olds to investigate scalar implicature detection. 
They found that when the researcher made the request I would like some boxes to 
contain a token, when all the boxes already contained a token, the youngest 
participants removed a token from at least one of the boxes 68% of the time, whilst 
the oldest children did so 83% of the time. This high rate of pragmatic responding 
was very close to the 86% rate for the adults. 
As can be seen from the studies described above, the age of acquisition of 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures seems to vary with 4-year-old children being 
sensitive in one study (Pouscoulous et al., 2007) and 10-year-old children being 
insensitive in another (Noveck, 2001). One study that sheds some light on these 
seemingly contradictory findings is that of Feeney et al. (2004). They gave 7-year-
old children a statement evaluation task based on that used by Noveck (2001) and a 
storyboard task. The storyboard task depicted, in photographs, a girl interacting with 
a set of objects. The children’s task was to decide whether the girl gave a truthful 
response when she was asked by her mother what she had done to the objects. When 
the children heard the girl say she had interacted with some of the objects when she 
had been seen to interact with all, for example I’ve eaten some of the biscuits when 
she had eaten all, they rejected her response 79% of the time. However in the 
statement evaluation task the children rejected the infelicitous some statements only 
43% of the time. This would suggest that sensitivity to scalar implicatures may not 
be a case of all or nothing; once sensitivity begins to emerge, it may not always be 
seen. 
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So the present picture regarding the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to 
scalar implicatures in children appears to be linear, in that there is no evidence from 
the experimental pragmatics literature of children being more pragmatic than adults. 
However it must be remembered that the age groups investigated in the studies have 
tended to have a large gap between the oldest child participants and the adults. Also, 
no study has included adolescents and so it remains to be seen how sensitive this age 
group is to scalar implicatures. It is difficult to say at what age sensitivity develops. 
It does appear that once sensitivity is acquired it is not always seen, as there are also 
adults who give logical interpretations. Whether logical interpretations in adults 
represent a failure to detect the scalar implicature or the cancellation of the 
implicature is still debateable. It also appears that sensitivity to scalar implicatures, 
at least for children, is context dependent (Feeney et al., 2004). The factors that 
facilitate this detection are the subject of the next part of the review. 
1.4.2. What contexts facilitate sensitivity to the implicature associated with some? 
The role of context in the detection of scalar implicatures has received very 
little research attention, and the small number of studies that have been carried out 
have tended to have a different focus depending on whether the participants are 
adults or children. Within the adult age group the focus has tended to be on 
identifying contexts in which the scalar implicature is endorsed less often. Two 
contexts where this appears to be the case are ones which threaten the face of the 
listener, in other words the self-image a person has (Bonnefon, Feeney & 
Villejoubert, 2009), and those whereby it is enough to know that some is the case 
and knowing all adds no additional information, known as lower-bound contexts 
(Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006). With regards to children the focus has been on 
identifying contexts that facilitate their detection of scalar implicatures, and as 
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shown in section 1.4.1. factors which are often implicated include shared 
conversational background (Guasti et al., 2005), naturalistic context (Guasti et al., 
2005) and deception (Feeney et al., 2004). However, unlike the previously 
mentioned studies concerning adults detection of implicatures (Bonnefon et al. 2009; 
Breheny et al., 2006), it is still not fully understood which contexts aid facilitation in 
children and how they do so. The experimental infancy of the topic and the tendency 
for researchers to manipulate a number of variables in a single study, have not only 
made it difficult to assess the relative contribution of each contextual factor, they 
have led to claims, for example, that a shared conversational background facilitates 
sensitivity (Guasti et al., 2005) when sensitivity is not always seen in studies that 
have provided such a background (Hurewitz et al., 2006; Papafragou & Musolino, 
2003; Pouscoulous et al., 2007). 
The finding that children have difficulty detecting scalar implicatures with 
the statement evaluation task appears robust, with children in a number of studies 
giving a maybe all interpretation for some (Noveck, 2001; Feeney et al. 2004; Guasti 
et al., 2005). In addition, Feeney et al.’s (2004) finding that there was a difference in 
children’s response rates to infelicitous some between the statement evaluation and 
storyboard tasks suggests that it is the statement task itself that hinders the detection 
of scalar implicatures in children, rather than the non-availability of scalar inferences 
per se.  
Guasti et al. (2005) suggest that the source of difficulty, in relation to the 
detection of scalar implicatures in the statement evaluation task, may lie in the 
conversational background; the statement task relies on encyclopaedic knowledge 
that may not be common to both parties. According to these authors the crucial 
factors for enhancing the detection of scalar implicatures are “the availability of the 
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relevant evidence and naturalness of the situation” (p.692). Guasti and colleagues 
found that 7-year-old children had high rates of pragmatic responding when it 
involved a TVJT. This methodology typically involves two experimenters, one 
acting out short stories using props and the other playing the role of a puppet sitting 
watching alongside the participants. At the end of the story the puppet recounts what 
they think has taken place within the story (Crain & Thornton, 1998).  Guasti et al. 
modified the task so that the participants watched a video where the experimenter 
acted out stories using props whilst holding a puppet. At the end of each story the 
puppet recounted what had happened in the story, and the child’s task was to say 
whether it was a good or bad description of what had happened. For example, one 
story featured five soldiers who had to go and collect a treasure. The soldiers had a 
discussion about the merits of going by motorbike or on horseback, motorbikes were 
considered to be fast but expensive, and the decision was made that they should all 
go on horseback. Thus the scenario made the evidence needed to evaluate the under-
informative statement immediately available to the participants. This claim for the 
facilitatory role of a naturalistic context is supported by the work of Papafragou and 
Tantalou (2004), who propose that conversational contexts allow children to 
formulate felicity expectations and to derive scalar implicatures when the speaker’s 
contribution results in infelicity. However, with regards to a shared conversational 
background, insensitivity has also persisted in studies that have utilised this factor. 
As was seen in the previous section, the children in the studies of Papafragou and 
Musolino (2003) and Pouscoulous et al. (2007) had low rates of pragmatic 
responding. According to Hurewitz et al. (2006) it is not the visual scene per se but 
the nature of the discourse that accompanies the scene which determines whether or 
not implicatures are detected. Therefore whilst a shared conversational background 
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may be necessary for the detection of scalar implicatures in children, it is not 
sufficient.  
Children’s difficulties with scalar implicature detection can also be framed in 
terms of effort. According to Pouscoulous et al. (2007) children have fewer cognitive 
resources than adults, thus children fail to recognise infelicity in the statement 
evaluation task and tasks involving naturalistic contexts because the cognitive 
demands of the task are so great that they interfere with the processing of the 
implicature. They suggest that sensitivity can be facilitated if the cognitive demands 
of the task are decreased. They propose that one demanding aspect of the task is the 
required mode of response; the meta-linguistic judgement that a child usually has to 
make.  Whilst it is the case that modifying the task, so that the child performed an 
action rather than giving a verbal response, resulted in an increase in pragmatic 
responding, the children in Hurewitz et al.’s (2006)  study were at chance in their 
detection of scalar implicatures with a task that required an action for a response. In 
addition other studies have shown spontaneous implicature detection with meta-
linguistic judgements (Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005). Therefore whilst this 
type of response may be cognitively demanding it does not necessarily block scalar 
implicature detection. In addition, Pouscoulous et al. also made another two changes; 
distractor items were removed and the scalar term was changed from certains to 
quelques. These additional changes make it difficult to assess the relative 
contribution of the mode of response.  
An alternative way to look at the issue of context is to frame the difficulties 
in terms of effect; in other words what is there to be gained from drawing the 
implicature. According to Feeney et al. (2004) children do not detect the implicature 
in the statement evaluation task because there are no cognitive effects to be gained 
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from doing so, therefore they do not expend the effort required to process it. 
However in the storyboard task employed in the study, the girl’s infelicitous reply to 
her mother could be construed as evidence of an intention to deceive. For example, 
the girl’s claim that she had eaten some of the biscuits when it was shown that she 
had in fact eaten all of them could be seen as an attempt to avoid telling her mother 
that she had eaten all the biscuits, without actually lying. The authors propose that it 
is beneficial for the children to detect deception, and thus the children expend the 
required effort to process the implicature. This claim that the cognitive effects to be 
gained from the storyboards arise from the detection of deception seems plausible, as 
the detection of deception would seem to be beneficial; indeed there are claims that 
we have an evolved ability to detect cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). However, 
the relative contribution of deception to the detection of scalar implicatures is 
difficult to assess as it is confounded with another factor; the shared conversational 
background.  
So the role of context in terms of the facilitation of sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures in children is unclear. The claims of the various authors are difficult to 
assess given the number of manipulations that are carried out within the same study 
(Pouscoulous et al., 2007), other potential confounds (Feeney et al., 2004) and 
contradictory findings (Guasti et al., 2005). Clearly until systematic controlled 
studies are carried out in relation to context, the question in the title of this 
subsection will remain unanswered. However, finding out what role context plays in 
the facilitation of sensitivity to scalar implicatures is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish that the claims made by the individual studies are 
valid; that is sensitivity, or insensitivity, is due to the claimed factor. This is not easy 
to establish when a number of variables have been manipulated. Secondly knowing 
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how and why context facilitates sensitivity will aid understanding of how scalar 
implicatures are processed, and this in turn will have implications for theoretical 
accounts of scalar implicature, which are the focus of the next part of this review.  
1.4.3. Which contemporary theory best captures the processing of the scalar term 
some?  
 Within the field of experimental pragmatics there has been a debate over 
which of the contemporary theories of pragmatics, default or relevance based 
accounts, best captures scalar implicature processing. It appears that different aspects 
of the empirical data support both accounts. Part of this contradiction may be 
explained by the different assumptions that researchers have made regarding the 
nature of the process responsible for the computation of scalar implicatures. Some 
researchers see this processing as involving at most two steps (Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Noveck & Posda, 2003; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007), whilst others see it as 
involving up to three steps (Feeney et al., 2004). More research is needed not only to 
increase our understanding of the nature of the processing of scalar implicatures but 
to see whether either of the contemporary pragmatic theories can fully account for 
the empirical data.    
The debate over which theory of scalar implicature best captures how scalar 
terms are processed centres on the issue of speed, with Levinson’s (1983, 2000) 
default theory being contrasted against that of  Sperber and Wilson’s (1985/1995) 
Relevance Theory. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, Levinson’s default 
theory proposes that scalar implicatures go through automatically, and consequently 
a logical interpretation should be slower than a pragmatic interpretation as it would 
represent cancellation of the implicature. For RT the opposite is true, for contexts 
where the pragmatic interpretation is not primed. For this account, a logical response 
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represents insensitivity to the implicature and therefore this would be quicker than a 
pragmatic interpretation, which involves not only attributing to the speaker a 
meaning provided by the linguistic decoding but also attributing meaning 
construction based on the context (Noveck & Sperber, 2007). Experimental studies 
have tested the theoretical claims of Levinson, and Sperber and Wilson by analysing 
the time taken by adults to make logical and pragmatic interpretations to infelicitous 
some (Bott & Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Feeney et al, 2004; 
Noveck & Posda, 2003).  
Bott and Noveck (2004) examined the time course of scalar implicatures in a 
series of experiments where they presented categorical statements to adults which 
required a true/false judgement. They compared the time taken for participants to 
make a logical response to infelicitous some statements, such as some elephants are 
mammals, with the time taken to make a pragmatic response and found that 
pragmatic interpretations took significantly longer. They also found that the number 
of pragmatic responses to the infelicitous some statements decreased when the time 
available to make a response decreased. They concluded that the scalar inference is 
made after the logical meaning of some has been processed. Similar findings came 
from Noveck and Posda (2003) who presented participants with three different types 
of some statements; patently true, patently false and under-informative statements. In 
a between-participants analysis they found that participants who responded logically 
to the under-informative statements were faster in their response times than those 
who responded pragmatically. In addition, the logical responders were also 
significantly faster in responding correctly to the other conditions; the patently true 
and patently false items. The authors concluded that implicatures are part of a late 
arriving, effort-demanding decision process. 
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Similar conclusions come from the only study to date that has directly 
manipulated the effect of cognitive load on the processing of scalar implicatures. De 
Neys and Schaeken (2007) gave participants a sentence verification task involving 
infelicitous some statements, whilst at the same time burdening their executive 
cognitive resources with a memory task. They found fewer pragmatic interpretations 
were made when a complex dot pattern had to be memorised compared to when the 
dot pattern was simple. According to the authors the decrease in pragmatic responses 
under load indicates that detecting scalar implicatures requires the involvement of 
effortful cognitive processes. They suggest that if effort was involved in the logical 
interpretation, through the cancellation of the implicature as suggested by default 
theory, then more pragmatic interpretations would have been expected under load.  
With regards to how scalar implicatures are processed by children there are 
no reaction time or direct load manipulation studies. However, a corollary of the 
studies investigating sensitivity to scalar implicatures in children has been that if 
children have difficulties detecting the scalar implicature when adults have none, 
then scalar implicatures must require more effort than the children have at their 
disposal. According to Pouscoulous et al. (2007) if the cognitive demands of a task 
are decreased, thus minimising the amount of effort required by the children to 
process the implicature, then pragmatic response rates increase. The authors made a 
number of changes to a task where young children had a low pragmatic response 
rate. In the original task children had to make judgements about the quantity of 
animals in a box, for example some turtles are in the boxes. In the modified version 
the authors removed distracter items, changed the response from a meta-linguistic 
judgement to one that was based on an action, and changed the quantifier from 
certains to quelques. This modified version resulted in an increase in pragmatic 
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responding amongst younger children. However, even though the manipulations 
would intuitively seem to decrease the demands placed on cognitive resources, there 
was no independent measure of the effort required for each manipulation to assess its 
load factor.   
 Although the studies described above lend support to relevance based 
accounts their findings appear to rely on the assumption that a logical interpretation 
of a scalar term indicates that the scalar implicature has not been detected. This 
assumption is made explicit by Guasti et al. (2005) who comment that “adult 
subjects in the Noveck study failed to compute the implicature associated with some 
41% of the time” (p. 671), and by Katsos, Breheny and Williams (2005) who state 
that in terms of processing resources the scalar implicature is “costly and 
cancellation never occurs” (p. 1109). 
However, Feeney et al. (2004) proposed that this at-most-two step process 
was too simple. They suggested that for certain adults there was a third possible step; 
the cancellation of a scalar implicature after its computation. Like the previously 
described reaction time studies, Feeney et al. gave participants a statement 
evaluation task. However rather than comparing reaction times between logical and 
pragmatic interpretations to infelicitous some statements, which they felt was 
problematic as two different responses were involved, they compared the time taken 
to say yes to an  infelicitous some statement with the time taken to give the same 
response to a   statement containing felicitous some. They found that the response 
times differed, with participants taking significantly longer to give a logical response 
to the infelicitous statement. The authors suggested that this increase in response 
time was due to the increased processing time involved in the inhibition of the 
pragmatic implicature. They supported their argument with the finding that logical 
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responding to the infelicitous some statements was positively correlated with a 
measure of cognitive capacity; they suggested that resisting the pragmatic inference 
required effort and this was achieved by people high in cognitive resources. Thus, 
contrary to the assumptions made in other studies (Bott & Noveck, 2004; De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; Katsos et al., 2005; Noveck & Posda, 2003) a logical response is 
not necessarily indicative of a failure to detect the implicature, and both the 
processing and cancellation of the implicature appear to require effort.  
Earlier attempts to discriminate between the theories of Levinson (1983, 
2000) and Sperber and Wilson (1985/1995) rest on the assumption that one of the 
accounts must be right. However both theories appear to have some support. There is 
evidence that the processing of the implicature involves effort, in line with relevance 
based accounts. There is also evidence that the cancellation of a scalar implicature 
involves effort which is in line with default theory. However, this could also fit in 
with relevance based accounts as, contrary to Katsos et al.’s (2005) statement, RT 
does allow the cancellation of implicatures even after they have been processed, if 
expectations of relevance change during the course of comprehension (Garrett & 
Harnish, 2009; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Further experimental investigation is 
needed to test these theories to see whether either approach can adequately 
accommodate experimental findings. 
 
1.5. Summary and Overview of Experimental Work 
There is experimental evidence that in certain contexts adults and children 
differ in terms of their sensitivity to the scalar implicature associated with some, with 
adults being more sensitive than children. This has led to two assumptions; 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures develops linearly and the processing of scalar 
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implicatures is effortful. A corollary of this is that adults’ and children’s 
interpretations reflect the same processes; a logical interpretation is indicative of a 
failure to detect the scalar implicature whereas a pragmatic interpretation indicates 
sensitivity. However, our understanding of adults and children’s interpretations of 
some is far from complete and a number of issues remain unresolved. Firstly, the 
linearity of the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar terms has not been 
established, merely assumed. Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that Noveck’s 
(2001) assumption that logical interpretations are supplanted by pragmatic 
interpretations is too simplistic; an additional step may be available. Also, finding 
the same type of responding in children and adults appears not to be necessarily 
indicative of the same processing mechanisms; a logical response may reflect either 
the failure to detect a scalar implicature or the cancellation of the implicature. 
Following on from this point, although experimental evidence appears to support a 
relevance based account of scalar implicature processing, there is evidence that 
effort is implicated in both the processing of the scalar implicature and the 
cancellation of the implicature. Finally, the role of context in the facilitation of 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures remains unclear. 
 The broad aim of the experiments in this thesis is to address the outstanding 
issues outlined above. Chapter 2 describes four experiments which explore the 
developmental trajectory of sensitivity to the scalar implicature associated with some 
with three different methodologies, and in a number of age groups ranging from 
preschool children through to adults. In addition the first experiment in the chapter 
examines the universal nature of scalar terms by including the connective or. 
Chapter 3 contains two experiments that investigate the role of context in the 
facilitation of sensitivity to scalar implicatures, by examining the contribution of 
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factors, namely shared conversational background and deception, that have been 
implicated in that facilitation. The last experimental chapter, Chapter 4, investigates 
the processing of scalar terms in children and adults to see if the cost of processing a 
scalar implicature is the same for both age groups, and examines the time course of 
interpretations in relation to current pragmatic theories of scalar implicature. The 
final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 5, synthesizes the findings of the experimental 
chapters, and offers an interpretation based around the three research questions. It 
also considers the implications and limitations of the research, with suggestions for 
how future research should proceed.   
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Chapter 2 
The Development of Sensitivity to Scalar Implicatures  
2.1. Aim 
Although they do not show universal pragmatic responding, adults’ 
experimental detection of scalar implicatures is well accepted (Noveck, 2001). 
However children’s spontaneous detection of scalar implicatures has been the 
subject of some debate (Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti, et al., 2005; Hurewitz et al., 
2006; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; 
Pouscoulous et al., 2007). Also, implicit within the scalar implicature literature is the 
assumption that the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar terms is linear, 
even though no study has investigated a wide range of age groups to establish that 
this is the case. The aim of the four experiments in this chapter was to investigate the 
development of spontaneous sensitivity to scalar implicatures. 
 
2.2. Introduction  
As seen in Chapter 1, scalar implicatures have become the focus of 
experimental investigation (eg. Bott & Noveck, 2004; Feeney et al., 2004; Noveck, 
2001; Noveck & Posda, 2003; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & 
Tantalou, 2004), rather than being merely a phenomenon invoked to explain adults’ 
poor performance on reasoning tasks.  However, this work is in its experimental 
infancy, consequently empirical evidence to support claims that have been made is 
limited. Thus questions still remain regarding the development of sensitivity to 
scalar implicatures. 
Although the literature that is relevant to the aims of this chapter was 
reviewed in Chapter 1, a brief summary will now be given.  
46 
 
The literature on scalar implicature appears to be divided between studies 
which suggest that children have difficulties detecting the scalar implicature 
associated with some and those suggesting that it is possible for even young children 
to detect it.  
Studies that have found high rates of logical responding in children, and thus 
are suggestive of children having difficulty with detecting scalar implicatures, have 
tended to be those that have used a statement evaluation task (Feeney et al., 2004; 
Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001). Nevertheless, high rates of logical responding 
have also been seen in studies that could be described as scenario evaluation tasks 
(tasks where children are asked to evaluate a statement based on a scene that they 
can see) (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous et al., 2007).  However 
attention must be drawn to the rates of logical responding of adults in these studies. 
Whilst the assumption is made that adults’ are capable of detecting scalar 
implicatures their rates of logical responding vary greatly, from very low rates of 
logical responding, 8% in Papafragou and Musolino’s (2003) study, to a high rate of 
65% in Feeney et al.’s (2004) study (a rate which incidentally was not significantly 
different from that of the 7-year-old participants). Moreover, other studies have 
revealed equivocal rates of logical responding in adults (Noveck, 2001; Guasti et al., 
2005; Pouscoulous et al., 2007). This opens up the suggestion that the insensitivity 
seen in the children may not be a reflection of their pragmatic abilities per se but 
more a reflection of the impoverished pragmatic nature of the task.   
A number of studies have shown that children are not always insensitive to 
the scalar implicature associated with some. Pragmatic response rates have ranged 
from 77% in 4-year-olds (Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004), to 52% (Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003) and 75% (Pouscoulous et al., 2007) in 5-year-old children. 
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However these findings have a somewhat limited application to establishing whether 
or not children can spontaneously detect scalar implicatures; training was used in the 
Papafragou and Musolino experiment, conditions of under-informativeness were not 
set up in the Papafragou and Tantalou study, and Pouscoulous et al. investigated 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures through the production of an action rather than a 
linguistic response.  
Spontaneous sensitivity requiring a linguistic response, that is to say 
observed in the absence of training, has been seen in children in two experiments; 
the fourth experiment of Guasti et al. (2005) and the second experiment of Feeney et 
al. (2004). Both studies found rates of pragmatic responding in 7-year-olds equal to 
or greater than 75%. Unfortunately both of these studies are limited in what they 
reveal about the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar implicatures in 
children. The Guasti et al. study showed that 7-year-old children can be adult-like in 
their detection of scalar implicatures, as their 25% logical response rate did not 
significantly differ from the 17% logical response rate of the adults. However, as the 
study investigates only two age groups, this finding represents a snapshot of 
sensitivity rather than showing when sensitivity develops and how its development 
proceeds. The Feeney et al. study is important in that it appears to be the only 
within-participants experiment investigating sensitivity to the scalar implicature 
associated with some2. It revealed that 7-year-old children appeared to be insensitive 
to scalar implicatures on one task but not on another; a 57% logical response rate in 
a statement evaluation task compared to a 21% logical response rate in a storyboard 
task. This suggests that sensitivity is not an all or nothing case; once sensitivity 
emerges in children it is not always seen, which incidentally also appears to be the 
                                                 
2 Hurewitz et al. (2006) use a within-participants design to investigate sensitivity to numbers 
compared to quantifiers. 
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case for adults. Unfortunately only one age group of children was investigated in this 
study, so the criticisms that were made of the Guasti et al. study regarding 
developmental findings also apply to this study. In addition no adult data were 
collected for the Feeney et al. study so it is not known how the adults would respond 
to the storyboards. In a later experiment in the same paper, Feeney et al. found very 
high rates of logical responding in adults on a timed statement evaluation task. The 
authors’ analysis of the adults’ responses to infelicitous and felicitous some led them 
to conclude that there was a group of adults who seemed to be detecting the scalar 
implicature and then cancelling it. If this was the case and the adults were to do the 
same in the storyboard task then it is possible that a greater rate of pragmatic 
responding may be seen in children compared to the adults.  
Although the Feeney et al. (2004) study was limited in its findings, its 
methodology offers the potential to uncover the developmental trajectory of 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures. The use of two tasks in a within-participants design 
helps to establish whether sensitivity is task dependent or if it has not yet developed. 
Likewise the trajectories can be compared to see if development is the same in both 
tasks. In addition, the storyboard task sets up conditions of under-informativeness, 
which was a criticism of the Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) study. Furthermore, the 
control storyboards establish that the children have a good understanding of the 
terms all and some, and the high rates of logical responding achieved with this task 
suggest that it will be suitable for younger children. The storyboard also requires a 
meta-linguistic judgement, which allows direct comparison with the statement 
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evaluation task. Yet for all these merits, the storyboard methodology is a relatively 
untested technique3 and therefore replication of the Feeney et al. finding is required.  
 Therefore the aim of the experiments in this chapter was to investigate the 
development of spontaneous sensitivity to scalar implicatures using the statement 
evaluation task and the storyboard methodology; to establish at what age sensitivity 
is seen and whether sensitivity develops linearly. To this end the first experiment 
investigated sensitivity in two groups of children, Year 1 children (5-6-years-of age) 
and Year 4 children (8-9-years-of-age), and a group of adults. The second 
experiment expanded the previous experiment’s age range to include two adolescent 
age groups; Year 7 children (11-12-years-of-age) and Year 10 children (14-15-years-
of-age). The third experiment focused on preschool children aged 3-4-years-old, and 
the fourth experiment followed up the findings of Experiment 3 with a novel 
methodology.   
 
2.3. Experiment 1: Sensitivity to scalar implicatures in children and adults 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This first experiment followed up Feeney et al.’s (2004) results in two ways; 
it examined whether the facilitatory effect of context seen in the 7-year-old children 
extended to other age groups and it also examined whether the quantifier findings 
extended to another type of scalar term, the connective or. 
It would be expected that the findings from one scalar term would generalise 
to another as scalar terms are often considered to be homogenous in the derivation of 
their meaning, in that they have a lower-bounded literal interpretation, whilst their 
upper-bounded interpretation is arrived at by means of an implicature (Grice, 1989; 
                                                 
3 The storyboard methodology has been used to look at scalar implicatures in second language 
acquisition (Slabakova, in press) 
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Horn, 1972). Therefore for comparable tasks it might be expected that context will 
affect interpretations of some and or in a similar manner. Indeed it has been 
suggested that findings from one scalar term do generalise to another (Noveck, 
2001). However, there is work from cardinals (Huang & Snedeker, 2005; Hurewitz 
et al., 2006; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003) that suggests that children do not treat 
all scalar terms in the same way. Thus finding out whether the dissociation seen with 
some is seen with or would help resolve this debate. Before describing the aims of 
the study and the experiment itself, a brief explanation of the different interpretations 
of or will be given, followed by a summary of the findings on or from the literatures 
on experimental pragmatics and reasoning. 
Logical and pragmatic interpretations of the connective or    
 Logically, or is defined as a truth functional connective that links two 
disjuncts. Or is taken to be logically true if at least one of the disjuncts is true. Thus 
it is considered true if both disjuncts are true, and so, is compatible with and. For 
example, it is commonly understood that the statement, the applicant should have a 
degree or five years experience, does not rule out someone applying who satisfies 
both requirements. However in natural language or tends to be seen as offering an 
alternative between two disjuncts. For example the statement, we will go to the 
cinema or the zoo, suggests that one or other of the attractions will be visited, but not 
both; if both attractions are to be visited then it would be expected that the stronger 
term and would have been used. The difference in meaning for or can be made 
distinct by preceding the connective with the terms inclusive, meaning maybe both, 
or exclusive, meaning not both. The difference between the two definitions can be 
seen in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Truth table for the connective or 
Proposition 
P Q 
Inclusive Or Exclusive Or 
True True True False 
True False True True 
False True True True 
False False False False 
  
As can be seen from Table 2.1 the only distinction between the two forms of or is 
the truth value for the proposition where both disjuncts are true; this proposition is 
true for inclusive or, but false for exclusive or (for a review of the debate over 
whether the two interpretations of or constitute two semantically different terms see 
Jennings, 1994; and Simons, 2000).  
 Children’s and adults’ sensitivity to the implicature associated with or  
With regards to the development of sensitivity to the implicature associated 
with or, the findings from both children and adults are mixed.  
In the literature on experimental pragmatics high inclusive/logical response 
rates have tended to suggest that both children and adults are insensitive to the 
implicature associated with or (Chierchia et al., 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & 
Thornton, 1998; Chierchia et al., 2004; Gualmini, Crain & Meroni, 2000; Gualmini, 
Meroni & Crain, 2001). For example, Chierchia et al. (2004) found that 5-year-old 
children overwhelmingly allowed both disjuncts to be true when it involved making 
a bet on the outcome of a story. When faced with a situation where a puppet said I 
bet that Batman will take a cake or an apple, the children honoured the bet 95% of 
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the time when Batman was seen to take both. The adults also honoured the bet the 
majority of the time, with a compliance rate of 60%. Similarly Chierchia et al. 
(2001) found that the statement every dwarf who chose a banana or a strawberry 
received a jewel was accepted by children 92% of the time, when it was the case that 
dwarves who received the jewel had chosen both. The adults displayed an even 
higher acceptance rate of 95%. However, there is evidence from other studies for 
universal pragmatic responding in adults. When Chierchia et al. (2001) changed the 
scenario and statement to every boy chose a skateboard or a bike, the adults always 
considered this to be false when both items were chosen. The children’s logical 
response rate in this study also dropped to 50%.   
One problem with interpreting the results of this literature, is that or is quite 
often in the scope of other logical operators, such as the quantifier every (Chierchia 
et al., 2001), the conditional if (Chierchia et al., 2004; Gualmini et al., 2000) and the 
modal can (Gualmini et al., 2001). It is unclear what effect these other logical 
operators have on the detection of a scalar implicature as some researchers propose 
that linguistic structure alone is responsible for the interpretation of the connective 
(Cherchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001), whilst others have investigated 
extralinguistic factors, such as the effect of predicting an outcome that involves a 
wager (Chierchia et al., 1998; Chierchia et al., 2004). 
Findings in the reasoning literature have led researchers to suggest that adults 
do not necessarily favour a pragmatic interpretation of or, unlike the work on some, 
with high rates of inclusive responding being found (Braine & Rumain, 1981; Evans 
& Newstead, 1980; Paris, 1973; Winer, 1990). For example, Evans and Newstead 
found that the majority of adults considered the proposition either the letter is an A 
or the number is a 3 to be true when it was followed by the letter/number pair A3. 
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Similarly, adults in the Paris study who were asked to decide whether a spoken 
description, such as the bird is in the nest or the shoe is on the foot, matched an 
accompanying slide presentation, considered the statement to be true 75% of the 
time when both items were present. In addition the children in this study also 
appeared to favour an inclusive interpretation, with the majority considering the 
statement to be true if both items were present. Logical response rates ranged from 
97% in 7-year-olds to 75% in 16-year-olds.  
The Paris (1973) study also highlights an important point when considering 
inclusive/exclusive interpretations of or, that of considering the whole truth table. 
Regardless of which interpretation is given to or, the connective should be accepted 
as true when one of the disjuncts is true. A closer look at the truth table in the study 
reveals that errors are made on those propositions that involve mixed forms 
(true/false and false /true) and vary from 70% for 7-year-old children to 24% for 
college students. This acceptance of or as true when both disjuncts are true, but false 
when one disjunct is false, suggests the participants are interpreting or as 
conjunction. 
 The tendency to interpret or as conjunction has also been found in research 
that has used a different methodology to that used by Paris (1973). For example, 
Suppes and Feldman (1971) asked children between the ages of 4 and 6 years to give 
me the things that are green or square, and found that children offered green squares 
47% of the time, which was the majority response rate. Interestingly this response 
rate was far greater than that of where either the green items were offered (25%), or 
where the square items were offered (6%); both being indicative of an exclusive 
interpretation. The inclusive interpretation of or, offering all the green things and all 
the square things as well as the green squares, had only a 3% response rate. In 
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another example Neimark and colleagues (Nitta & Nagano, 1966, cited in Neimark 
& Slotnick, 1970; Neimark & Slotnick, 1970; Neimark, 1970) investigated set 
relations, using mimeographed tasks, in 7- to 19-year-olds, and found that when 
asked to circle the sets that corresponded to the statement black or birds, the 
participants tended to circle the set that contained only black birds, rather than 
including the sets that contained black things and birds. Even though errors declined 
sharply with age, the older participants made the conjunction error a quarter of the 
time.  
However it is not just children who make conjunction errors in their 
interpretation of or. Gualmini et al. (2004) found that adults always rejected the 
statement John or Paul can lift the piano when it was shown that both were able to. 
Moreover when Evans et al. (1993) reviewed adult studies on disjunctive reasoning 
they found that when the whole truth table was considered, rather than just 
individual rates of inclusive/exclusive responses, more adults gave exclusive rather 
than inclusive interpretations.  
Experimental aims and predictions 
The aim of this experiment was three-fold; firstly to examine developmental 
trends in people’s sensitivity to scalar terms, secondly to investigate whether 
interpretations of scalar terms change in relation to context, and finally to examine 
the homogeneity of scalar terms. Given the findings of  Feeney et al. (2004), this 
experiment employed the same methodology to establish that their effect was 
reliable, to investigate whether a dissociation in context was seen in other age 
groups, namely adults and Year 1 children, and to see whether the findings from the 
scalar term some extended to the scalar term or. To accommodate this final aim a 
statement evaluation task and storyboards comparable with those used to investigate 
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some and all were devised for the connectives or and and, and were incorporated 
with the quantifier statements and storyboards.  
Four predictions were made: First, based on the dissociation in context seen 
in the Feeney et al. (2004) study it was predicted that the Year 4 children would 
show limited sensitivity to scalar implicatures in the statement evaluation task but 
significant sensitivity in the storyboard task. Following on from this, it was 
anticipated that the Year 1 children would be insensitive to scalar implicatures in the 
statement task, although it was expected that some of them would be able to detect 
the implicature in the storyboard task. Thus the second prediction was that a 
dissociation in context would be seen in the Year 1 children. With regards to the 
adults it was unclear how they would respond between contexts, given that it is 
generally accepted that they can detect scalar implicatures but don’t always do so. 
However, taking into account the assumptions about the developmental trajectory of 
sensitivity to scalar terms, the third prediction was that the adults would show the 
same or increased rates of sensitivity in both tasks compared to the children. The 
final prediction was that as scalar terms are considered to be homogenous in their 
derivation, the findings from some would generalise to or.  
2.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Seventy one people participated in the experiment. These were split into 
three age groups: twenty three Year 1 children, age range 5 years 7 months to 6 years 
6 months; twenty four Year 4 children, age range 8 years 7 months to 9 years 6 
months; and twenty four adult participants, age range 18 years to 60 years. The 
children attended a school in the North East of England and the adults were recruited 
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from users of a church hall in the same area. The head teacher gave consent for the 
children whilst the adults gave their own consent.  
Materials 
 The participants heard a list of 48 randomly ordered statements and 32 
randomly ordered storyboards. Half of the statements and storyboards contained the 
quantifiers some or all, and half contained the connectives or or and.
 Quantifier statement materials. These materials were based on the statement 
materials of Noveck (2001) and concerned three types of information; factually 
universal, factually existential and absurd. A factually universal statement is one 
where the quantifier all best describes how many of a group possess a particular 
feature, such as all elephants have trunks. A factually existential statement is one 
where the quantifier some best describes how many of a group possess a particular 
feature, such as some animals have stripes, whilst an absurd statement is one where 
neither quantifier correctly describes it, such as garages sing.  Each statement 
described a relationship between a quantifier and a noun and was presented in one of 
the following subgroups: True all statements, for example all giraffes have long 
necks; false all statements, for example all dogs have spots; felicitous some 
statements, for example some houses have a garage; infelicitous some statements, for 
example some snow is cold; absurd all statements, for example all policeman are 
made of jelly; absurd some statements, for example some peas wear shorts. These 
subgroups and examples can be seen in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2  
The quantifier subgroups, with examples, for each task in Experiment 1  
Sub Group Statements Storyboards 
True All All elephants have trunks I ate all the biscuits      
(ate 3/3 biscuits) 
False All All dogs have spots I dirtied all the 
towels                 
(dirtied 2/3 towels)  
Absurd All All garages sing  
Felicitous Some Some animals have stripes I broke some of the 
tiles                  
(broke 2/3 tiles) 
Infelicitous Some Some giraffes have long necks I picked some of the 
flowers           
(picked 3/3 flowers) 
Absurd Some Some policemen are made of jelly  
 
Each statement was presented with either all or some preceding it, although each 
participant received only one form, which resulted in two sets of materials (see 
appendix AI for statements used).  
Quantifier storyboard materials. The storyboards were taken directly from 
Feeney et al. (2004). An example of a storyboard can be seen in Figure 2.1.  
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Charlotte finds 3 sweets     She eats the first sweet 
        
She eats the second sweet     She eats the third sweet 
 
Charlotte’s Mum says, 
“Charlotte what have you done with the sweets?” 
 
Figure 2.1. An example of a quantifier storyboard used in Experiment 1. 
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Each of the storyboards contained four or five coloured photographs, depending on 
the subgroup, and depicted a theme. There were 16 themes (see appendix AII for 
themes used) each of which centred on the activities of a girl in relation to a set of 
objects she had found, such as eating sweets or picking flowers. In each storyboard a 
girl called Charlotte finds three objects and interacts with either two or three of them. 
In each case her mother asks what she had done to the objects. Charlotte replies by 
stating that she has interacted with all/some of them, such as, I‘ve eaten all/some of 
the biscuits. Participants saw each theme in one of four forms corresponding to four 
of the subgroups of the statement materials; four true all, four false all, four 
felicitous some and four infelicitous some storyboards. There were no absurd forms 
of the storyboards. The subgroups with examples can be seen in Table 2.2. Each 
storyboard was presented with either all or some appearing in Charlotte’s reply, 
although each participant received only one form, which resulted in two sets of 
materials.  
Connective statement materials. The connective statements, containing and 
or or, were designed to match four of the subgroups of the quantifier statements. 
Thus there were true and, false and, felicitous or and infelicitous or statements, but 
no absurd connective statements. The quantifier and connective statements also 
matched in that they contained the same noun, for example an elephant was 
mentioned in both sets of statement materials. An example statement for each 
subgroup can be seen in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3  
The connective subgroups, with examples, for each task for Experiment 1  
Sub Group Statements Storyboards 
True And An elephant has a trunk and 
ears 
I ate the Twix and the Kit Kat 
(ate both) 
False And A dog has a tail and an 
umbrella 
I pulled Katy’s hair and 
Beth’s hair (pulled one girl’s 
hair)  
Felicitous Or  A book has pages or a nose I cut the leg off the dog or the 
leg off the teddy (cut one) 
Infelicitous Or A giraffe has a long neck or a 
tongue 
I broke the white tile or the 
green tile (broke both) 
 
Two sets of connective statements were prepared, which can be seen in Appendix 
AI. 
  Connective storyboard materials. As was the case with the connective 
statement materials, the connective storyboards were designed to match the 
subgroups of the quantifier storyboards. Thus there were true and, false and, 
felicitous or and infelicitous or storyboards. The themes chosen for the storyboards 
also matched the themes used in the quantifier storyboards (see appendix AII for 
themes used). An example connective storyboard can be seen in Figure 2.2.  
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  Claire sees two tiles 
 
 
    
She breaks the white tile        She breaks the green tile 
 
 
 
Claire’s mum says, “Claire what have you done to the tiles?” 
 
Figure 2.2. An example of a connective storyboard used in Experiment 1. 
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In the connective storyboards a girl called Claire finds two objects and 
interacts with either one or both of them. In each case her mother asks her what she 
has done to the objects, and Clare replies that she has interacted with one and/or the 
other, for example I’ve eaten the Twix and/or the Kit Kat. Each theme had four 
subgroups, corresponding to the subgroups of the quantifier storyboards, and an 
example of each can be seen in Table 2.3. Participants saw each theme in one of the 
four subgroups. Two sets of materials were prepared.  
 Each set of connective statements was paired with a set of quantifier 
statements, which were then randomly ordered. The same was done for the 
connective and quantifier storyboards. This resulted in two sets of materials which 
were ordered and counterbalanced to produce four groups.   
Procedure 
Participants received instructions on how to complete each task immediately 
before they attempted that task. For the statement task participants were told they 
would hear a series of statements and they had to decide whether each statement was 
true or false. For the storyboard task participants were told they would see a number 
of photographs and hear accompanying text. They had to decide whether the 
response made by the child was true or false. For both tasks participants had an 
answer sheet on which to record their responses; a tick if they considered the 
statement/response to be true, a cross if they considered it to be false.  
 All of the children were tested in small groups and received their materials in 
three parts to prevent fatigue effects. The statements were presented in one sitting 
whilst the storyboards were split into two sittings with sixteen storyboards in each. 
The adults were tested either individually or in small groups and completed the tasks 
in one sitting.  
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2.3.3. Results 
Alpha levels were set at p ≤ .05 for all the inferential tests carried out in this 
and subsequent experiments. No adjustments were made for multiple comparisons4. 
The participants’ responses were coded with respect to their logical 
correctness. The correct response for the absurd statements is always false. The 
correct logical response for the true/felicitous all and and materials is true, whilst the 
correct logical response for the false/infelicitous all and and materials is false. 
However for some and or the correct logical response is always true regardless of 
truth/felicity.  
 The data from one Year 1 child was excluded from the analysis due to poor 
responding on the true all and true and storyboards.  
 Quantifier data 
 The mean scores and standard deviations for the remaining 70 participants 
according to truth, term and task can be seen in Table 2.4. Each participant scored 7 
or 8 on the absurd statements, and this result was not included in further analysis. 
                                                 
4 There are a number of procedures available to make alpha-adjustments when multiple statistical 
tests are carried out in a study; the Bonferroni correction being one of the most common. The rational 
for the use of such methods is to control for type I errors. However the use of these methods is hotly 
debated (see Matsunaga, 2007; O’Keefe, 2003; Perneger, 1998; Rothman, 1990; Tutzauer, 2003). 
Taking this debate into account, and in view of the infancy of the phenomena being studied and the 
possibility of type II errors, the decision was made to simply report test statistics, p values and effect 
sizes and discuss possible interpretations of each result.      
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Table 2.4 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the quantifier terms 
in Experiment 1  
Age Truth/felicity Term Task 
Year 1 
(n = 22) 
Year 4 
(n = 24) 
Adult 
(n= 24) 
Statements 3.86 
(0.35) 
3.88 
(0.34) 
3.88 
(0.34) 
All 
Storyboards 3.77 
(0.53) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
3.92 
(0.28) 
Statements 3.50 
(0.67) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
True/ 
Felicitous 
Some 
Storyboards 2.91 
(1.34) 
3.12 
(1.36) 
3.88 
(0.45) 
Statements 3.41 
(0.59) 
3.83 
(0.48) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
All 
Storyboards 3.68 
(0.72) 
3.67 
(0.64) 
3.88 
(0.34) 
Statements 2.68 
(1.81) 
2.63 
(1.79) 
2.17 
(1.55) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
Some 
Storyboards 0.86 
(1.39) 
0.37 
(0.71) 
1.67 
(1.81) 
Note: The maximum number of correct logical responses for each statement type was 4. 
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Statement data. Collapsing results across the age groups, there were 
significantly fewer logical responses given to the some trials (mean 6.30) than to the 
all trials (mean 7.61), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 4.79, p < .001,  
r = .40, and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 6.23) compared with the 
true/felicitous trials (mean 7.69), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 5.47, 
p < .001, r = .46. These results also held for the individual age groups, all p’s < .05, 
all r’s ≥ .31 (see appendix BI, Tables 1 & 2, for statistics for each age group). 
The number of logical responses given to each type of statement by each age 
group was analysed using Friedman tests. These analyses revealed that the effect of 
statement type for the Year 1 children was approaching significance, χ2 (3) = 7.64,   
p = .053, and was significant for the other two age groups, all p’s ≤ .001 (see 
appendix BI, Table 3, for the statistics for the individual age groups) . Follow up 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that the Year 4 and adult age groups gave 
significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some statements compared to 
any other statement type, all p’s ≤ .009, all r’s ≥ .38, whilst for the Year 1 age group 
the infelicitous some statements significantly differed only from the true all 
statements, z = 2.53, p = .011, r = .38 (see appendix BI, Table 4, for statistics for the 
comparison of each statement type for each age group). 
Storyboard data. Collapsing results across the age groups, revealed that 
significantly fewer logical responses were given to the some trials (mean 4.29) than 
to the all trials (mean 7.63), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 6.86,       
p < .001, r = .58, and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.71) compared with the 
true/felicitous trials (mean 7.20), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 6.62, 
p < .001, r = .56. These results also held for the individual age groups, all p’s < .001, 
all r’s ≥ .52 (see appendix BI, Tables 5 & 6, for statistics for each age group). 
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The number of logical responses given to each type of storyboard by each 
age group was analysed using Friedman tests and these were significant for all age 
groups, all p’s < .001 (see appendix BI, Table 7). This analysis was followed up with 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. This analysis revealed that all age groups gave 
significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some storyboards compared 
to any other storyboard type, all p’s ≤ .001, all r’s ≥ .50 (see appendix BI, Table 8, 
for statistics for the comparison of each storyboard type for each age group).  
Infelicitous some data.  The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some 
responses for both tasks can be seen in Figure 2.3. 
In the statement task, the distributions of the Year 1 and Year 4 children were 
unimodal, with the majority of children always giving a logical response, although in 
both age groups there were a number of children who always gave a pragmatic 
response. The adults, however, were much more equivocal, and their distribution 
was more evenly spread. The distributions in this task contrast sharply with the 
distributions for the infelicitous some data in the storyboard task. The distributions of 
the Year 1 and Year 4 children were once again unimodal, but the majority of 
children always gave a pragmatic response, and there were very few children who 
always gave a logical response. The adult data is also unimodal, with the majority of 
adults always giving a pragmatic response, however there were also a number of 
adults who always gave a logical response.   
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Figure 2.3. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials, according to age and 
task, in Experiment 1
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Collapsing across age groups, significantly fewer logical responses were 
given to the infelicitous some trials in the storyboard task (mean 0.97) than in the 
statement task (mean 2.49), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 5.06,       
p < .001, r = .43. The effect of task for each age group can be seen in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean number of logical responses to the infelicitous some trials, 
according to age and task, in Experiment 1. 
 
Significantly fewer logical responses were given in the storyboard task by the 
Year 1 children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.17, p ≤ .002,            
r = .48, and by the Year 4 children, z = 3.70, p < .001, r = .53, but there was no 
significant effect of task for the adults, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,     
z = 1.21, p = .226, r = .17. 
With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some trials between the age groups, there was no significant difference in the 
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statement task, Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2) = 1.63, p = .443, but the difference in the 
storyboard task was approaching significance, Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2) = 5.53,       
p = .063. Additional analysis on the storyboard finding revealed that the there was no 
difference in the number of logical responses given by the Year 1 and Year 4 
children, Mann Whitney test, U = 231, p = .381, r = .13, but the Year 4 children gave 
significantly fewer logical responses than the adults, Mann Whitney test, U = 190,   
p = .022, r = .33.   
Connective data 
The mean scores and standard deviations for the participants according to 
truth, term and task can be seen in Table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the connective 
terms in Experiment 1  
Age Truth/felicity Term Task 
Year 1 
(n = 22) 
Year 4 
(n = 24) 
Adult 
(n= 24) 
Statements 3.91 
(0.29) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
And 
Storyboards 3.91 
(0.29) 
3.75 
(0.68) 
3.96 
(0.20) 
Statements 0.00 
(0.00) 
1.58 
(1.59) 
1.13 
(1.66) 
True/   
Felicitous 
Or 
Storyboards 1.05 
(1.25) 
1.88 
(1.75) 
2.00 
(1.77) 
Statements 3.95 
(0.21) 
3.71 
(0.62) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
And 
Storyboards 3.77 
(0.53) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.92 
(0.28) 
Statements 3.41 
(0.73) 
3.12 
(1.57) 
0.92 
(1.25) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
Or 
Storyboards 1.41 
(1.47) 
2.17 
(1.83) 
0.67 
(1.27) 
Note: The maximum number of correct logical responses for each statement type was 4. 
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Statement data. Collapsing results across the age groups, significantly fewer 
logical responses were given to the or statements (mean 3.39) than to the and 
statements (mean 7.83), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 7.02,             
p < .001, r = .59, and to the true/felicitous statements (mean 4.87) compared to the 
false/infelicitous statements (mean 6.34), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, 
z = 4.36, p < .001, r = .37. These results also held for the Year 1 and Year 4 children, 
all p’s ≤ .006, all r’s ≥ .40. The difference in logical response rates between and and 
or also held for the adults, Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 4.22, p < .001, r = .61, 
however the difference in logical responding to the true/felicitous and 
false/infelicitous statements was not significant for this age group, z = 0.29, p = .774, 
r = .04 (see appendix BI, Tables 9 & 10, for statistics for each age group). 
The number of logical responses given to each type of statement by each age 
group was analysed using Friedman tests, and these were significant for each age 
group, all p’s < .001 (see appendix BI, Table 11). Follow up tests for the Year 1 
children revealed that whilst the infelicitous or statements (mean 3.41) differed from 
all other statement types, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, all p’s ≤ .008, 
all r’s ≥ .40, felicitous or statements (mean 0.00) also differed from all other 
statement types, all p’s <.001, all r’s ≥ .64. For the Year 4 children infelicitous or 
(mean 3.12) differed from true and (mean 3.96) and felicitous or (mean 1.58), whilst 
felicitous or differed from all other statement types, all p’s ≤ .001, all r’s ≥ .47. In 
the adult participants infelicitous or and felicitous or did not differ from each other,  
z = 0.36, p = .73, r = .05, but each differed from the other statement types, all p’s < 
.001, all r’s ≥ .58 (see appendix BI, Table 12, for statistics for the comparison of 
each statement type for each age group). 
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Storyboard data. Collapsing results across the age groups, revealed that 
significantly fewer logical responses were given to the or storyboards (mean 3.07) 
than to the and storyboards (mean 7.77), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,  
z = 6.90, p < .001, r = .58, but there was no difference between the false/infelicitous 
storyboards (mean 5.31) compared with the true/felicitous storyboards (5.53), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.76, p = .446, r = .06. The difference 
between or and and also held for the individual age groups, all p’s < .001, all r’s ≥ 
.53 (see appendix BI, Table 13, for statistics for each age group). There was no 
difference between the true/felicitous and false/infelicitous storyboards for the Year 
1 children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.93, p = .367, r = .14, but 
for the Year 4 children and the adults fewer logical responses were given to the 
false/infelicitous storyboards than the true/felicitous storyboards, all p’s ≤ .030, all 
r’s ≥ .31 (see appendix BI, Table 14, for statistics for each age group). 
The number of logical responses given by each age group to each type of 
storyboard was analysed using Friedman tests and these were significant for all age 
groups, all p’s < .001 (see appendix BI, Table 15, for statistics for each age group). 
Follow up tests for the Year 1 and Year 4 children revealed that the infelicitous or 
and felicitous or storyboards did not differ from each other, Year 1, z = 0.99,            
p = .321, r = .15, Year 4, z = 1.46, p = .144, r = .21, but infelicitous or and felicitous 
or each differed from the other storyboard types, all p’s ≤ .002, all r’s ≥ .45. In the 
adult participants infelicitous or had significantly fewer logical responses than all the 
other storyboard types, all p’s ≤ .003, all r’s ≥ .43, however felicitous or also had 
significantly fewer logical responses than the other storyboard types, all p’s ≤ .003, 
all r’s ≥ .43 (see appendix BI, Table 16, for statistics for the comparison of each 
storyboard subgroup for each age group). 
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Infelicitous or data 
The nature of the distributions for the infelicitous or responses in both tasks 
can be seen in Figure 2.5.  In the statement task the distributions of the Year 1 and 
Year 4 children were unimodal, with the majority of children always giving a logical 
response. The distribution of the adults was also unimodal but their majority 
response was to always be pragmatic. In the storyboard task the majority of the Year 
1 children always gave a logical response, although the remainder of the children 
were evenly distributed across the scores. The Year 4 children’s data was bimodal 
with the majority of children either always giving a logical response or never giving 
one. The adults’ distribution was similar to that of the statements task with the 
majority never giving a logical response.  
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Figure 2.5. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous or trials, according to age and task, 
in Experiment 1. 
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Collapsing across age groups, significantly fewer logical responses were 
given to the infelicitous or trials in the storyboard task (mean 1.41) than in the 
statement task (mean 2.46), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 4.29,       
p < .001, r = .36. The effect of task for each age group can be seen in Figure 2.6. 
  
         
Figure 2.6. Mean number of logical responses to the infelicitous or trials, according 
to age group and task, for Experiment 1. 
 
Significantly fewer logical responses were given in the storyboard task by the Year 1 
children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.88, p < .001, r = .58, and 
by the Year 4 children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.26, p = .024, 
r = .33, but there was no significant effect of task for the adults, Wilcoxon matched 
pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.90, p = .369, r = .13.  
With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous or 
trials between the age groups, there was a significant difference in the statement task, 
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Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2) = 27.87, p < .001, and in the storyboard task, Kruskal-
Wallis test, H(2) = 9.53, p = .009. Following up these results with Mann-Whitney 
tests revealed there was no significant difference in the number of logical responses 
given by the Year 1 compared to the Year 4 children in either the statement task,     
U = 235.00, p =.460, r = .11, or the storyboard task, U = 201.50, p = .152, r = .21, 
but the Year 4 children gave significantly more logical responses than adults in both 
tasks; statement task, U = 102.50, p < .001, r = .58, storyboard task, U = 158.00,      
p = .003, r = .42.   
2.3.4. Discussion 
Two of the predictions made at the start of the experiment were confirmed: 
The Year 4 children showed greatly increased sensitivity to the scalar implicature 
associated with some in the storyboard task and a dissociation in context was seen in 
the Year 1 children. However, the third prediction that the development of sensitivity 
to scalar implicatures would be linear was not supported as the adults had a higher 
logical response rate to the infelicitous some trials in the storyboard task compared to 
the Year 4 children. Finally, given the problems that were encountered with or, it 
was difficult to ascertain whether the findings from some generalised to or, and thus 
the fourth prediction remained untested. 
Given the difficulties participants had with the connective control statements 
(this will be expanded on shortly), the connective and quantifier results will be 
discussed separately.   
 With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some trials the Year 4 results are in keeping with the findings of Feeney et al. (2004) 
in that the 8-year-old children show sensitivity to the scalar implicature. This 
sensitivity is somewhat limited in the sentence evaluation task, with a logical 
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response rate of 66%, but nonetheless this response rate is significantly lower than 
those of the control statements. The logical response rate is also equal to that found 
by Feeney et al. and lower than those of Noveck (2001) and Guasti et al. (2005). In 
addition very high rates of pragmatic responding were seen in the storyboard task, 
with a pragmatic response rate of 91%. This is even higher than the 79% pragmatic 
response rate found by Feeney et al., suggesting that their conclusion, that children 
are capable of detecting scalar implicatures, is valid. These results indicate that these 
children are more likely to reject an infelicitous statement, such as some elephants 
have trunks, than they are a felicitous one, such as some houses have a garage. 
However, they are more likely to detect infelicity when it is part of a naturalistic 
context, such as in the storyboards, rather than in a contrived situation, such as the 
statement evaluation task. This finding also supports studies that have found high 
rates of pragmatic responding to infelicitous some using naturalistic contexts (Guasti 
et al., 2005; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Pouscoulous et al., 2007).    
The results from the Year 1 children show that when given pragmatically 
enriched materials children as young as 5-years-of-age can spontaneously detect the 
implicature associated with some, even when it requires a meta-linguistic judgement. 
Their pragmatic response rate of 77% in the storyboard task was far greater than the 
52% seen in Papafragou and Musolino’s (2003) between-participants experiment, 
and it was achieved without training. Although sensitivity to the scalar implicature 
was not significant in the statement task, the 67% logical response rate observed in 
this experiment was less than the 85% of logical responses given by the 10-year-olds 
in Noveck’s study. In addition, in this study there were six children who always 
rejected the infelicitous some statements, suggesting that for some young children 
the implicature is readily available even with pragmatically impoverished materials.  
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The adults, as expected, were equivocal in their response to the infelicitous 
some statements, with a logical response rate of 54%, which falls between the 66% 
rate reported in Feeney et al. (2004) and the 41% rate reported by Noveck (2001). 
Surprisingly the adults did not show significantly more sensitivity in the storyboard 
task. Even more unexpected was the finding that their 42% logical response rate in 
the storyboard task was significantly higher than that of the Year 4 children. This 
result goes against the assumption that children should never be more pragmatic than 
adults (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou, 2003). This finding is also difficult to explain 
with the viewpoint that a logical response is only indicative of insensitivity to the 
implicature (Noveck, 2001; Bott & Noveck, 2005; Guasti, 2005). If this is the case it 
is hard to explain why adults, who are considered to have more cognitive resources, 
should be less sensitive to the implicature than the children. The finding is best 
accounted for by Feeney et al.’s suggestion that a logical response can also represent 
the cancellation of the implicature, and it is the cancellation that requires effort. This 
point is taken up and focused on in Chapter 4.      
The results from the statement and storyboard tasks for the infelicitous or 
trials show that children are capable of detecting the implicature associated with the 
connective. Logical response rates of 35% for the Year 1 children and 54% for the 
Year 4 children in the storyboard task were significantly lower than the logical 
response rates of 79% and 78% respectively in the statement task. Thus children 
were far less likely to accept a statement such as I’ve spilt the Coco-Cola or the Irn 
Bru when they had seen that the speaker had spilled both, than they were to accept a 
statement such as the snow is cold or white.    
However consideration of the control statements reveals that the picture for 
or is not as straightforward as it was for some. As was pointed out in the introduction 
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to this experiment, when considering the interpretation people give to infelicitous or, 
the interpretation must be considered alongside the responses to the control 
statements. A high logical response rate to the infelicitous or statements combined 
with a low logical response rate to the felicitous or statements suggests that or is 
being interpreted as conjunction rather than disjunction. Regardless of whether one 
is willing to accept two true disjuncts being present, the presence of only one true 
disjunct should be accepted, thus logical response rates to felicitous or should be 
near ceiling. Unfortunately in the statement task both the Year 1 and Year 4 children 
had low rates of logical responding on the felicitous or trials, 0% and 28% 
respectively, and high rates of logical responding on the infelicitous or trials, 85% 
and 78% respectively, suggesting that conjunction was their preferred interpretation. 
However there is evidence that the errors do not reflect a simple case of interpreting 
or as conjunction. In the storyboard task both the Year 1 and Year 4 children had 
low rates of logical responding on the felicitous or and the infelicitous or trials, and 
this pattern was also seen in the adults, moreover there were significant differences 
between the logical response rates for the infelicitous or and the true and trials in 
both tasks for all the age groups.  
The floor effect, seen in the Year 1 children in the statement task, whereby 
no logical responses were given to the felicitous or trials, is particularly worrying.  
The statements were designed with the youngest participants in mind, and particular 
consideration was given to the attributes of the noun that rendered the disjunct false. 
It was important that attributes were chosen which the children would know were not 
a defining feature of the noun, so to be obviously false. For example, it is well 
known that elephants have feet and not hooves, but as hooves are the feet of other 
animals, choosing this attribute may have confused the young children.  However 
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this uncharacteristic attribute may also have been responsible for unforeseen 
problems. There were several reports from the adult participants that it was 
surprising to be asked whether an elephant has ears or socks. Instead of considering 
the nature of the disjunct the participants said they focused on the unexpected 
attribute and dismissed the sentence accordingly; it could be the case that the 
children also did this.    
It is also possible that the problems the participants had interpreting or could 
have influenced their responses to some, as both groups of children had lower than 
expected logical response rates to the felicitous some trials, 73% for the Year 1 
children and 78% for the Year 4 children. The rate for the Year 4 children seems low 
when compared to the 90% rate found by Feeney et al. (2004). Because of concerns 
that the statement methodology might not be ideal for studying the implicature 
associated with or, the remaining experiments concentrate solely on investigating the 
scalar implicature associated with some.  
 
2.4. Experiment 2: Sensitivity to scalar implicatures in Year 1, Year 4, Year 7, 
and Year 10 children and adults  
2.4.1. Introduction 
The finding from Experiment 1, that the Year 4 children were more 
pragmatic than the adults, was unexpected given the current assumptions in the 
scalar implicature literature. The main aim of this experiment was to attempt to 
replicate this finding. A secondary aim was to investigate sensitivity in two groups 
of adolescents. These two age groups, Year 7 and Year 10 children warrant attention 
for three reasons: First, investigations into scalar implicature have tended to focus on 
children under 11, therefore the developmental trajectory between this age and 
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adulthood is unknown. Second, studies comparing one group of children to a group 
of adults cannot be considered to be truly developmental. They do provide a snap 
shot of what is happening at a particular age, but unless a range of age groups are 
tested on the same task it is difficult to say how development proceeds. Finally, if it 
does turn out that children are more pragmatic than adults, then the response patterns 
of the adolescents may help to formulate an hypothesis as to why that might be the 
case, as studies involving adolescent participants have been informative for theories 
of reasoning (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; Klaczynski, 2001, 2004; Klaczynski & 
Cottrell, 2004). 
2.4.2. Method 
Participants 
One hundred and nine people participated in the experiment. These were split 
into five age groups: twenty four Year 1 children, age range 5 years 9 months to 6 
years 9 months; twenty three Year 4 children, age range 8 years 9 months to 9 years 
9 months; twenty two Year 7 children, age range 11 years 10 months to 12 years 10 
months; twenty one Year 10 children, age range 14 years 10 months to 15 years 10 
months; and nineteen adult participants, age range 20 to 55 years. The Year 1, Year 
4, and Year 7 groups were recruited from two schools in the North East of England. 
The Year 10 group was recruited from a local school and a youth group. The adult 
participants were recruited at Durham University. The head teachers gave consent 
for the children’s participation. The adults gave their own consent. 
Materials 
Participants heard a list of 24 statements and saw a series of 16 storyboards. 
The materials were identical to those used for the quantifiers all and some in 
Experiment 1 (see Appendix AI). As in Experiment 1, two sets of statement 
82 
 
materials were prepared and the statements within each set were randomly ordered. 
The same was done with the storyboard materials. There were two pairings of 
statements and storyboard materials and the order of presentation was 
counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
Participants received instructions on how to complete each task immediately 
before they attempted that task. For the statement task participants were told that 
they would hear a series of statements and they had to decide whether each was true 
or false. For the storyboard task participants were told that they would see a number 
of photographs and hear accompanying text, and they had to decide whether the 
response made by the child was true or false. For both tasks participants had an 
answer sheet on which to record their responses. All the participants were tested in 
small groups and the tasks were completed in one sitting. 
2.4.3. Results 
As in the previous experiment the participants’ responses were coded with 
respect to their logical correctness. Before the data were analysed the scores of two 
Year 1 children, one Year 4 child, four Year 10 children and two adults who all 
scored at or below chance levels in one of the true all conditions were removed. The 
mean scores and standard deviations for the remaining 100 participants according to 
term, truth, task and age can be seen in Table 2.6. Each participant scored 7 or 8 on 
the absurd statements and this result was not used in any further analysis. 
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Table 2.6.  
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) according to term, 
truth, task and age for Experiment 2.  
All 
Age Truth/ 
Felicity 
   Task 
Yr 1 
n = 22 
Yr 4 
n = 22 
Yr 7 
n = 22 
Yr 10 
n = 17 
Adult 
n = 17 
True/ 
Felicitous 
Statements 3.91 
(0.29) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.86 
(0.35) 
3.76 
(0.44) 
3.88 
(0.33) 
 Storyboards 3.95 
(0.21) 
3.86 
(0.35) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.88 
(0.33) 
3.82 
(0.39) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
Statements 3.91 
(0.29) 
3.91 
(0.29) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.94 
(0.24) 
 Storyboards 3.73 
(0.63) 
3.95 
(0.21) 
3.91 
(0.29) 
3.94 
(0.24) 
3.59 
(1.00) 
Some   
Age Truth/ 
Felicity 
   Task 
Yr 1 
n = 22 
Yr 4 
n = 22 
Yr 7 
n = 22 
Yr 10 
n = 17 
Adult 
n = 17 
True/ 
Felicitous 
Statements 3.73 
(0.46) 
3.95 
(0.21) 
3.95 
(0.21) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
 Storyboards 3.59 
(0.50) 
3.68 
(0.48) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.94 
(0.24) 
3.94 
(0.24) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
Statements 3.95 
(0.21) 
1.95 
(1.84) 
0.18 
(0.50) 
1.35 
(1.66) 
2.18 
(1.63) 
 Storyboards 0.95 
(1.36) 
0.27 
(0.55) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
1.35 
(1.84) 
1.35 
(1.62) 
Note: The maximum number of correct logical responses for each statement type was 4. 
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Statement data 
Collapsing results across the age groups, significantly fewer logical 
responses were given to the some statements (mean 5.86) than to the all statements 
(mean 7.84), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 7.17, p < .001, r = .51 
and to the false/infelicitous statements (mean 5.89) compared to the true statements 
(mean 7.81), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 7.05, p < .001, r = .50. 
These results also held for all the individual age groups, p’s < .01, r’s ≥ .49, except 
the Year 1 children, p > .05 for both cases (see appendix BII, Tables 1 & 2, for 
statistics for each age group). 
The number of logical responses given to each type of statement by each age 
group was analysed using Friedman tests, and where significant these were followed 
up with Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. This analysis revealed that except for the Year 
1 children, χ2 (3) = 5.71, p = .127, all other age groups gave significantly fewer 
logical responses to the infelicitous some statements compared to any other statement 
type, all p’s ≤ .003, all r’s ≥ .49 (see appendix BII, Tables 3 & 4, for statistics for the 
comparison of each statement type for each age group). 
Storyboard data 
Collapsing across age groups, significantly fewer logical responses were 
given to the some storyboards (mean 4.58) than to the all storyboards (mean 7.74), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test z = 8.32, p < .001, r = .59, and to the 
false/infelicitous storyboards (4.59) compared to the true/felicitous storyboards 
(mean 7.73), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 8.51, p < .001, r = .60. 
These results also held for all the individual age groups, p < .01, r ≥ .48 (see 
appendix BII, Tables 5 and 6, for statistics for each age group). 
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The number of logical responses given to each type of storyboard was 
analysed using Friedman tests and these were found to be significant for all age 
groups, all p’s < .001, all r’s ≥ .49 (see appendix BII, Table 7, for statistics for each 
age group). This analysis was followed up with Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. This 
analysis revealed that all age groups gave significantly fewer logical responses to the 
infelicitous some storyboards compared to any other storyboard type, all p’s ≤ .005, 
all r’s ≥ .48 (see appendix BII, Table 8, for statistics for the comparison of each 
storyboard type for each age group).   
Infelicitous some data 
The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data can be seen in 
Figure 2.7.  The distributions were not normal in either task for any age group. In the 
statement task two of the age groups, Year 1 and Year 7, had unimodal distributions, 
although they were polarized in their modes, whilst the other three age groups were 
bimodal. In the storyboard task all the distributions for the age groups were 
unimodal on zero. 
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Figure 2.7. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials, according to age and 
task, for Experiment 2. 
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With regards to the infelicitous some statements, the means for which can be 
seen in Figure 2.8, a Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that the number of logical 
responses significantly differed according to age, H(4) = 48.20, p < .001.  
 
 
Figure 2.8. Mean number of logical responses to the infelicitous some trials for each 
age group according to task in Experiment 2. 
 
Comparing each age group with its neighbour, Mann-Whitney tests  revealed 
that the Year 1 children gave significantly more logical responses than the Year 4 
children, U = 93, p < .001, r = .63, these Year 4 children gave significantly more 
logical responses than the Year 7 children, U = 115.5, p = .001, r = .52, but these 
Year 7 children gave significantly fewer logical responses than the Year 10 children, 
U = 107, p  = .005, r = .45, who did not differ significantly from the adults,              
U = 105.5, p = .164, r = .24. In addition, a Mann-Whitney test revealed that the 
number of logical responses given by the Year 7 children was significantly fewer 
than the number given by the adults, U = 56.5, p < .001, r = .67. 
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With regards to the infelicitous some storyboards, the means for which can 
also be seen in Figure 2.8, a Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that the number of logical 
responses differed significantly according to age, H(4) = 11.80, p = .019. Comparing 
each age group with its neighbour, Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the Year 7 and 
Year 10 groups differed from each other, U = 126.5, p = .025, r = .36 9 (see 
appendix BII, Table 9, for other age group comparison statistics). Further analysis 
also revealed that both the Year 4 children, Mann-Whitney tests, U =117.5, p = .021, 
r = .37, and the Year 7 children, U =104.5, p = .004, r = .46, gave significantly fewer 
logical responses than the adults.  
In relation to differences in responding between tasks and collapsing across 
age groups, a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test revealed that significantly 
fewer logical responses were given to the infelicitous some trials in the storyboard 
task compared with the statement task, z = 5.61, p < .001, r = .40. The effect of task 
for each age group can be seen in Figure 2.8. Significantly fewer logical responses 
were given to the infelicitous some trials in the storyboard task by the Year 1 
children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test z = 4.05, p < .001, r = .61, and by 
the Year 4 children, z = 3.23, p ≤ .001, r = .49, but there was no significant effect of 
task for the other age groups, all p’s > .05 (see appendix BII, Table 10, for statistics 
for each age group).     
The nature of the pattern of responding between the tasks is summarized in 
Table 2.7.  
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Table 2.7  
Number of participants for each pattern of responding according to age group in 
Experiment 2 
 Statement > 
Storyboard 
Statement = 
Storyboard 
Statement < 
Storyboard 
Year 1 22 2 0 
Year 4 13 8 1 
Year 7 2 17 3 
Year 10 3 11 3 
Adult 8 8 1 
Note: The column headings show the relationship between the number of logical responses 
given to the infelicitous some trials in both of the experimental conditions.   
 
As can be seen from Table 2.7 the pattern of responding was different for each age 
group; although one shared feature was that for all age groups only a minority of 
participants, if any, responded more logically to the storyboards as compared with 
the statements. Although not apparent from the table, there were different response 
patterns between the age groups for those participants who gave the same number of 
responses in both tasks. The Year 1 same responders were all logical, the Year 4 and 
Year 7 same responders were all pragmatic, whereas the Year 10 and the adult same 
responders were a mixture of logical and pragmatic responders. 
2.4.4. Discussion 
The results of the experiment attest to the reliability of the finding that 
children can be more pragmatic than adults. Not only were the Year 4 children more 
pragmatic than the adults in the storyboard task, as seen in Experiment 1, but the 
Year 7 children were more pragmatic than the adults in both tasks.  
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In the statement task logical responding dominated the Year 1 age group after 
which it declined to the point of near extinction in the Year 7 children, before re-
emerging in late adolescence and adulthood. An overall increase in pragmatic 
responding in the storyboard task obscured the differences between the age groups 
but as can be seen in Figure 2.8 the developmental trajectory in both tasks was U-
shaped. The pattern of responding in the Year 1, Year 4 and Year 7 children 
followed the current assumption that pragmatic responding increases with age 
(Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Reboul, 2008; Noveck & Sperber, 
2007; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). However the pattern of responding that 
followed from the Year 7 children through to the adults does not fit with this 
assumption and is consequently problematic. An explanation for this pattern of 
responding is given in the Chapter Discussion. 
It is also worth noting, given the ease with which the Year 7 children 
appeared to detect the scalar implicature, that the interpretations given by the adults 
did not always appear to be effortless. A number of the adults were heard to voice 
out loud which interpretation they should chose based on what they perceived to be 
the demands of the task. For instance one participant was heard to say that he 
couldn’t decide whether he should chose the interpretation that was actually true, i.e. 
that if Charlotte ate all the sweets then she had actually eaten some of them, or 
whether he should chose the interpretation that was expected in that type of dialogue, 
i.e. if someone asks what you have done you should be as informative as possible.  
The findings of this experiment are problematic for current pragmatic 
theories. Default theories (Chierchia, 2004; Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 1972, 2004; 
Levinson, 1983, 2000) suggest that for adults the detection of a scalar implicature is 
automatic whilst its cancellation is effortful. Applying the same rationale to children 
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is problematic as to do so appears to necessitate the claim that Year 1 children were 
able to cancel the implicature at a greater rate than the adults. Relevance theories 
(Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1985/1995) on the other hand propose that effort 
is involved in processing the scalar implicature. If this is the case then it is hard to 
explain why the Year 7 children have a higher pragmatic response rate compared to 
the adults. RT would also find it difficult to account for the adult participants being 
faced with a choice over which interpretation to make, as this deliberation goes 
against the principle of optimal relevance. Whether either of the two theories can 
give an adequate account of scalar implicatures will be addressed in the General 
Discussion. 
 
2.5. Experiment 3: Sensitivity to scalar implicatures in preschool children 
2.5.1. Introduction 
This experiment extended the age range of the previous experiments to 
investigate sensitivity in preschool children, to see whether 3- and 4-year-olds were 
capable of spontaneously detecting the implicature associated with some in tasks that 
required meta-linguistic judgements. Although researchers have found that training 
has been required to facilitate the detection of scalar implicatures (Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003) and others have suggested that meta-linguistic judgements may be a 
source of difficulty for young children (Pouscoulous et al., 2007), the high rates of 
pragmatic responding shown by the 6-year-old children in the storyboard condition 
of the previous experiments suggests that younger children may also show sensitivity 
in this task. Preschool children not only possess a wide repertoire of inference 
making skills before they start school (Buckley, 2003), they are also capable of, and 
able to detect, deception (Bussey, 1992; Lewis, Stanger & Sullivan, 1989; Sodian, 
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Taylor, Harris & Perner, 1991). As Feeney et al. (2004) claimed that it was the 
potentially deceptive nature of the protagonist’s utterances in the storyboards task 
that facilitated detection of the scalar implicature in children, it is possible that the 
preschool children will also be able to expend the effort necessary to process the 
implicature, in order to gain the positive cognitive effects associated with the 
detection of an attempted act of deception.  
Thus the aim of this experiment was to investigate whether spontaneous 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures in tasks requiring a meta-linguistic judgement could 
be found in children younger than had previously been tested .To this end a group of 
3- and 4-year-olds were tested with modified versions of the quantifier materials 
from Experiment 1. Given the high levels of pragmatic responding seen in the 6-
year-olds in the previous experiments of this chapter, the prediction was made that 
the preschool children would show spontaneous sensitivity in the pictureboard task, 
a task equivalent to the storyboard task of the previous experiments, but not in the 
statement task.  
2.5.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty three children, aged between 3 years and 4 years 6 months (mean age 
3 years 10 months) participated in the study. They all attended a school nursery in 
the North East of England. Consent for their participation was given by the head 
teacher. 
Materials 
The children heard a list of 24 statements and saw a series of 16 
pictureboards with an accompanying soft toy. 
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Statements. The 24 statements took the same form as those used in the 
previous experiments (see appendix AIII for the statements used). Each statement 
was presented with both all and some preceding it, although each participant 
received only one form, which resulted in two sets of materials. In each set the all 
and some statements were blocked, this was to minimise possible confusion in the 
children as to what quantifier they were judging.  The order of the quantifier blocks 
was counterbalanced which resulted in four conditions. The order of the statements 
within each block was randomized. 
Pictureboards. The 16 pictureboards were a simplified version of the 
storyboards used in the previous experiments. It was thought that the number of 
photographs and amount of text in the storyboards might be too demanding for the 
young children in terms of the amount of cognitive effort required to maintain 
concentration. To control for this the number of photographs was reduced to two. An 
additional aid to concentration involved replacing the model in the story with a soft 
toy. The soft toy was present in the testing room and the child was able to hold it 
whilst they evaluated the pictureboard. An example pictureboard is shown in Figure 
2.9.  
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Figure 2.9. Example of pictureboard used in Experiment 3. 
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As can be seen from Figure 2.9 each pictureboard contained two photographs which 
were placed back-to-back; the initial photograph showing a soft toy with three 
objects and the reverse showing the same soft toy and the result of the toy’s actions. 
There were four themes, drinking juice, spilling juice, eating sweets and eating cake. 
Each theme had four forms consistent with the true all, false all, felicitous some and 
infelicitous some trials of the storyboards in the previous experiments. 
A different toy was used in each of the pictureboards and the children saw 
each of the four forms of the pictureboards. The pictureboards were blocked 
according to the some/all response of the toy and the order of presentation of the 
blocks was counterbalanced amongst the children. 
Each set of pictureboards was paired with a set of statements, and the order 
of presentation was counterbalanced amongst the children. 
Procedure  
Immediately prior to the task commencing each child was assessed to see if 
they had an understanding of what true meant. This assessment consisted of asking 
the children a number of questions, such as, if I said you had an elephant sitting on 
your head, would that be true? All of the children, who were assessed individually, 
appeared to understand the term and gave answers of yes for a true state of affairs 
and no for untrue.  
For the statement task each child was told that they would hear a sentence 
and if they thought that the sentence was true they should say yes but if they thought 
that it was not they should say no. The researcher recorded the children’s answers. 
For the pictureboard task the pictureboards were arranged in a semicircle 
with the accompanying soft toy placed behind the pictureboard. The researcher 
introduced the child to the soft toy and told the child about a job that had been given 
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to the toy, which the child would see in the photographs. The researcher then asked 
the toy about the task it had been given and invited the child to turn the photograph 
over. The researcher then informed the child of the toy’s response and the child 
responded with a yes if they thought that the toy’s response was true and no if it was 
not; this response was recorded by the researcher. For example: 
Researcher                             
(pointing at photograph) 
Bat I gave you three bottles to mind, 
what did you do with them?  
Researcher                                         
(to child) 
Shall we look to see what Bat did 
with them? 
Child turns the pictureboard over  
Researcher  Bat says he drank some of the 
bottles. 
 
The children did not always answer spontaneously and sometimes the final sentence 
had to be repeated. 
All the children completed the tasks on an individual basis and in one sitting. 
2.5.3. Results 
As in the previous experiments the children’s responses were coded with 
respect to their logical correctness. The data from four children was removed at this 
point; two for low correct responding on the absurd statements5 and two for low 
correct responding on the false all pictureboards6.  
Examination of the remaining data revealed that the majority of responses in 
the tasks were yes/no but there was a significant difference in the type of response 
between the tasks with the children giving more yes/no responses in the statement 
                                                 
5 Low correct responding on the absurd statements could be indicative of a positive response bias. 
6 Low correct responding on the false all statements could be due to lack of experience, but on the 
pictureboards it could be indicative of failure to consider the quantifier.  
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task, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.19,  p = .001, r = .52. The 
mean percentages for the two tasks can be seen in Table 2.8.  
Table 2.8  
Type of response, expressed as a percentage, given in Experiment 3 
Task  
Type of  Response Statements Pictureboards 
Yes/No 99.0 85.5 
Other 1.0 14.5 
 
The other response category took two forms, those which could be easily interpreted 
as meaning no, such as he didn’t, and those where no interpretation was possible, 
such as where the child merely stated a numeral7. Only those responses which could 
be interpreted to mean yes/no were included in the analysis, which resulted in two 
further children being excluded as they had no score for the felicitous some trials in 
the pictureboard condition. Consequently analysis was carried out on the proportions 
of answers given for the remaining 17 children. The mean proportion of logical 
responses according to truth, term and task are shown in Table 2.9. With regards to 
the absurd statements all of the children correctly judged all of the statements to be 
false and this finding was not included in any further analysis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The vast majority of this type of response occurred in the felicitous some pictureboard condition. 
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Table 2.9  
Mean proportion (standard deviations) of logical responses, according to truth and 
term and task, for Experiment 3 
(n = 17) Statements Pictureboards 
True          
All 
.92 
(0.19) 
.97 
(0.12) 
False         
All 
.40 
(0.36) 
.96 
(0.09) 
True      
Some 
.83 
(0.26) 
.84 
(0.34) 
Infelicitous 
Some 
.86 
(0.22) 
.46 
(0.46) 
 
Statement data 
The children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the all statements 
(mean proportion .68) than to the some statements (mean proportion .88), Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.35, p = .019, r = .40 and to the 
false/infelicitous statements (mean proportion .66) than to the true/felicitous 
statements (mean proportion .90), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,             
z = 3.37, p = .001, r = .58.  
The number of logical responses given to each type of statement was 
analysed using a Friedman test, and this was significant, χ2 (3) = 20.90, p > .001. 
Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that the children gave significantly 
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fewer logical responses to the false all statements compared to any other statement 
type, all p’s ≤ .004, all r’s ≥ .50 (see appendix BIII, Table 1, for statistics for the 
comparison of each statement type).  
Pictureboard data 
The children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the some 
pictureboards (mean proportion .65) than to the all pictureboards (mean proportion 
.96), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.24, p = .001, r = .56. The 
difference in the number of logical responses to the false/infelicitous pictureboards 
(mean proportion .73) compared to the true/felicitous pictureboards (mean 
proportion .89) was approaching significance, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks 
test, z = 1.81, p = .070, r = .31. 
The number of logical responses given to each type of pictureboard was 
analysed using a Friedman test, and this was significant, χ2 (3) = 14.22, p = .003. 
Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that the children gave significantly 
fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some pictureboards when compared with 
the true all and false all pictureboards, all p’s ≤ .004, all r’s ≥ .50 and the 
comparison with the felicitous some pictureboards was approaching significance, z = 
1.82, p = .069, r = .31 (see appendix BIII, Table 2, for statistics for the comparison 
of each pictureboard type).  
Infelicitous some data 
The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data can be seen in 
Figure 2.10.  
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Figure 2.10. Distribution of participants according to the proportion of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials in Experiment 3. 
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In the statement task the distribution of children was unimodal; twelve children 
always gave a logical response and five children gave a logical response the majority 
of the time. However in the pictureboard task the distribution was bimodal; seven 
children never gave a logical response, six children always gave one and four 
children were equivocal. 
With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some trials between tasks, significantly fewer logical responses were given in the 
pictureboard task than in the statement task, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks 
test, z = 2.49,  p = .013, r = .43. Performance on neither task depended on whether it 
was attempted first or second, Mann Whitney tests, statement task, U = 35,                
p = 1.000, r = 0.00, pictureboard task, U = 28, p = .460, r = .13. 
Examination of the nature of the pattern of responding between tasks 
revealed that ten children gave more logical responses in the statement task, five 
gave the same number in both tasks, whilst only two gave more logical responses in 
the pictureboard task. 
2.5.4. Discussion 
The prediction made at the start of the experiment, that nursery children 
would show spontaneous sensitivity in the pictureboard task but not in the statement 
task was confirmed. This experiment suggests that at least some preschool children 
can spontaneously detect the implicature associated with some even when they have 
to make a meta-linguistic judgement. Although the children in this experiment 
overwhelmingly accepted the infelicitous some statements as true, the logical 
response rate in the pictureboard task dropped to under 50%. The finding also 
supports the suggestion made in the previous experiments that sensitivity is not an 
all or nothing affair; whilst sensitivity is developing it is not necessarily seen in all 
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contexts. Not one of the children showed sensitivity in the statement task, implying 
that detection is context dependent and not readily available if the context is not 
supportive. 
However, two problems were encountered with the materials:  
First, although the statement condition produced near ceiling yes/no 
responses, the false all control statements were not answered as well as anticipated. 
One reason for this could be a lack of world knowledge. As the statements task 
involves retrieval of encyclopaedic knowledge, judging a statement such as all dogs 
have spots to be false requires the retrieval of counterexamples, and finding 
counterexamples can be a difficult process for children (Beck, Robinson, Carroll & 
Apperly, 2006). The nouns used in the statements were chosen because it was 
thought that the children would be familiar with them, however it could be that the 
children possessed a limited knowledge of the nouns and this meant that a 
counterexample was difficult to find.  
Within the picture board condition the problem was one of coding; the 
children gave answers which could not always be coded easily. Problems with the 
data arose in the felicitous some condition, when the children answered two instead 
of giving a yes/no response. Although this response is correct in that it describes how 
many objects were interacted with, the fact that they did not give the answer in the 
required format meant that this data could not be used, as there was no of knowing 
whether they regarded the sentence as true or false. With regards to the difference in 
logical responses rates between the target and control pictureboards, this loss of data 
could be the reason that the difference between the infelicitous and felicitous some 
trials did not reach significance, even though there was a moderate effect size. 
Whilst this lack of significance could indicate that  the children’s understanding of 
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the term some is tenuous, interestingly these children also tended to respond 
pragmatically to the infelicitous some trials, which would suggest that whilst the 
children may not know what some means they know it does not mean all. This in 
turn suggests that the children’s rate of sensitivity was underestimated. One possible 
reason for the reduction of yes/no responses in this condition could be that the 
pictureboards are more cognitively demanding than the statements, in that they 
require the children to concentrate for a longer period of time and remember 
information. Although the condition was designed to facilitate detection it could be 
that the children lose concentration and are unsure of giving a definitive answer.  
   To overcome these problems a second experiment was designed which 
featured a condition which involved the children more directly.   
 
2.6. Experiment 4: Further investigation into sensitivity to scalar implicatures 
in preschool children 
2.6.1. Introduction  
Although the results of the previous experiment suggested that preschool 
children were able to detect scalar implicatures, the results were not as conclusive as 
one would hope for. It was suggested that one of the problems in the last experiment 
could be due to the children failing to maintain engagement with the materials. 
Given that children a few years older than the preschoolers had no problem giving 
yes/no responses in a condition requiring more concentration (Experiment 2 of this 
thesis), it was thought that a task that directly involved the children, given their 
egocentric nature (Piaget, 2001; Piaget & Inhelder, 2000), may overcome this 
problem. Bearing this in mind, one of the characteristics that the pictureboards and 
storyboards from the previous experiments in this thesis have in common is that the 
104 
 
main character could be said to be intending to deceive. Relevance Theory (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1985/1995) would predict that the cognitive gains from detecting 
deception would be worth the effort of the extra processing. If this is the case, then a 
task that involved the direct deception of the child participants may increase the 
cognitive effects to be gained from the detection of the deception and thus increase 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures in those children. To this end a new set of stimulus 
materials was introduced, consisting of a set of paper bags and their contents. It was 
predicted that the rate of logical responding to the infelicitous some trials in this new 
condition would be significantly different from the control trials.   
2.6.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty one children, aged between 3 years and 4 years 6 months (mean age 
3 years 10 months) participated in the study. They all attended a nursery in the North 
East of England. The head teacher gave consent for the children’s participation.  
Materials 
The children were tested with sixteen pictureboards and sixteen bags. 
Pictureboards. The pictureboards were the same as those used in Experiment 
3. As in that experiment they were blocked according to the some/all response of the 
toy and the order of presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced amongst the 
children. 
Bags. Each of the bags was made of brown paper and contained three objects 
of the same type, such as balls or chocolates. The bags took the same form as the 
pictureboards, regarding quantifier and felicity, through the manipulation of how 
many objects the researcher took and how many she claimed to have taken:  
true all  - researcher takes 3 objects and claims to have taken all 
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false all - researcher takes 2 objects and claims to have taken all  
felicitous some - researcher takes 2 objects and claims to have taken some 
infelicitous some - researcher takes 3 objects and claims to have taken some 
The children saw four of each form of the bags, thus there were four true all, four 
false all, four felicitous some and four infelicitous some trials. A different set of toys 
or sweets was used for each trial (see Appendix AIV for objects used).The trials 
were blocked according to the some/all claim of the researcher and block order was 
counterbalanced amongst the children.  
Each set of pictureboards was paired with a set of bags, and condition order 
was counterbalanced.  
Procedure 
As in Experiment 3 each child was assessed prior to the first task taking place 
to see if they had an understanding of what true meant. This assessment consisted of 
asking the children the same questions as in that experiment, such as  if I said you 
had an elephant sitting on your head, would that be true? All of the children, who 
were assessed individually, appeared to understand the term and gave answers of yes 
for a true state of affairs and no for untrue.   
The procedure for the pictureboard task was the same as Experiment 3. Thus 
the pictureboards were arranged in a semicircle with the accompanying soft toy 
placed behind the pictureboard. The researcher introduced the child to the soft toy 
and told them about a job that had been given to the toy, which the child would see 
in the photographs. The researcher then asked the toy about the task it had been 
given and invited the child to turn the photograph over. The researcher then 
informed the child of the toy’s response and the child responded with a yes if they 
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thought that the toy’s response was true and no if it was not; this response was 
recorded by the researcher.    
 For the bags task, each child was shown the 16 bags and told that they would 
have the opportunity to either talk about or play with the contents of each bag. After 
this interaction had taken place the researcher ensured that the child was holding all 
the items from the bag. The researcher then took either two or three items from the 
child and made a statement about the number of items taken. The child’s task was to 
decide whether the researcher’s statement was true. For example: 
Researcher      Shall we look and see what’s inside this bag? 
(Bag is handed to child) 
 Researcher   Do you know what they are?                           
 (to child) 
 Child    Bouncy balls. 
 Researcher      That’s right. Shall we bounce them? 
(The balls are bounced and the researcher engages the child in conversation 
about the colour of the balls, which one bounced the highest, etc.) 
Researcher   Would you hold the balls for me? 
(Researcher ensures that child is holding all the bouncy balls) 
Researcher   I’m going to take this bouncy ball from you. 
(Researcher takes bouncy ball from child. This step is repeated either once or 
twice) 
Researcher I’ve taken some of the bouncy balls. Is this true? 
In order to avoid fatigue the children were tested individually in two sittings, which 
were one week apart. They saw a set of sixteen pictureboards in one sitting and a set 
of sixteen bags in the other.  
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2.6.3. Results 
As in the previous experiments the children’s responses were coded with 
respect to their logical correctness. The data from one child was removed at this 
point for low correct responding on the felicitous some trials in both tasks. 
Examination of the remaining data revealed that the majority of responses in 
the tasks were yes/no but the children sometimes answered with a different response, 
as in Experiment 3. The difference in the type of response between the tasks was 
approaching significance, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 1.79,          
p = .074, r = .28, with the children giving more yes/no responses in the bag task. The 
mean number of responses for the two tasks can be seen in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10  
Type of response given in Experiment 4, expressed as a percentage  
Task  
Type of  Response Pictureboards Bags 
Yes/No 86.25 96.56 
Other 13.75 3.44 
 
The same criteria were applied to accepting those responses that could be 
interpreted to mean yes/no, as in Experiment 3, which resulted in the loss of data 
from four children as they had no score for the felicitous some trials in one of the 
tasks. Consequently analysis was carried out on the proportions of answers given for 
the remaining 16 children. The mean proportions of logical responses according to 
truth, term and task are shown in Table 2.11.  
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Table 2.11   
Mean proportion (and standard deviations) of logical responses according to truth, 
term and task for Experiment 4 
(n = 16) Pictureboards Bags 
All .98 
(0.06) 
.98 
(0.06) 
True/ 
Felicitous 
Some .81 
(0.30) 
.92 
(.16) 
All .77 
(0.34) 
.91 
(0.26) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
Some .55 
(0.43) 
.45 
(0.45) 
 
Pictureboard data 
In the pictureboard task the children gave significantly fewer logical 
responses to the some trials (mean .68) than to the all trials (mean .88), Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.02, p = .043, r = .36, and to the 
false/infelicitous trials (mean .66) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean .90), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.58, p = .010, r = .46. The number of 
logical responses given to each trial was analysed using a Friedman test, and this was 
significant, χ2 (3) = 11.92, p = .008. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed 
that the children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some 
trials when compared with the true all trials, z = 2.85, p = .004, r = .50 but not to the 
false all or the felicitous some trials, all p’s ≥ .114, all r’s ≤ .24 (see appendix BVI, 
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Table 1 for statistics for the comparison of the target and control trials for the 
pictureboard task).  
Bag data 
For the bag task the children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the 
some trials (mean .68) than to the all trials (mean .95), Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed ranks test, z = 2.74, p = .006, r = .48 and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 
.68) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean .95), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
ranks test, z = 2.99, p = .003, r = .53. The number of logical responses given to each 
trial was analysed using a Friedman test, and this was significant, χ2 (3) = 22.03,      
p > .001. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that the children gave 
significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some trials than to any other 
trial, all p’s ≤ .019, all r’s ≥ .42 (see appendix BIV, Table 2 for statistics for the 
comparison of the target and control trials for the bag task).  
Infelicitous some data    
The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data for both tasks can 
be seen in Figure 2.11. In the pictureboard task responses were evenly distributed at 
the ends and middle of the scale; five children never gave a logical response, seven 
children always, or nearly always, gave one, and four children were equivocal. 
Whilst in the bag task the distribution was bimodal with nine children never, or 
rarely, giving a logical response and seven children always, or nearly always, giving 
a logical response. The nature of the pattern of responding between tasks was that 
eight children gave more logical responses in the pictureboard task, two gave the 
same number in both tasks, whilst six gave more logical responses in the bag task. 
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Figure 2.11. Distribution of participants according to the proportion of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials for the pictureboard 
and bag tasks in Experiment 4. 
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Analysis revealed that there was no significant difference in the proportion of 
logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials between tasks, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.57, p = .569, r = .10, nor was there any 
significant difference in the proportion of logical responses to the infelicitous some 
trials based on the order in which the tasks were given, U = 28, p = .826, r = .04. 
However there was a significant practice effect, with the children giving fewer 
logical responses to the infelicitous some trials in the task that was presented second 
(mean .31), compared to the task that was presented first (mean .69), Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.28, p = .023, r = .40. Additional analysis of 
this practice effect revealed that the children gave significantly fewer logical 
responses to the infelicitous some trials than to any other trial for the task they 
received second, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, all p’s ≤ .004, all r’s ≥.51, however in 
the task they received first the infelicitous some trials only differed significantly 
from the true all trials, Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 2.39, p = .017, r = .60 (see 
appendix BIV, Table 3 for statistics showing the comparison of target trials to control 
trials for each task).  
2.6.4. Discussion 
The prediction made at the start of the experiment, that children would give 
fewer logical responses to the target trials compared to the control trials in the bag 
task was confirmed. This finding helps develop the current understanding of 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures in very young children in a number of ways. It 
shows that sensitivity can occur spontaneously, without the need for training, and 
that sensitivity can be seen in tasks that require a meta-linguistic judgement. 
Furthermore, this result was achieved in an experiment that set up conditions of 
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under-informativeness, where the children displayed a good understanding of all and 
some.  
One unexpected finding of this experiment was the effect of practice; 
regardless of which task came first the majority of children showed increased 
sensitivity on the task that they completed second. Explicit training has been shown 
to have a beneficial (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), if somewhat limited (Guasti et 
al., 2005), effect on implicature detection. However, the children in this experiment 
received no information about the goals of the task, nor any feedback on their 
responses, and there was a delay of one week between the administration of the 
tasks. Repeated testing on theory of mind tasks has been shown to improve 
experimental scores over control groups scores (Flynn, 2006) and one explanation 
put forward is that it is children’s own perception of conflicting evidence rather than 
training from adults that causes them to change their beliefs, and that time is 
essential in allowing children time to ruminate on this change (Slaughter & Gopnik, 
1996). Another possible explanation may lie with the control items. It has been 
proposed that the control items may add to the complexity of the task for children 
(Pouscoulous et al., 2007) and that a smaller difference in the number of control to 
target items may facilitate detection in adults (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007), but it 
may be the case that in these experiments the control items helped to make the 
difference between the felicitous some and infelicitous some trials more salient and 
the children are able to exploit this difference the second time around.  
 The findings of this experiment have implications for theoretical accounts of 
scalar implicature. With regards to the practice effects, both default and relevance 
based accounts can offer an explanation: For relevance theories the trials in the first 
task may have highlighted the difference between the some and all trials, and 
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between the true and false trials. The children may have been able to make use of 
this knowledge on the second task, and thus less effort may have been required to 
see infelicity in the second task. A corollary of this is that if less effort is required, it 
can result in more effect, thus the children perform more pragmatically in task two. 
For default theories, again the structured nature of the tasks may have facilitated the 
learning of the pragmatic meaning of the term, and thus enabled the children to 
perform more pragmatically in the second task. With regards to the lack of 
sensitivity that is seen in some children within each task, then again both accounts 
can offer an explanation; the default account through lack of acquisition, and 
relevance theory in terms of effort or effects. However both accounts are less 
convincing for those children who show consistent sensitivity in one task but not the 
other. If some generates a default interpretation it is not clear why it is activated in 
one context and not the other, when the pragmatic demands of the two tasks are 
ostensibly the same. Similarly, as sensitivity is seen in both tasks it suggests that the 
effect is worth the effort, and the effort is not overly demanding, so it is unclear why 
the implicature is relevant in one task but not the other.  
 
2.7. Chapter Discussion 
 The general aim of the four experiments in this chapter was to investigate the 
development of spontaneous sensitivity to scalar implicatures; that is, to establish at 
what age sensitivity is seen and whether it develops linearly. 
 The experimental findings show that children as young as 3-years-old can 
detect scalar implicatures and that the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to 
scalar implicatures is not linear, it appears to be U-shaped. These findings indicate 
that some of the current assumptions in the experimental pragmatics literature 
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regarding the development of sensitivity to scalar implicatures are incorrect; young 
children can detect scalar implicatures even when required to make a meta-linguistic 
response, and children can be more pragmatic than adults. 
 Looking at the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 in Table 2.12 the 
following picture for the individual age groups emerges.  
Table 2.12 
Types of responder, expressed as a percentage and broken down by age group, from 
the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 
Response Categories Year group 
Logical/ 
Logical 
Logical/ 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic/ 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic/ 
Logical 
Other 
Preschool 47 41   12 
Year 1 23 73   4 
Year 4  41 45  14 
Year 7   95  5 
Year 10 24  59  18 
Adult 24 24 35 5 12 
Note: In the response category the pairings show the statement context followed by the storyboard 
context. Logical ≥ 3 logical responses, Pragmatic ≤ 1 logical response, Other represents responses 
involving at least one score of 2. 
 
Preschool children are able to detect the scalar implicature but only if the 
context is supportive, thus no child is pragmatic in both tasks. The same is also true 
of the Year 1 children, although more children are able to detect the scalar 
implicature in the storyboard task compared with the previous age group. The Year 4 
children are effectively split between those who are reliant on the context to make 
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the implicature and those who can make it regardless of the task. In addition no child 
in this age group is wholly logical in the storyboard task. The Year 7 children are 
universally sensitive to the implicature regardless of context. Pragmatic responding 
regardless of context is also seen in the majority of the Year 10 children, although 
nearly a quarter of this age group respond logically across both tasks. Adult 
responses are mixed and no one type of response dominates. This age group also has 
the only case of a participant responding pragmatically in the statement task and 
logically in the storyboard task. 
 Although the U-shaped trajectory may seem surprising, U-shaped 
development is seen in a number of other fields, such as drawing (Gardner & 
Winner, 1982), face perception (Carey, 1982), maths (McNeil, 2007; Stavy, Strauss, 
Orpaz & Carmi, 1982) and language development (Ervin & Miller, 1963; 
Bowerman, 1982). In fact, such is the prominence of U-shaped development in the 
learning of the English past tense, that models of human learning (Plunkett & 
Marchman, 1993; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Westerman, 1998) are judged 
against their ability to model this phenomenon. In addition, other fields can easily 
explain the finding that children are more pragmatic than adults, even though it goes 
against current assumptions regarding scalar implicatures. In the cognitive 
developmental literature Piaget (2001; Piaget & Inhelder, 2000) proposes that logical 
thought does not emerge until adolescence, with the development of formal 
operations. These operations allow a child to move away from reasoning about 
concrete situations involving step-by-step processes, to reasoning systematically 
about all logical relations involving abstract concepts. So whilst even young children 
may appear to be capable of logical thought on tasks that involve situations that they 
are familiar with (Dias & Harris, 1988; Hawkins, Pea, Glick & Scribner, 1984; 
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Harris & Nunez, 1996), they fail on tasks which are decontextualised and require 
abstract thought (Wildman & Fletcher, 1977, Piaget & Inhelder, 2000). Similarly in 
the reasoning literature dual process theories (Evans & Over, 2004; Sloman, 1996; 
2002; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000; for recent reviews see Evans, 2003; 
Osman, 2004) suggest that there are two separate but interacting processes for 
reasoning: Heuristic processes are fast, parallel, automatic, unconscious and driven 
by context. Analytic processes are slow, conscious, controlled, constrained by 
working memory capacity and responsible for decontextualised thinking (Stanovich, 
1999), which underlies our ability to reason or decide independently of context. As 
logical thinking is cognitively demanding it is therefore more likely to be carried out 
by those who are high in cognitive resources. 
So how might sensitivity to scalar implicatures develop? Any explanation 
must be constrained by the pattern of responding that is seen within the individual 
age groups, as well as comparisons between the age groups to consider when 
particular types of response emerge and disappear. Bearing these constraints in mind, 
as well as the U-shaped trajectory, and drawing on research from literatures 
additional to experimental pragmatics, one possible explanation could be as follows: 
The detection of the scalar implicature in the two youngest age groups relies on 
context, thus pragmatic responding is possible but only if the context is supportive. 
The complete lack of pragmatic/pragmatic responders suggests that the detection of 
the implicature is not automatic for these age groups. This finding, and the finding 
that the numbers of logical/logical responders declines with age, suggests that the 
initial understanding of the scalar term some is consistent with a logical reading 
(Noveck, 2001). It is unlikely that the logical responses of these two age groups are 
due to the same processes of the logical/logical responders in the Year 10 and adult 
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age groups as there is a complete absence of this type of responder in Years 4 and 7. 
It is more likely that the preschool and Year 1 children have failed to detect the 
implicature, rather than that they have detected the scalar implicature and then 
cancelled it.  
As children get older scalar implicatures are more easily detected, evidenced 
by the increase in pragmatic responding from preschool to Year 4, although some of 
the children in the latter age group are still reliant on context. The logical responses 
in the Year 4 group only occur in the statement task suggesting that this response 
represents a failure to detect the implicature rather than the cancellation of it , for if 
the children had used logical thought to influence their interpretation then logical 
responding in the storyboard task would have been expected. However no child 
consistently gave logical responses in the storyboard task.  
By Year 7 there is no evidence of logical responding in either of the tasks. 
This universal pragmatic responding suggests that the scalar implicature is easily 
detected, so much so that it could be automatic. Logical responding re-emerges in 
Year 10 and the children are largely split into logical/logical and 
pragmatic/pragmatic responders. This re-emergence of logical responding coupled 
with the lack of effect of context within participants suggests that logical responders 
in this age group have detected the implicature and cancelled it (Feeney et al., 2004). 
The relatively small numbers of Year 10 and adult logical/logical responders 
suggests that this kind of logical thinking is not available to all (Piaget, 2001; Piaget 
& Inhelder, 2000).  
Responses in adulthood are much more varied and it is more difficult to say 
what a logical response represents in the logical/pragmatic responders. It may be that 
the adults, or at least some of the adults, have both types of response available and 
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chose an interpretation based on the task, thus a logical response could be indicative 
of cancellation of the scalar implicature. Or it could be that the task is so easy for the 
adults that minimal cognitive resources are allocated to the statement task and the 
implicature goes undetected, whereby a logical response would represent 
insensitivity to the implicature. 
To summarise, it is hypothesised that the initial interpretation of some is 
consistent with a logical reading but as age increases so does sensitivity to its scalar 
implicature. Initially context is heavily relied upon to detect the scalar implicature 
but this declines with age to the point where the implicature is so readily detected 
that pragmatic responding is universal. After this point, logical responding re-
emerges; this could be indicative of cancellation of the implicature in some 
participants, or insensitivity in others.       
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Chapter Three 
Deception Contexts and Scalar Implicatures  
3.1. Aim 
The effect of context on children’s performance in cognitive tasks is well 
documented (e.g. Cummins, 1995; Donaldson, 1978; McGriggle & Donaldson, 
1974; Girotto, Gilly, Blaye & Light, 1989; Schwartz & Goldman, 1996) but the role 
of context in the facilitation of the detection of scalar implicatures in children is 
unclear. The aim of the two experiments in this chapter was to investigate claims that 
have been made regarding how context facilitates sensitivity in children, and in 
particular Feeney et al.’s (2004) claim that deception contexts facilitate the detection 
of scalar implicatures. 
 
3.2. Introduction 
Whilst initial experimental investigations into the detection of scalar 
implicatures suggested that children were insensitive to them (Noveck, 2001; 
Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), it is now known that this is not necessarily the case. 
Children have demonstrated sensitivity to scalar implicatures in a number of studies 
(Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Pouscoulous, et al., 2007), and in Chapter 2 
of this thesis we saw sensitivity in children as young as 3-years-of-age. Three factors 
that have been implicated in facilitating this increase in sensitivity are shared 
conversational backgrounds (Guasti et al, 2005), strong discourse support (Hurewitz 
et al., 2006) and deception contexts (Feeney et al., 2004). Evidence and support for 
claims that have been made about the importance of these factors is somewhat 
limited, as was seen in Chapter 1, consequently how contexts facilitate the detection 
of scalar implicatures remains unclear. As a means of establishing the rationale for 
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the experiments in this chapter the evidence presented in Chapter 1 will be briefly 
reviewed. 
According to Guasti et al. (2005) high rates of logical responding in the 
statement evaluation task may be due to the fact that the background against which 
the scalar implicature is evaluated is not common to the researcher and participant. 
For example, in relation to the statement some bikes have wheels, a researcher may 
intend that the set to be considered is the set of fully functioning bikes. However, a 
participant may extend the set to include bikes that are broken, and if the statement is 
evaluated against this extended set then it is felicitous rather than infelicitous. Guasti 
et al. found that when they used a naturalistic context that made the relevant 
evidence immediately available, 7-year-old children appeared adult-like in their 
sensitivity rates to scalar implicatures. The authors claim that this shared background 
coupled with a naturalistic conversational context sets up informativeness 
expectations in line with Gricean principles. However, it would appear that whilst a 
shared conversational background may facilitate sensitivity to scalar implicatures it 
does not always do so, as other studies have revealed high rates of logical responding 
even in the presence of this factor (Huang & Snedeker, 2005; Hurewitz et al., 2006; 
Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous et al., 2007).  
According to Hurewitz et al. (2006), who considered work on scalar 
implicatures and studies on developmental sentence-processing (eg. Hurewitz, 
Brown-Schmidt, Thorpe, Gleitman & Trueswell, 2000; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill & 
Logrip, 1999), it is not just a shared background that children need, as children fail 
to derive inferences even when the visual scene supports such interpretations; the 
conversational discourse needs to set up informativeness expectations (eg. 
Papafragou, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004). Thus, they propose that a shared 
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conversational background is insufficient; children need strong discourse support to 
derive pragmatic inferences.  
Feeney et al. (2004) suggested that children’s insensitivity to scalar 
implicatures in the statement evaluation task may be due to lack of cognitive effects; 
there is nothing to be gained from drawing the implicature in the statement task, 
therefore children do not expend the effort required to do so. The authors claimed 
that the dissociation due to context that they found in children is due to the cognitive 
effects gained from the use of a deception context in the storyboard task. As the 
detection of an intention to deceive is beneficial, the children expend the necessary 
effort required to process the scalar implicature. This claim for the facilitatory role of 
deception contexts seems plausible given that we supposedly have an evolved ability 
to detect cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005) and this type of context has produced 
high levels of pragmatic responding in children as young as three-years-of age 
despite requiring a meta-linguistic judgement (see Pouscoulous et al., 2007, for 
comments on type of responding). However the authors provide no evidence for their 
claim, and their manipulation of context was confounded with another factor, namely 
that the storyboards also provide a shared conversational background.  
The main aim of the experiments in this chapter was to investigate Feeney et 
al.’s (2004) claim that deception contexts facilitate the detection of scalar 
implicatures. As was pointed out above, the authors provided no evidence to support 
their claim, nor do they provide a definition of deception. Deception is a multi-
faceted term meaning different things to different researchers (Hyman, 1989; Masip, 
Garrido & Herrero, 2004; Mitchell & Thompson, 1986; Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1981), thus the use of this term does not pinpoint what it is about the 
storyboard context that results in greater sensitivity to scalar implicatures. 
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Deception is often seen as synonymous with lying (Ekman, 1989; Lewis, 
1993; Masip et al. 2004). Whilst implicatures are not lies in the sense that they are 
logically true8 they are considered to be deceptive in the sense that they are under-
informative (Hopper & Bell, 1984; Vincent & Castlefranchi, 1981). Under-
informativeness though is a feature of any task that involves scalar implicatures, 
therefore it cannot be this feature that facilitates sensitivity in the storyboard task 
compared to the statement evaluation task. Feeney et al. (2004) suggest that it is the 
agent’s attempts to mislead an audience, that is Charlotte’s attempt to mislead her 
mother, which results in a greater pragmatic response rate. This suggestion seems 
plausible given that one feature of the bags task used in Experiment 4, which 
resulted in sensitivity being seen in 3-year-old children, was the deceptive 
interaction between the child and the researcher, and this feature is absent in the 
statement evaluation task.  
If sensitivity to scalar implicatures is facilitated by the attempts of an agent to 
mislead an audience, then the manipulation of this factor should result in differing 
levels of sensitivity. To this end the first experiment involved manipulating the 
presence or absence of an agent, whilst the second experiment extended the 
methodology of the first to include materials designed to manipulate the motivation 
to deceive.       
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 However see Meibauer, 2005, for a definition of lying that includes not only false assertions but true 
assertions that carry false implicatures.    
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3.3. Experiment 5: The effect of an agent in deception contexts on sensitivity to 
scalar implicatures in Year 1 and Year 4 children 
3.3.1. Introduction 
According to Feeney et al. (2004) the dissociation seen in children, between 
the statement and storyboard tasks, could be due to the cognitive effects associated 
with the detection of an attempt by an agent to deceive an audience. However, the 
tasks not only differed in terms of cognitive effects, but also in terms of shared 
conversational background. The storyboard task, unlike the statement task, makes 
the relevant evidence immediately available, and it is claimed that this feature also 
facilitates sensitivity to the implicature (Guasti et al., 2005). To investigate whether 
the attempt of an agent to deceive an audience makes an additional contribution to 
the detection of scalar implicatures, over and above that made by the shared 
conversational background, the visual component of the storyboard task was held 
constant whilst the dialogue was manipulated so as to make reference to an agent in 
one condition but not in the other. Thus, although none of the photographs included 
an agent, in one condition the dialogue made specific reference to an agent. If the 
increased sensitivity to the implicature that is seen in the storyboard task is due to an 
agent’s attempt to deceive, then such increased sensitivity (i.e. decreased logical 
responding), would be expected in the agent condition rather than the non-agent 
condition. 
3.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Fifty three children participated in the experiment. There were twenty five 
Year 1 children (age range: 5 years 6 months – 6 years 6 months; mean age: 6 years 
1 month) and twenty eight Year 4 children (age range: 8 years 6 months – 9 years 6 
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months; mean age: 9 years), all from a school in the North East of England. Consent 
for their participation was given by the head teacher. 
Materials 
The children saw 32 storyboards, with 16 storyboards in each condition. The 
storyboards were based on those used in previous experiments and contained the 
same control trials, true all, false all and felicitous some, and target trials, infelicitous 
some. The visual appearance of the storyboards was held constant, although each 
storyboard depicted a different set of objects, whilst the dialogue accompanying the 
storyboards was manipulated to make reference to an agent in one condition but not 
in the other (for the themes used for the storyboards see Appendix AV).  An example 
storyboard for each condition can be seen in Figure 3.1.  
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(A)     Charlotte finds three balloons              (A)     She pops the first balloon 
(NA)  Here are three balloons                        (NA)  The first balloon has been popped   
                                                                                                                  
      
(A)     She pops the second balloon                 (A)     She pops the third balloon 
(NA)  The second balloon has been popped   (NA)   The third balloon has been 
            popped 
 
(A) Charlotte’s mum says to Charlotte, Charlotte what have you done to the 
balloons? Charlotte says, I popped some of the balloons. 
(NA) Some of the balloons have been popped. 
 
(A) = Agent Condition    (NA) = Non-agent Condition 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of a storyboard used for each condition in Experiment 5. 
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Visual appearance. As can be seen in Figure 3.1 each storyboard contained 
four photographs. The first photograph introduced three objects, and the following 
photographs depicted an interaction with either two or three of the objects. If an 
interaction happened with only two of the objects the fourth photograph was a repeat 
of the preceding one.  
  Dialogue. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, in the agent condition the dialogue 
took the form of a story about a girl called Charlotte. In the story Charlotte finds 
three objects, she interacts with either two or three of the objects, she is then asked 
by her mum what she has done to the objects and she gives a reply. In the non-agent 
task no reference is made to any one interacting with the objects. The objects and 
what has happened to them are simply referred to and there is a final statement about 
the end state of affairs.  
One potential problem with manipulating the dialogue is that the concluding 
statement in the non-agent condition is in the passive voice, and an understanding of 
the passive voice generally occurs later than that of the active voice (Buckley, 2003), 
which is the grammatical form of the agent condition. However, research suggests 
that whilst passive sentences may be syntactically complex (Harris & Coltheart, 
1996) the children in this experiment should be able to comprehend the statements 
given their age and the construction of the passive. This is because the passive 
sentences used were both truncated (no agent present) and non-reversible (the object 
could not carry out the verb). Both of these factors have been found to facilitate 
comprehension of the passive voice in children (Bever, 1970; Buckley, 2003; Harris, 
1976; Maratsos, Kuczaj, Fox & Chalkley, 1979; Tager-Flusberg, 1993; Van der 
Lely, 1996).  In addition the use of the passive voice moves the focus of attention 
from the agent to the object (Tomasello & Brooks, 1999); this coupled with the 
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truncated form whereby no agent is mentioned could serve to enhance the 
experimental manipulation of agent and non-agent conditions.  
Each storyboard appeared with the quantifiers all and some, although each 
child received only one form. This resulted in two sets of storyboards for each 
condition. The order of presentation of the conditions, agent/non-agent, was 
counterbalanced resulting in four groups for each age group.  
Procedure 
The experiment was completed in two sittings with a gap of a week between 
each condition. The children took part in small groups and received instructions on 
how to complete the task immediately prior to attempting each task. For the agent 
condition they were told that they would hear stories about a girl called Charlotte 
who finds different objects. Their job was to decide whether the statement made by 
Charlotte, in response to her mum asking what she has done to the objects, was true 
or false. In the non-agent condition the children were told that they would see a 
series of storyboards and that in each story board there would be a collection of 
objects. Their job was to decide whether the statement made about the final state of 
affairs was true or false. The children had an answer sheet on which to record their 
answers. 
3.3.3 Results 
As in the previous experiments the children’s responses were coded with 
respect to their logical correctness. At this point the data of five Year 1 children were 
removed, four because of poor responding in the true all trials of the agent condition 
and one for the same trials in the non-agent condition, and from one Year 4 child 
because of below or at chance responding on the control trials in both conditions. 
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The mean scores and standard deviations for the remaining 47 children according to 
truth, term, condition and age can be seen in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) according to truth, 
term, condition and age for Experiment 5 
  Year 1                  
(n = 20) 
Year 4                  
(n = 27)  
  Agent  Non-agent Agent Non-agent 
True/      
Felicitous 
 
All 
 
Some 
 
3.95 
(0.22) 
3.15 
(1.14) 
3.80 
(0.52) 
3.35 
(0.93) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
3.96 
(0.19) 
False/    
Infelicitous 
All 
 
Some 
 
3.80 
(0.52) 
0.75 
(1.07) 
3.30 
(1.17) 
1.35 
(1.60) 
3.96 
(0.19) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
3.96 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Note. The maximum score for each category is 4. 
To be assured that the passive sentence construction of the non-agent 
condition had not caused comprehension difficulties, analysis was carried out on the 
number of logical responses given to the control statements between conditions. 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that there was no difference in responses rates 
for either age group, Year 1, z = 1.23, p = .207, r = .20, Year 4, z = 1.00, p = .317,    
r = .14. 
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Agent data 
In the agent condition the Year 1 children gave significantly fewer logical 
responses to the some trials (mean 3.90) than to the all trials (mean 7.76), Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 4.05, p < .001, r = .64, and to the 
false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.56) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 7.10), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.24, p = .001, r = .51. The Year 4 
children also gave significantly fewer logical responses to the some trials (mean 
4.14) than to the all trials (mean 7.96), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,     
z = 4.87, p < .001, r = .66, and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.12) compared to 
the true/felicitous trials (mean 8.00), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,        
z = 4.86, p < .001, r = .66. 
Friedman tests were used to analyse the number of logical responses given to 
the control and target trials in the agent condition by each age group. The results 
were significant for both age groups, Year 1, χ2 (3) = 44.42, p < .001, and Year 4,   
χ2 (3) = 79.58, p < .001. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that both 
groups of children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some 
trials than to any of the control trials, all p’s ≤ .001, all r’s ≥ .52 (see Appendix BIV, 
Tables 1 and 2 for statistics showing the comparison of each type of trial in the agent 
condition). 
Non-agent data 
In the non-agent condition the Year 1 children gave significantly fewer 
logical responses to the some trials (mean 4.70) than to the all trials (mean 7.10), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests, z = 3.01, p = .003, r = .48, and to the 
false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.66) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 7.16), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.43, p = .001, r = .54. The Year 4 
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children also gave significantly fewer logical responses to the some trials (mean 
4.00) than to the all trials (mean 7.96), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,     
z = 5.11, p < .001, r = .70 and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.00) compared to 
the true/felicitous trials (mean 7.96), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 
5.04, p < .001, r = .69. 
Friedman tests were used to analyse the number of logical responses given to 
the control and target trials in the agent condition by each age group. The results 
were significant for both age groups, Year 1, χ2 (3) = 21.98, p < .001, and Year 4,   
χ2 (3) = 78.16, p < .001. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that both 
groups of children gave significantly fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some 
trials than to any of the control trials, all p’s ≤ .005, all r’s ≥ .44 (see Appendix BV, 
Tables 3 and 4 for statistics showing the comparison of each type of trial in the non-
agent condition).  
Infelicitous some data    
The natures of the distributions of the infelicitous some data for both 
conditions can be seen in Figure 3.2. In the agent condition the majority of children 
in both age groups were always pragmatic; only two Year 1 children were logical 
and these were logical responders in the non-agent condition. In the non-agent 
condition the Year 4’s distribution was almost identical to that of the agent 
condition, whilst for the Year 1 children there is a shift towards an increase in logical 
and equivocal responders.  
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials for the agent and non-
agent conditions in Experiment 5. 
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Analysis of the infelicitous some data, the means of which can be seen in 
Figure 3.3, revealed that the Year 1 children gave significantly more logical 
responses in both conditions when compared with the Year 4 children, Mann-
Whitney tests, non-agent condition, U = 171, p = .008, r = .39, agent condition,       
U = 141, p < .001, r = .55. With regards to responding between conditions, the Year 
1 children gave significantly more logical responses in the non-agent condition than 
in the agent condition, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.07, p < .039,  
r = .33, but there was no significant difference for the Year 4 children, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 1.34, p = .18, r = .18.  
    
 
Figure 3.3. Mean number of logical responses to the infelicitous some trials, for the 
agent and non-agent conditions, for each age group in Experiment 5.   
 
The order in which the conditions were presented was also examined to see if 
it affected the rate of logical responding to the infelicitous some trials; the means 
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(and standard deviations) for the Year 1 children can be seen in Table 3.2 and for the 
Year 4 children in Table 3.3.   
Table 3.2 
Year 1 children’s mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for 
the infelicitous some trials, according to condition and order of presentation, for 
Experiment 5 
Condition Order 
Agent Non-agent 
Agent First 0.50 
(0.54) 
0.25 
(0.46) 
Year 1  
(n = 20) 
 
Non-agent First 0.92 
(1.31) 
2.08 
(1.68) 
 
Collapsing across conditions, the Year 1 children who received the non-agent 
condition first (mean 1.50) gave more logical responses to the infelicitous some trials 
than those children who received the agent condition first (mean 0.37) and this was 
approaching significance, Mann-Whitney test, U = 26, p = .078, r = .39. The 
medium effect size suggests that the lack of significance may be due to the small 
number of participants, rather than there being no real effect. Within conditions, 
there was no effect of order in the agent condition, Mann-Whitney test, U = 44,        
p = .732, r = .05, but there was an effect of order in the non-agent condition, with 
those children who received this condition first giving more logical responses 
compared to the children who received it second, Mann-Whitney test, U = 20,          
p = .020, r = .52.   
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Table 3.3 
Year 4 children’s mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for 
the infelicitous some trials, according to condition and order of presentation, for 
Experiment 5 
Condition Order 
Agent Non-agent 
Agent First 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Year 4    
( n = 27) 
 
Non-agent First 0.31 
(0.48) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
 
Order effects were also seen in the Year 4 children. Collapsing across conditions, the 
children who received the non-agent condition first (mean 0.39) gave significantly 
more logical responses to the infelicitous some trials than the children who received 
the agent condition first (mean 0.00), Mann Whitney test, U = 56, p = .012, r = .34. 
Within conditions, there was no effect of order in the non-agent condition, Mann 
Whitney test, U = 84, p = .299, r = .14, but there was in the agent condition with 
those children who received this task second giving more logical responses than the 
children who received it first Mann Whitney test, U = 63, p = .027, r = .42. 
The data was also analysed for practice effects.  These were seen in the Year 
1 children, with significantly more logical responding in the task that was presented 
first (mean 1.45) compared to the task that was presented second (mean 0.65), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.58, p = .010, r = .41. Practice effects 
were not observed in the Year 4 children, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, 
z = 1.34, p = .180, r = .18. 
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3.3.4. Discussion 
The prediction made at the start of the experiment, that children would show 
increased sensitivity to the scalar implicatures in the agent condition was partially 
confirmed; increased sensitivity in the agent condition was found in the Year 1 
children, but not in the Year 4 children, who had near universal pragmatic 
responding in both conditions.  
The expected difference in response rates between the conditions was not 
seen in the Year 4 children; their rate of logical responding was close to floor level. 
As the visual scene was held constant in both conditions it could be proposed that the 
shared conversational background was responsible for the high level of sensitivity to 
the scalar implicatures, rather than the deception context. However, comments made 
by the children during testing lead to an alternative explanation. The children often 
commented, I wonder who has eaten the sweets, or, I wonder who has torn the 
magazines. These comments suggest that although no-one was present in the non-
agent condition, as all the pictures depicted the results of actions, the children 
inferred the involvement of an actor. Indeed other research has shown that very 
young children can infer the involvement of a hidden causal agent, without direct 
perceptual evidence of the agent’s existence, if the context involves objects being 
acted upon (Saxe, Tenenbaum & Carey, 2005; Saxe, Tzelnic & Carey, 2007). If the 
Year 4 children did infer the involvement of an agent then this could provide an 
alternative account for the lack of difference in the response rates between the two 
conditions. 
The greater pragmatic response rate of the Year 1 children in the agent 
condition suggests that a deception context which involves an agent’s attempts to 
mislead an audience facilitates sensitivity to scalar implicatures over and above the 
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benefits gained from a shared conversational background, thus supporting Feeney et 
al.’s (2004) claim. However, it should be noted that this was not the only facilitatory 
factor for this age group; practice effects were also observed. This finding though 
does raise the question of whether an important aspect of facilitation is the 
motivation behind the agent’s attempt to deceive. It could be said that in minimising 
her involvement with the objects, Charlotte could benefit by lessening the 
consequences of her actions. In other words, if Charlotte’s mother would be angry to 
learn that all the paint pots have been knocked over, Charlotte, by implying that she 
hasn’t knocked over all of them, may escape some punishment. Indeed deception to 
avoid punishment is the most common form of deception in early childhood (Lewis, 
1993). In the non-agent condition there was nobody to benefit from the deception. 
Therefore the possibility remains that sensitivity to scalar implicatures is facilitated 
by situations where there is a benefit to the agent of being under-informative. 
Because of the floor effects found with the Year 4 children in this experiment, the 
next experiment focused on Year 1 children.       
 
3.4. Experiment 6: Further investigation into deception contexts and sensitivity 
to scalar implicatures in Year 1 children  
3.4.1. Introduction 
The previous experiment provided evidence for a facilitating effect of an 
agent in deception contexts, particularly amongst the youngest participants. An 
important question about this result is whether the motivation of the agent is a key 
aspect of this facilitation effect. In order to investigate this question, an additional set 
of storyboards was introduced. This descriptive set differed from the interactive set 
used in the previous experiment in terms of the nature of the involvement with the 
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objects. In the storyboards used in the previous experiment the objects were 
interacted with, either explicitly in the agent condition or implicitly in the non-agent 
condition. In the new set of storyboards the objects are merely described and no 
responsibility can be attached to the speaker for their current state. For example, one 
descriptive storyboard features three bags of sweets and the bags are described with 
reference to their contents. Thus Charlotte has the motivation to deceive in the 
interactive set but not in the descriptive set. It was predicted that if sensitivity is 
facilitated by the potential benefits to an agent, then there should be more pragmatic 
responding in the agent condition of the interactive set compared to the descriptive 
set. In order to replicate the effect of agency in the previous experiment, the agent 
and non-agent conditions were included for both sets of storyboards. Once again the 
rationale for this manipulation is that if sensitivity relies on the presence of an agent 
who is under-informative then more pragmatic responding might be expected in the 
agent conditions regardless of the nature of the agent’s involvement with the objects.      
3.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Fifty five children participated in the experiment (age range 5 years 8 months 
to 6 years 9 months; mean age 6 years 3 months). They were the Year 1 age groups 
from three schools in the North East of England. Consent for their participation was 
given either by the head teacher or the parents. 
 Materials 
There were two sets of storyboards; an interactive set and a descriptive set. 
The interactive storyboards were visually identical to the storyboards in the previous 
experiment. Modification was made to the dialogue to make the storyboards 
compatible with the new descriptive set. Reference to Charlotte’s mother was 
removed, so Charlotte made a statement about what she had done to the objects 
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rather than responding to her mother’s query. The new descriptive set of storyboards 
described characteristics of objects. The descriptive storyboards had the same layout 
as the interactive ones, and for each set of storyboards there were two conditions, as 
in the previous experiment, agent and non-agent. The themes used for the descriptive 
storyboards can be seen in Appendix AV, and an example of a descriptive storyboard 
with accompanying dialogue for each condition can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
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(A) Charlotte finds three bags of sweets (A) The first bag contains liquorice all   
sorts 
(NA) Here are three bags of sweets (NA) The first bag contains liquorice all   
sorts  
        
(A) The second bag contains liquorice  (A) The third bag contains liquorice   
all sorts     all sorts 
(NA) The second bag contains liquorice   (NA) The third bag contains liquorice 
all sorts                                                             all sorts 
 
(A) Charlotte says, “Some of the bags contain liquorice all sorts” 
(NA) Some of the bags contain liquorice all sorts 
 
(A) = Agent Condition    (NA) = Non-agent Condition 
Figure 3.4. Example of a descriptive storyboard for each condition in Experiment 6. 
140 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.4, in the agent condition Charlotte is still the 
focus of the dialogue, although a change has been made to the dialogue from the 
previous experiment. In this experiment she makes a statement about what she has 
done (interactive set) or what she has found (descriptive set) rather than giving a 
response to her mother’s query. In the non-agent condition the interaction or 
characteristics of the objects are described and a final statement is made about the 
objects.  
Each child saw one set of storyboards, either the interactive or descriptive 
set, with the agent and non-agent conditions. There were sixteen storyboards in each 
condition of which twelve were control trials, true all, false all and felicitous some 
and four were the infelicitous some target trials. The order of presentation of the 
agent and non-agent conditions was counterbalanced, this resulted in eight groups.  
Procedure 
The children took part in small groups and received instructions on how to 
complete each task immediately prior to the task taking place. For the agent 
condition they were told that they would hear stories about a little girl called 
Charlotte who finds different objects. Their task was to decide whether the statement 
made by Charlotte at the end of the story about what she had done, was true or false. 
In the non-agent condition the children were told that they would see a series of 
storyboards and that in each story board there would be a collection of objects. Their 
job was to decide whether the statement made about the final state of affairs was true 
or false. The children had an answer sheet on which to record their answers. The 
tasks were completed in two sittings with a gap of two weeks between each.                                       
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3.4.3. Results 
As in the previous experiments the responses of the children were coded 
according to their logical correctness. At this point the data from seven children were 
removed because of their poor performance on the control trials in both conditions. 
The mean scores and standard deviations for the remaining 48 participants according 
to truth, term, set and condition can be seen in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4  
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) according to truth, 
term, set and condition for Experiment 6 
  Interactive 
(n = 22) 
Descriptive 
(n = 26) 
  Agent Non-agent Agent Non-agent 
True/ 
Felicitous 
All 
 
Some 
 
3.86 
(0.35) 
3.59 
(0.91) 
3.82 
(0.50) 
3.09 
(1.19) 
3.77 
(0.43) 
3.12 
(1.42) 
3.65 
(0.56) 
3.12 
(1.11) 
False/ 
Infelicitous 
All 
 
Some 
 
3.73 
(0.55) 
0.64 
(1.00) 
3.73 
(0.46) 
1.05 
(1.21) 
3.73 
(0.53) 
2.35 
(1.60) 
3.58 
(0.90) 
2.58 
(1.60) 
Note. The maximum score for each category is 4. 
Interactive set data 
In the agent condition of the interactive set of storyboards fewer logical 
responses were given to the some trials (mean 4.23) compared to the all trials (mean 
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7.59), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 4.11, p < .001, r = .62, and to 
false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.36) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 7.45), 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 4.04, p < .001, r = .61. In the non-
agent condition fewer logical responses were also given to the some trials (mean 
4.14) compared to the all trials (mean 7.55), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks 
test, z = 4.20, p < .001, r = .63, and to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 4.77) 
compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 6.91), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
ranks test z = 3.28, p = .001, r = .50. Friedman tests were used to analyse the number 
of logical responses given to the control and target trials for both conditions and 
these were significant, agent χ2 (3) = 46.68, p < .001, and non-agent χ2 (3) = 43.10,  
p < .001. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that significantly fewer 
logical responses were given to the infelicitous some trials than any of the control 
trials in both conditions, all p’s ≤ .001, all r’s ≥ .50 (see Appendix BVI, Table 1 for 
statistics showing the comparison of target trials with control trials for both 
conditions) 
Descriptive set data  
In the agent condition of the descriptive set of storyboards fewer logical 
responses were given to the some trials (mean 5.46) compared to the all trials (mean 
7.50), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 3.84, p < .001, r = .53, but not 
to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 6.08) compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 
6.88), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 1.44, p = .150, r = .20. In the 
non-agent condition fewer logical responses were also given to the some trials (mean 
5.69) than to the all trials (mean 7.23), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,     
z = 3.13, p =.002, r = .43, but not to the false/infelicitous trials (mean 6.15) 
compared to the true/felicitous trials (mean 6.77), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
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ranks test, z = 1.28, p =.201, r = .18. Friedman tests were used to analyse the number 
of logical responses given to the control and target trials for both conditions and 
these were significant, agent χ2 (3) = 15.30, p = .002, and non-agent χ2 (3) = 7.89,    
p = .048. Follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that significantly fewer 
logical responses were given in both conditions to the infelicitous some trials when 
compared to the true all and false all trials, all p’s ≤ .017, all r’s ≥ .33 but not to the 
felicitous some trials, all p’s ≥ .132, all r’s ≤ .21 (see Appendix BV, Table 2 for 
statistics showing the comparison of target trials with control trials for both 
conditions). 
Infelicitous some data  
The distribution of the infelicitous some data in the interactive set for both 
conditions, which can be seen in Figure 3.5, is unimodal; the majority response in 
both conditions is to always be pragmatic. With regards to the pattern of responding 
between conditions, ten of the children were consistent in their responses, which 
tended to be pragmatic, eight were more logical in the non-agent condition compared 
to the agent condition, whilst four were more logical in the agent condition 
compared to the non-agent condition.  
A different distribution and pattern of responding can be seen in Figure 3.5 
for the descriptive set of storyboards. Although the distributions are again unimodal, 
the majority response is to always be logical. As to the pattern of responding 
between conditions; ten children were more logical in the non-agent condition 
compared to the agent condition, four were more logical in the agent condition 
compared to the non-agent condition, whilst twelve children were consistent between 
conditions. Of these twelve consistent responders only three were pragmatic 
responders.  
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                                     Interactive Set 
  Agent Condition                                       Non-agent Condition 
 
 Number of logical responses to the infelicitous some trials 
                                                   
Descriptive Set 
               Agent Condition                                      Non-agent Condition 
  
 Number of logical responses to the infelicitous some trials 
 
Figure 3.5. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses 
given to the infelicitous some trials in both conditions and for both sets of 
storyboards in Experiment 6. 
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With regards to responses to the infelicitous some trials between sets, 
significantly more logical responses were given to the descriptive set for both the 
agent, Mann Whitney test, U = 122.5, p < .001, r = .50, and non-agent conditions, 
Mann Whitney test, U = 131.5, p = .001, r = .48. However within each set there was 
no significant difference between the number of logical responses given to the agent 
and non-agent conditions, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests, interactive set,  
z = 1.45, p = .147, r = .22, descriptive set, z = 0.89, p = .373, r = .12.  
The order in which the conditions were presented was also examined to see if 
it affected the rate of logical responding to the infelicitous some trials; the means 
(and standard deviations) for the interactive set of storyboards can be seen in Table 
3.5 and for the descriptive set in Table 3.6.   
Table 3.5 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the infelicitous 
some statements of the interactive set of storyboards, according to condition and 
order of presentation, for Experiment 6 
Condition Order 
Agent Non-agent 
Agent First 0.62 
(1.19) 
0.46 
(0.78) 
Interactive  
(n = 22) 
 
Non-agent First 0.67 
(0.71) 
1.89 
(1.30) 
 
Collapsing across conditions in the interactive set of storyboards revealed 
that significantly more logical responses were given to the infelicitous some trials by 
the children who received the non-agent condition first (mean 2.56) than those who 
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received the agent condition first (mean 1.08), Mann-Whitney test, U = 29.00,          
p = .042, r = .43. Within conditions, there was no effect of order in the agent 
condition, Mann-Whitney test, U = 47.50, p = .404, r = .18, but there was an effect 
in the non-agent condition, with those children who received this condition first 
giving more logical responses compared to the children who received it second, 
Mann-Whitney test, U = 22, p = .009, r = .56.  
Table 3.6 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the infelicitous 
some statements of the descriptive set of storyboards, according to condition and 
order of presentation, for Experiment 6 
Condition Order 
Agent Non-agent 
Agent First 2.38 
(1.66) 
2.08 
(1.85) 
Descriptive  
(n = 26) 
 
Non-agent First 2.31 
(1.60) 
3.08 
(1.19) 
 
No order effects were seen in the descriptive set of storyboards either collapsing 
across conditions, Mann-Whitney test, U = 71.00, p = .482, r = .14, or within 
conditions, Mann-Whitney tests, agent, U = 81.00, p = .853, r = .04, non-agent,        
U = 58.50, p = .158, r = .28. 
The data was also analysed for practice effects; the means (and standard 
deviations for which can be seen in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the infelicitous 
some trials, for each set of storyboards, according to time of presentation of the 
conditions, for Experiment 6 
 
 1st Condition 2nd Condition 
Interactive set         
(n = 22) 
1.14 
(1.36) 
0.55 
(0.74) 
Descriptive set         
( n = 26) 
2.73 
(1.46) 
2.19 
(1.70) 
 
Practice effects were seen in the interactive set of storyboards, with children giving 
significantly more logical responses to the infelicitous some trials in the condition 
they received first compared to the condition they received second (mean 0.55), 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 2.09, p = .036, r = .32. Practice effects were not 
observed in the descriptive set of storyboards, Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 1.53, 
p = .127, r = .21.    
3.4.4. Discussion  
To summarise the results of this experiment; the descriptive set of 
storyboards produced significantly less pragmatic responding in both the agent and 
non-agent conditions compared to the interactive set of storyboards, but there was no 
significant difference in pragmatic response rates within each set of storyboards 
between the agent and non-agent conditions. 
The difference in logical response rates to the infelicitous some trials that was 
seen between sets, but not within sets, suggests that the motivation behind an attempt 
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to deceive plays a facilitatory role in the detection of scalar implicatures. The 
statement made by Charlotte (the agent condition) for the infelicitous some trials of 
both sets of storyboards could be seen as untruthful. However, in the interactive set 
of storyboards Charlotte obviously gains from the infelicitous statement if her 
interlocutor fails to detect the implicature. It is difficult to imagine what the 
cognitive gains are from uttering an infelicitous statement about the colour of paint 
charts.   
Unlike the previous experiment, the number of logical responses to the 
infelicitous some trials between the conditions of the interactive set of storyboards 
was not significantly different. However  in this experiment there was an overall 
decrease in logical responding to the infelicitous some trials compared to Experiment 
5 (Exp. 5, mean = 2.10 ; Exp. 6, mean = 1.69) especially in the non-agent condition 
of this experiment (Exp. 5 non-agent, mean = 1.35; Exp. 6 non-agent, mean 1.05), 
which could possibly account for this finding. There was a weak to medium effect of 
agency. r = .22, and an order effect was still observed in the non-agent condition, 
which would suggest that agency is still important for some children. However, 
practice effects in the interactive storyboard set are again seen, suggesting that 
context is not the only facilitating factor. 
With regards to pragmatic theories, the results of this experiment are best 
accounted for by relevance theories. These theories can account for the difference in 
response rates to the infelicitous some trials between the descriptive and interactive 
sets through effort and/or effect; there are possibly greater cognitive effects in 
detecting an untruth that benefits the speaker of the utterance. Additionally the 
practice effects that are found in the interactive set can be explained in terms of set 
structure; the trials in the first task may have highlighted the difference between the 
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some and all trials, and between the true and false trials. This may have enabled the 
children to make comparisons between the terms which helped them to see the 
under-informative nature of the infelicitous some trials, and thus enabled them to 
perform more pragmatically in task two.  The lack of practice effects in the 
descriptive set can also be explained; although the effort has decreased, the effect to 
be gained does not warrant the extra processing of the implicature.  
Levinson’s (1983, 2000) default theory could account for the practice effects; 
the structured set of examples may have helped the children to see the under-
informative nature of the infelicitous some trials, and thus enabled them to perform 
more pragmatically in task 2. However the fact that the practice effects are not seen 
in the descriptive set casts doubt on this explanation. The descriptive set has 
essentially the same structure as the interactive set and would therefore allow the 
same comparisons, thus it is difficult to see why learning is not facilitated in the 
descriptive set without recourse to the context. The difference in response rates to 
the infelicitous some trials between the interactive and descriptive sets is also 
difficult for default theories. As the children were randomly assigned to the different 
sets, a similar level of linguistic knowledge would be expected between the groups. 
However whilst the majority response pattern in the interactive set was to be 
consistently pragmatic between the conditions, this was the minority response in the 
descriptive set.  
 
3.5. General Discussion 
 The experiments presented in this chapter show that context plays an 
important role in the detection of scalar implicatures. However, a supportive context 
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alone does not necessarily result in the detection of scalar implicatures and effects of 
age, order of presentation and practice are also seen. 
 The two experiments examined the role of deception in the facilitation of 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures, and in doing so also considered the role of shared 
conversational background.  
 The high levels of pragmatic responding seen in the experiments suggest that 
deception does facilitate the detection of scalar implicatures in children, thus 
supporting the claim of Feeney et al. (2004). However, the contribution of deception 
is multifaceted. Deception has many definitions or features (Chisholm & Feehan, 
1977; Vincent & Castlefranchi, 1981) including being under-informative (Adler, 
1997), involving an agent (Hyman, 1989) and misleading with the truth to benefit the 
speaker (Sutter, 2009), all of which would apply to the experimental manipulations 
carried out in the chapter. However, the difference in the level of logical responding 
to the infelicitous some trials between the interactive and descriptive sets of 
storyboards in Experiment 6 suggests that the aspect of deception which contributes 
to the facilitation of sensitivity to scalar implicatures in the storyboard task is the 
motivation behind the act of deception, in other words sensitivity is more likely to be 
seen when there is a reason for being under-informative.  
The finding that sensitivity to scalar implicatures is more likely to be seen in 
contexts when there are gains to made from the deceptive act, raises the interesting 
possibility that detection of scalar implicatures could be facilitated by contexts which 
carry consequences for the interpretation of scalar terms. For example Guasti et al. 
(2005) found high rates of pragmatic responding in a study that would fit this 
explanation. In their study we are told that part of the scenario involved a discussion 
between the soldiers regarding the benefits and costs of each mode of transport; 
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motorbikes were considered fast but expensive and therefore horses were chosen. 
This scenario seems to convey the message that the choice of transport is important 
and that cost is the reason for the soldiers’ choice. Maybe the children are aware of 
this and seek to be as informative as possible as a result. A lack of consequences 
could explain children’s, and adults, insensitivity in the statement evaluation task, 
and also children’s insensitivity in Papafragou and Musolino’s (2003) study, where it 
doesn’t seem to matter whether some or all of the elephants have trunks or whether 
some or all of the horses jumped over a fence. This could be a fruitful line of future 
enquiry. 
With regards to claims made about shared conversational backgrounds 
(Guasti et al. 2005), the findings from the descriptive set of storyboards once again 
show that even when the difference between what is known and what is claimed is 
immediately available, sensitivity is not necessarily seen in young children. 
However, the descriptive storyboards produced a higher level of pragmatic 
responding in the Year 1 children compared with the statement condition in 
Experiment 2 for the same age group. This suggests that whilst neither deception nor 
a shared conversational background are sufficient for scalar implicature detection, 
each is beneficial to young children.  
 One interesting finding of this chapter was the universal pragmatic 
responding of the Year 4 children in Experiment 5. A possibility for future research 
would be to extend the age range in that experiment to see if sensitivity to the 
implicature follows the same U-shaped trend that was seen in Experiment 1, thus 
confirming the proposal that the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures is not linear. In addition, finding out when consistent logical responding 
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re-emerges will have implications for theories of children’s cognitive development. 
This point is expanded on in the General Discussion in Chapter 5.  
 With regards to theoretical accounts of scalar implicature, although both 
relevance and default theories can explain many of the results of this chapter, the 
effects of practice are probably best accounted for by relevance theories. The lack of 
such effects in the descriptive set of Experiment 6 suggests that the structure of the 
task and a second presentation does not necessarily facilitate a pragmatic 
interpretation of the term some. However, although context is a central feature of 
relevance theories, and it has been shown that this is an important factor in the 
detection of scalar implicatures, it appears that effort and effect determine whether 
an implicature is detected; thus a supportive context does not necessarily result in 
sensitivity to a scalar implicature. The role of effort in scalar implicature detection is 
the subject of the next chapter.    
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Chapter Four 
The Processing of Scalar terms in Children and Adults 
4.1. Aim 
How scalar terms are processed by adults and children remains unclear. 
Researchers stand divided over the issue in adults, with the debate centring on 
whether implicatures are processed automatically or derived according to context, 
and there is no processing account for children, merely the assumption that scalar 
implicatures are more effortful for this age group as compared to adults. The U-
shaped result of Experiment 2, along with the anecdotal reports of the adult 
participants, suggests that adult processing may be more complex than contemporary 
theories propose, whilst children’s processing may not be as cognitively demanding 
as has previously been assumed. The aim of the two experiments in this chapter was 
to investigate and compare scalar implicature processing in children and adults.  
 
4.2. Introduction 
The default account of Levinson (1983, 2000) and Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1985/1995) RT give rise to very different views on the automaticity of scalar 
implicatures. Levinson proposes that scalar implicatures are so readily inferred that 
they are the default interpretation and go through automatically; any effort involved 
is in their subsequent cancellation. On the other hand Sperber and Wilson suggest 
that scalar implicatures are context dependent, and in the absence of contextual 
priming a pragmatic interpretation takes longer than a logical one.  
Experimental studies have tested these theoretical claims in one of two ways; 
by examining the effect of cognitive load on interpretations of infelicitous some (De 
Neys & Schaeken, 2007) or analysing the time taken to make logical and pragmatic 
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interpretations (Bott & Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Feeney et al., 
2004; Noveck & Posda, 2003). These studies, all conducted on adult participants, 
have tended to show that pragmatic interpretations take longer, and involve more 
effort, compared to logical interpretations, thus supporting relevance based 
accounts9. For example, De Neys and Schaeken (2007) gave their participants a 
sentence verification task involving under-informative sentences, whilst at the same 
time burdening their executive cognitive resources with a memory task. They found 
that participants made fewer pragmatic interpretations under load.  Bott and Noveck 
(2004), also using a sentence verification task, compared the time taken by 
participants to give a logical interpretation to infelicitous some trials, to the time 
taken by the same participants for a pragmatic interpretation, and found that 
pragmatic interpretations took longer. 
However, one point to note with the above mentioned studies (Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Noveck & Posda, 2003) is that the 
experimental designs are based on interpreting scalar implicature processing as 
having at most two steps and interpreting the results in line with this assumption. 
But, Feeney et al. (2004) suggested that this two-step process was too simple to 
account for the way all adults processed scalar terms. They proposed that there were 
at least three possible courses of action available to adults with regards to the 
processing of scalar terms; firstly the inference may go undetected, secondly the 
implicature could be made, and thirdly the adult participant may be aware of the 
pragmatic interpretation of the scalar term but prefers to give a logical response and 
so cancels the implicature. Rather than comparing reaction times between logical 
and pragmatic interpretations, which they felt was problematic as two different 
                                                 
9 The one exception being the study of Feeney et al. (2004), which found that for some adults a 
logical interpretation appeared to be a costly process.  
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responses were involved, Feeney et al. compared the time taken to say yes to 
infelicitous some trials with the time to give the same response to felicitous some 
trials. They found that the response times differed, with participants taking 
significantly longer to give a logical response to the infelicitous some trials. They 
suggested that this increase in response time was due to the increased processing 
time involved in the inhibition of the pragmatic implicature. Thus a logical response 
was not necessarily indicative of a failure to detect the implicature; it could represent 
a preferred interpretation. The authors supported their argument with the finding that 
logical responding to the infelicitous some trials was positively correlated with a 
measure of cognitive capacity, and suggested that because resisting the pragmatic 
inference required effort, this was achieved primarily by people high in cognitive 
resources.  
It is interesting to consider the results of Experiment 2, the U-shaped 
developmental trajectory with the re-emergence of logical responding in 
adolescence, in the context of Feeney et al.’s (2004) proposal that the processing of 
scalar terms may be more complex than has previously been supposed. It seems 
unlikely that all of the adults who answered logically had failed to detect the 
implicature, given the universal pragmatic responding of the Year 7 children. It 
seems more likely that at least some of the adults chose not to give a pragmatic 
response. And, coupled with the anecdotal comments of some of the adult 
participants, these results appear consistent with the suggestion that both logical and 
pragmatic interpretations are available to at least some adults. They raise the further 
possibility that choosing between these interpretations may be an additional source 
of processing difficulty in adults.      
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With regards to the processing of scalar terms in children there is a paucity of 
research, with no studies directly manipulating cognitive load or measuring reaction 
times. Therefore questions still remain as to whether children process scalar terms in 
line with adults, if less efficiently, or whether the processing is qualitatively 
different.  
The assumption in the literature appears to be that if the pragmatic 
interpretation of a scalar term takes longer than a logical interpretation in adults, the 
same will also be true for children, and that the processing cost of the implicature for 
children will be greater than for adults. This assumption is supported by work which 
found that sensitivity to implicatures increases when cognitive demands are lessened. 
Pouscoulous et al. (2007) made a number of changes to a task in which they found 
low pragmatic responding in young children. In the original task children had to 
make judgements about the amount of animals that were in a box, for example some 
turtles are in the boxes. In the modified version the authors removed distracter items, 
changed the response from a meta-linguistic judgement to one that was based on an 
action, and changed the quantifier from certains to quelques. This modified version 
resulted in an increase in pragmatic responding amongst younger children. However, 
even though the manipulations would intuitively seem to decrease the demands 
placed on the children’s cognitive resources, there was no independent measure of 
the effort associated with each manipulation.   
Yet there is reason to suspect that the effort involved in interpreting scalar 
terms may not be the same for children and adults. In Experiment 2 the re-emergence 
of logical interpretations suggested that the older adolescents and adults may have 
two responses available, whereas the universal pragmatic responding of the younger 
adolescents suggests that this age group only had one interpretation available. It may 
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be that for the adults, choosing between the alternate interpretations is an additional 
source of effort. If this is the case, then contrary to the assumption that processing 
scalar terms is never less costly for children than it is for adults, the reverse may be 
true.  That is, adults may incur processing costs that are not incurred by children. 
The aim of the two experiments described in this chapter was to test this possibility. 
 
4.3. Experiment 7: The effect of load on the detection of scalar implicatures 
4.3.1. Introduction 
There is a view in the experimental pragmatics literature that the processing 
of scalar implicatures is effortful. However much of the evidence for this view 
comes from indirect measures of effort, such as the association often drawn between 
increased reaction times for pragmatic interpretations of scalar terms and effortful 
processing, and the linking of the ability to detect scalar implicatures with increased 
access to cognitive resources. One study that sought a more direct measure of the 
role of effort in the processing of scalar terms is that of De Neys and Schaeken 
(2007). They used dual task methodology to investigate the effect of cognitive load 
on the detection of scalar implicatures. They burdened the executive cognitive 
resources of adults by having them memorise dot patterns, either complex (load 
condition) or simple (control condition), whilst evaluating statements containing 
scalar terms. They found that the number of pragmatic interpretations decreased in 
the load condition and claimed that this is because the detection of scalar 
implicatures is effortful, thus providing support for a relevance theory view. 
However, this conclusion is based on a two-step model of implicature processing, 
and as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter this model may be too simple. 
There may be two sources of difficulty in the statement evaluation task; detecting the 
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implicature, and choosing between a logical and pragmatic interpretation. Therefore 
one aim of this experiment was to test the validity and reliability of De Neys and 
Schaeken’s study and to establish whether there appears to be any evidence of choice 
making between pragmatic and logical interpretations in adults. 
An additional aim of this experiment was to examine the role of effort in 
children’s processing of scalar terms. As was mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, there is very little research that has directly focused on whether the 
processing of scalar terms is effortful for children, the possible exception being 
Pouscoulous et al. (2007)10. The assumption in the literature appears to be that if 
scalar implicatures are effortful for adults then they will be even more so for 
children. However, there are two experiments in this thesis where universal 
pragmatic responding has been seen in children; the Year 7 age group in Experiment 
2, and the Year 4 age group in Experiment 5. The general interpretation of some as 
meaning not all by these participants suggests that they had little difficulty 
processing the implicature. One possibility is that because the implicature is so 
frequent in older children, the pragmatic interpretation has become the default 
interpretation, and thus automatic and effortless. Another possibility is that detecting 
the implicature requires effort in children, just as in adults, but because they only 
have one interpretation available to them, the children do not have to expend extra 
effort in deciding whether to respond logically or pragmatically. 
In order to decide between these two possibilities, this experiment examined 
scalar implicature processing in a group of Year 6 children and a group of adults 
through the use of a dual task methodology, similar to that employed by De Neys 
and Schaeken (2007). One potential problem with their design was that each of their 
                                                 
10 But see comments made in the previous section of this chapter. 
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participants received the same amount of cognitive load. It is therefore not clear that 
the load affected all participants equally. For the current experiment it is imperative 
that load affects all participants equally, both within and between age groups. In 
response to this potential confound a number of modifications were made to the 
design of the De Neys and Schaeken study. Prior to the presentation of the tasks each 
participant had their load capacity determined through the use of a visual pattern test 
(Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004; Holmes, Adams & Hamilton, 
2008). This was to ensure that they could be given a load relative to this measure, 
thereby ensuring that all participants were equally affected by the load.  
A number of predictions are possible for this experiment. Given the 
assumption that implicatures are more demanding for children than adults, then the 
effect of load should be as great, or greater, in children than in adults. Alternatively, 
if choosing between interpretations is an additional source of difficulty for some 
adults, then the effect of load should be greater in the adults compared to the 
children.  
4.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Fifty three adults and thirty children participated in the study. The adults 
were recruited through a campaign at Durham University and an advertisement in a 
local magazine. Their ages ranged from 18 years to 65 years (mean age 30 years) 
and all gave their own consent. The children were a Year 6 class, aged from 10 years 
3 months to 11 years 2 months (mean age 10 years 7 months) from a primary school 
in the North East of England. Consent for their participation was given by the head 
teacher. 
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Materials 
Each participant heard two sets of 28 statements, under conditions of 
cognitive load or no load, and a post test consisting of 16 statements. Their load 
capacity was determined prior to them hearing the statements, using the Thames 
Valley Test Company’s Visual Patterns Test (VPT) (Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley & 
Wilson, 1997).    
Statements. The statements were based on those used in previous experiments 
in this thesis, with control and target statements (see Appendix AVII for statements 
used). De Neys and Schaeken (2007) gave their participants 10 infelicitous some 
target statements and 10 filler statements to evaluate. However they raised concerns 
that the ratio of target to filler statements might result in participants guessing the 
rationale of the experiment. To combat this, a smaller ratio was used; there were 8 
target statements and 20 filler statements. The filler statements comprised 8 
felicitous some, 4 absurd all, 4 absurd some, 2 true all and 2 false all statements. 
The purpose of these was to disguise the aim of the experiment, to determine that 
participants had a good grasp of the term some, and to establish that the load 
condition did not interfere with their general linguistic competence.  Two sets of 
materials were prepared. The sets were counterbalanced between participants with 
regards to order of presentation and load condition, resulting in four groups.   
A potential problem was identified with the statement evaluation task in 
Chapter 2, namely it was not certain that the statements which were considered to be 
universal by the researcher were considered to be such by the participants. If a 
participant considers the universal sentences to be existential then they will not 
consider them to be under-informative when the statements are preceded by the term 
some. In other words they will consider the some sentences to be felicitous rather 
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than infelicitous. In order to ascertain that each participant was considering the 
whole set, and not a partial set in relation to the infelicitous some statements, a post 
test was carried out. The post test consisted of the sixteen infelicitous some 
statements which had previously been presented to the participant, only this time the 
quantifier some was replaced by all. 
Cognitive Load. Prior to the presentation of the experimental conditions, each 
participant undertook the VPT. This test was used to assess the participant’s visual 
pattern capacity, in order to determine the amount of load they received in the load 
condition. The VPT is a measure of short-term visual memory and requires 
participants to reproduce a visual pattern. The visual pattern is created through filling 
in half the squares in a grid. The grids vary in size; the smallest measuring 2 x 2 and 
the largest 5 x 6 (see Figure 4.1 for example visual patterns).  
 
 
 
 
  
  
2 x 2 grid with two 
filled squares 
      
      
      
      
      
 
5 x 6 grid with fifteen filled squares 
 
Figure 4.1. Examples of test patterns in the Visual Patterns Test11 
 
                                                 
11 Reproduced with permission. Copyright © Pearson Assessment.  No part of this publication may be 
reproduced without prior permission from the publisher. 
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The number of filled squares in a grid determines the level of difficulty; this ranges 
from 2 to 15 filled squares. For each level of difficulty there are three patterns, each 
of which employs the same sized and shaped grid. The patterns are presented on a 
series of stimulus cards, with each participant seeing the card for three seconds, after 
which it is covered up, and they are required to replicate it on a response sheet, 
which consists of blank grids the same size and shape as the target pattern. Testing 
continues until the participant cannot correctly reproduce any of the three patterns 
that make up a particular level of difficulty. For the purposes of this experiment, 
participants were given a level score based on the difficulty level of the last set of 
patterns where all three patterns were correctly replicated. 
The cognitive load condition consisted of 24 patterns, one for each statement, 
where the difficulty level of the pattern matched that of the level score given in the 
assessment test. The grids and patterns were based on those of the VPT, and an 
example can be seen in Figure 4.2. 
 
    
    
    
    
 
Figure 4.2. Example of a level 8 difficulty pattern used in Experiment 7 
 
Procedure 
 The participants were run individually and received instructions on how to 
complete the tasks immediately prior to each task taking place. Testing began with 
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the visual pattern assessment, followed by the two sets of statements, with and 
without load, and ended with the post test.  
For the initial assessment of their visual pattern capacity, participants were 
told that their task was to replicate the patterns on the grids provided. They were told 
that the patterns would get progressively harder and not to worry if they got them 
wrong. They received feedback on their performance after each pattern. The 
assessment stopped when they got all the patterns wrong in a group of three, or if 
they reached the end.  
For the no load condition the participants were told to answer true or false to 
a series of statements read out by the researcher and if they were unsure of an answer 
they should go with the one that they thought was the best fit. The answers were 
recorded by the researcher.  
In the load condition the participants were presented with a pattern. Before 
replicating the pattern on a grid, the participant had to answer true or false to a 
stimulus statement, which was recorded by the researcher. The researcher monitored 
the participant’s performance on the replication of the pattern to ensure that they had 
sufficiently engaged with the task, and the participants received feedback on whether 
the pattern, but not the statement, was correct.   
In the post test the participants were told to answer true or false to a series of 
statements read out by the researcher. At the end of the test if the participant had 
answered false to any of the statements they were asked to give a reason for this 
response. 
4.3.3. Results 
The data of one adult participant was removed before analysis because of 
failure to engage sufficiently with the pattern replication task in the load condition. 
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The responses of the remaining 52 adults and 30 children were coded with respect to 
their logical correctness as in the previous experiments. Analysis of the post test 
revealed that 65% of the adults (34/52) and 93% of the children (28/30) always 
responded true to the true all statements, thus these participants considered these 
statements to be under-informative when the statements were preceded by the term 
some in the experimental conditions. The analysis will focus on these participants12.  
Control Statements 
Analysis of the control statements revealed that both sets of participants 
answered these well. The means (and standard deviations) can be seen in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the control 
statements, according to age and condition, for Experiment 7 
                 Condition 
 No Load Load 
Adult 
(n = 34) 
19.82 
(0.46) 
19.91 
(0.29) 
Child 
(n = 28) 
19.79 
(0.42) 
19.75 
(0.44) 
Note. The maximum score in each cell is 20 
 
There was no significant difference in the mean number of logical responses 
given to the control statements between the adults and children for either condition, 
Mann Whitney U tests, load U = 399.00, p = .087, r = .22, no load U = 447, p = .536, 
                                                 
12 If the data from those participants who did not consider all of the post test statements to be true is 
included in the analysis , the findings for this experiment still hold. See Appendix BVII for this 
analysis. 
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r = .08. Nor was there any difference in the number of logical responses given to the 
control statements between the load and no load condition within either age group, 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests, adults z = .91, p = .366, r = .11, children, 
z = .33, p = .739, r = .04. 
Infelicitous some statements  
The mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the 
infelicitous some statements for each age group can be seen in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the infelicitous 
some statements, according to age and condition, for Experiment 7  
                       Condition  
No Load Load 
Adult 
(n = 34) 
5.56 
(3.30) 
5.82 
(3.14) 
Child 
(n = 28) 
4.64 
(3.67) 
4.39 
(3.75) 
Note. The maximum score in each cell is 8   
 
Adult responses. The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data 
for both conditions can be seen in Figure 4.3. As can be seen from the figure the 
distribution of the adults is unimodal in both conditions. The majority response, 
within each condition, is consistent logical responding. There is little pragmatic 
responding over-all and very little consistent pragmatic responding within each 
condition.  
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of adults according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some statements, for both conditions, in 
Experiment 7. 
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 With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some 
statements between conditions, shown in Table 4.2, there was no significant 
difference, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.74, p = .457, r = .09. 
The order in which the conditions were presented was also examined to see if 
it affected the rate of logical responding to the infelicitous some statements; the 
means (and standard deviations) for which can be seen in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  
Adults mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the 
infelicitous some statements, according to condition and order of presentation, for 
Experiment 7 
Condition Order 
No load Load 
No load first 4.29 
(3.55) 
4.59 
(3.52) 
Adult         
( n = 34) 
 
Load first 6.82 
(2.53) 
7.06 
(2.16) 
Note. The maximum score in each cell is 8   
 
This analysis revealed that compared to those adults who received the no load 
condition first, the adults who received the load condition first gave significantly 
more logical responses to the infelicitous some statements in both the load condition, 
Mann-Whitney test, U = 92.50, p = .040, r = .35, and the subsequent no load 
condition, Mann-Whitney test, U = 79.50, p = .014, r = .42.  
 Analysing the rates of logical responding for the condition that was presented 
first revealed that adults who attempted the load condition first gave significantly 
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more logical responses to the infelicitous some trials (mean 7.06) compared to those 
adults who attempted the no load condition first (mean 4.29), Mann-Whitney test,   
U = 75.5, p = .009, r = .45.   
Children’s responses. The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some 
data for both conditions can be seen in Figure 4.4. As can be seen from the figure the 
distribution of the children’ responses is unimodal in both conditions, although not 
to the same extent as the adults. A quarter of the children are consistently pragmatic 
in the no load condition and there is a similar number of wholly pragmatic 
responders in the load condition.  
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of children according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some statements, for both conditions, 
in Experiment 7.
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With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some statements between conditions, the means of which can be seen in Table 4.2, 
like the adults there was no significant difference, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
ranks test, z = 0.74, p = .457, r = .09. However, unlike the adults, there was no effect 
of order of presentation, the means of which can be seen in Table 4.4, Mann 
Whitney tests, no load condition, U = 74.00, p = .243, r = .16, load condition,          
U = 79.00, p = .356, r = .12. 
Table 4.4 
Children’s mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the 
infelicitous some statements, according to condition and order of presentation, for 
Experiment 7 
Condition Order 
No load Load 
No load first 5.46 
(3.26) 
5.15 
(3.78) 
Children          
( n = 28) 
 
Load first 3.93 
(3.97) 
3.73 
(3.71) 
Note. The maximum score in each cell is 8   
 
Analysing the rates of logical responding for the condition that was presented first 
revealed that although the children who attempted the no load condition first gave 
more logical responses to the infelicitous some trials (mean 5.46) compared to those 
children who attempted the load condition first (mean 3.73), this difference was not 
significant, Mann-Whitney test, U = 71.5, p = .204, r = .24.   
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Comparison of adult and children’s results 
Although the adults gave more logical responses than the children to the 
infelicitous some statements in both conditions, see Table 4.2, these differences were 
not significant, Mann Whitney tests, no load, U = 422.50, p = .409, r = .11, load,     
U = 383.00, p = .144, r = .19. This is not the case though if load order is taken into 
account, see Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The adults and children who received the no load 
condition first did not differ significantly in the number of logical responses given to 
the infelicitous some statements in this condition, Mann Whitney test U = 83.50,      
p = .236, r = .22, or the subsequent load condition, Mann Whitney test U = 101.50,  
p = .680, r = .08, but there was a significant difference in the mean number of logical 
responses given to the infelicitous some statements between the adults and children 
who received the load condition first. The adults gave significantly more logical 
responses in both the load condition, Mann Whiney test, U = 68.50, p = .021, r = .44, 
and the no load condition, Mann Whitney test, U = 79.00, p = .034, r =.37.  
4.3.4. Discussion 
 To summarise the results of this experiment: there was no effect of cognitive 
load on children’s or adult’s processing of scalar terms; there was an effect of load 
order in the adult participants, with those adults who received the load condition first 
giving more logical interpretations in both conditions compared to those adults who 
received the no load condition first; and when load order was taken into account, the 
children gave more pragmatic interpretations to the infelicitous some trials than the 
adults.  
  According to De Neys and Schaeken (2007), the addition of cognitive load 
interferes with adults’ ability to draw scalar implicatures. If this is the case, then one 
would expect to see significantly more logical responding amongst adults in the load 
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condition compared to the no load condition. This was not the finding of this 
experiment, although a between-participants comparison based on the first condition 
attempted by the participants revealed that there was significantly more logical 
responding in the load condition compared to the no load condition.  
It could be argued that the changes made in this experiment to the design 
used by De Neys and Schaeken (2007) meant that the weak effect of load within 
participants was not detected. This experiment had fewer participants, the ratio of 
target to filler statements was decreased, a no load condition was used rather than a 
low load condition, and the cognitive load was adjusted in line with each participants 
visual cognitive capacity. These changes could also account for the difference in 
rates of pragmatic responding between the studies, 76 % in the De Neys and 
Schaeken study and 29% in this experiment. Indeed, it could be claimed that there 
was insufficient pragmatic responding in this experiment to uncover the small effect 
of load. However, the between-participants effect of load, and the effect of order in 
the adult participants both suggest that cognitive load does affect adult participants’ 
processing of scalar terms. The latter finding also suggests that the effect of load is 
more complex than was claimed by De Neys and Schaeken.   
The participants who received the load condition first gave significantly more 
logical responses in both conditions compared to those participants who received the 
no load condition first, but within participants there was no difference between 
conditions. This suggests that the high level of logical responding in the no load 
condition, when it followed the load condition, was the result of these adults 
developing a strategy in the load condition and sticking with it throughout the 
experiment.  
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The need for a strategy can be explained in terms of effort. If there are two 
sources of effort for the adult, the processing of the implicature and deciding 
whether to give a pragmatic or logical response, then having already experienced the 
demands of the secondary task in the visual assessment, the adults may decide to 
conserve effort by deciding to always answer logically when faced with the term 
some, and as it serves them well in the load condition they continue to use this in the 
no load condition. If the adults had not adopted a strategy then the same level of 
logical responding would be expected in both of their conditions. 
The suggestion of an effortful process of deciding between response 
alternatives in adult participants could also explain De Neys and Schaeken’s (2007) 
findings. As their sample consisted of university undergraduates it seems unlikely 
that none of their participants had the analytical ability to compute the implicature 
whilst being aware that it could be cancelled. The small increase (6%) in logical 
responding observed under load in their study could reflect a strategic switch to 
logical responding in a relatively small number of participants. Unfortunately, as De 
Neys and Schaeken’s results do not contain any analysis of order effects, it is not 
possible to comment on whether there was evidence of strategic responding in their 
sample. 
With regards to the processing of scalar terms in children, the results of this 
experiment suggest that when 10-year-old children draw the implicature they do so 
with little difficulty, as their response rates are not affected by load, and there is no 
evidence of strategy formation. This absence of difficulty in the children suggests 
that their processing may be different to that of the adult participants. This proposal 
is further supported by the finding that when the logical response rates of those 
participants who received the load condition first are considered, the children give 
174 
 
more pragmatic responses than the adults in both conditions. This appears to indicate 
that the processing of scalar implicatures can be more effortful for adults than it is 
for children, which goes against current assumptions in the literature.  This idea is 
consistent with the claim that the children, unlike the adults, have only one response 
available; that is, either they do not detect the implicature and so respond logically, 
or detect it and respond pragmatically, because once the implicature has been 
detected they are unable to cancel it.  
The findings of this experiment raise the possibility that adults’ processing of 
scalar terms is different to children’s. However what remains unanswered is whether 
detection of the implicature in adults is more effortful than in children. That is, 
because children have only one response available to them, the pragmatic 
interpretation may effectively be a default for them. For adults, on the other hand, 
because more than one response is available, the inference does not go through 
automatically. Another possibility is that the developmental difference that was 
observed may be due to the effort some adults have to exert in deciding between the 
pragmatic and logical response. Children who have only one response available to 
them do not experience this cognitive cost. The next experiment was designed to 
address these possibilities.      
 
4.4. Experiment 8: The time course of scalar implicatures 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The findings of the previous experiment suggested that children and adults 
may process scalar terms differently; both age groups are able to detect the 
implicature but only the adults are able to cancel the implicature once it has been 
made. Previous research (Bott & Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; 
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Noveck & Posda, 2003) has indicated that adults’ pragmatic interpretations of 
infelicitous some take longer than logical interpretations, and if the assumption in the 
literature that children’s processing costs will be equal to or greater than that of the 
adults holds, then one would expect to see the same trend in children. One of the 
main aims of this experiment was to test this prediction on the basis that if, as the 
previous experiment suggested, children have little difficulty processing scalar 
implicatures, then the cost to the children may be less than to the adults, and the 
opposite result may be seen.  
Another main aim of this experiment was to investigate the proposal that 
because some adults are aware that either of two responses is possible, they incur a 
response selection cost that is not incurred by children. To this end the time courses 
of logical responses to the infelicitous and felicitous some statements were examined. 
If the proposal holds, one would expect to see logical responses to the infelicitous 
some statements taking longer than the same response to the felicitous some 
statements in adults, but not in children.  
An additional aim was to examine the relationship between the type of 
interpretation given to the infelicitous some statements and participants’ working 
memory capacity. Given that Feeney et al. (2004) found that memory span was 
positively correlated with logical response rates to infelicitous some, and there have 
been similar claims in other work on individual differences in reasoning (Newstead, 
Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004; Stanovich & West, 1998; Torrens, 
Thompson & Cramer, 1999) the same relationship was predicted for the adults in 
this study. However, with regards to the children the opposite relationship was 
predicted. Taking into account Noveck’s (2001) suggestion that logical 
interpretations give way to subsequent pragmatic interpretations, the developmental 
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pattern that was seen for the sensitivity to scalar implicatures in the experiments of 
Chapter 2, and the finding of Morsanyi and Handley (2008) that heuristic responding 
in children is based on cognitive capacity, it was predicted that logical responding in 
the children would be negatively associated with counting span. 
4.4.2. Method      
Participants 
Thirty adults and thirty seven children participated in the experiment. The 
adults were recruited through a campaign at Durham University and an 
advertisement in a local magazine. Their ages ranged from 18 years to 55 years 
(mean age 29 years) and all gave their own consent. The children were aged between 
10 years 10 months and 12 years 9 months (mean age 11 years 9 months) and were 
recruited from Year 6 and Year 7 classes from two schools in the North East of 
England. Consent for their participation was given by either their parents or the head 
teacher.  
Materials and Procedure 
Each participant completed two tasks; a statement verification task consisting 
of an initial set of 48 statements and an 8 statement post test, and a working memory 
counting span task. The set of 48 statements and the counting span task were 
presented on a computer screen, whilst the post test was read out loud by the 
researcher.     
Statement task.  The 48 statements used were based on the ones used in the 
previous experiments. Each participant received 8 target infelicitous some statements 
and 40 control statements, which were comprised of equal numbers of true all, false 
all, absurd all, felicitous some and absurd some statements (see Appendix AVIII for 
statements used).  
177 
 
Each statement was presented with either all or some preceding it, although 
each participant received only one form, which resulted in two sets of materials. The 
order of the statements within each set was randomly assigned by the computer. The 
participant responded true or false to each statement using a button box, this 
response and the time taken to make it were recorded by the computer. In an attempt 
to equate reading times between statements, each statement was four syllables long. 
As in the previous experiment, in order to ascertain that each participant was 
considering the whole set and not a partial set in relation to the infelicitous some 
statements, a post test was carried out. The post test consisted of the eight 
infelicitous some statements which had previously been presented to the participant 
only this time the quantifier some was replaced by all, and the sentences were 
presented by the researcher. The participant again had to respond true or false to the 
statements. If they responded false they were asked for an explanation. 
Counting span task. Each participant had their working memory capacity 
measured through a counting span task. Counting span tasks are reliable, valid, and 
widely-used measures of Working Memory (WM) capacity and suitable for a 
number of populations (Conway et al., 2005). The task is designed to “force WM 
storage in the face of processing in order to engage executive attention processes” 
(Conway et al., p. 773) and has been used in previous studies of individual 
differences and reasoning abilities (e.g. Barrouillet & Lecas 1999; Handley, Capon, 
Beveridge, Denis, & Evans, 2004). The counting span task used here was a 
computerised version of that used by Case, Kurland and Goldberg (1982). Each 
participant was presented with screens containing blue and green dots, see Figure 
4.5. For each screen, their task was to count out loud the number of blue dots, whilst 
pointing at them, and to remember the total for each screen. The number of blue dots 
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ranged from 2 to 7. The number of screens presented in a series ranged from two to 
five screens. Once the participant had seen all the screens in a series they had to 
recall out loud the totals from each screen; these totals were recorded by the 
researcher. Participants saw three sequences of two, three, four and five screens.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. An example of a screen used in the counting span task of Experiment 8. 
 
4.4.3. Results 
Data treatment 
 Statement verification task. As in previous experiments the participants’ 
responses were coded with respect to their logical correctness. In order to ensure that 
participants had not traded speed for accuracy, participants were excluded if they got 
at least three absurd statements wrong, or at least four other control statements 
wrong in one sub-group. This resulted in the loss of the data from one adult 
participant and two children.  In addition, only those control statements that were 
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correct were included in the reaction time analysis. This resulted in the loss of 5.4% 
of the data from that analysis. Also, those responses to control and target statements 
that were considered to be outliers, that is, 3 standard deviations from the age group 
mean reaction time for that type of statement were also removed from both the 
behavioural and reaction time data. This resulted in a loss of 2.3 % of the control 
data and 3.9% of the responses to infelicitous some data. Finally, with regards to the 
infelicitous some data, only those statements that the participant considered to be true 
of all, as recorded in the post test, were included in the analysis, this resulted in the 
loss of 4.7 % of the data.  
Participants’ scores were converted into proportions, in order to take into 
account the results of the post test, thus for the infelicitous some trials the figure 
reported is the number of logical responses as a proportion of the number of 
statements the participant considered to be true of all.   
 Counting span task.  A participant’s counting span was measured according 
to the formula 1 + (n / 3) where n is the total number of correctly recalled sets 
(Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999). Sets were only considered up to the point where the 
participant failed to recall all three sets at a particular level (Case, Kurland & 
Goldberg, 1982).  
 Data analysis 
Behavioural rates of responding. The mean proportions of the logical 
responses according to truth, term and age group are shown in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5 
Mean proportions (and standard deviations) of logical responses for each statement 
type, according to age group, in Experiment 8 
Statement  
True   All False All Felicitous 
Some 
Infelicitous 
Some 
Adult 
(n = 29)  
.92 
(.09) 
.93 
(.10) 
.96 
(.06) 
.63 
(.36) 
Children 
(n = 35) 
.88 
(.11) 
.87 
(.13) 
.92 
(.11) 
.81 
(.29) 
 
In the adults significantly fewer logical responses were given to the some 
statements (mean proportion .80) compared with the all statements (mean proportion 
.93), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.58, p = .010, r = .34, and to the 
false/infelicitous statements (mean proportion .78) compared with the true/felicitous 
statements (mean proportion .95), Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test,              
z = 3.89, p < .001, r = .51. However this was not the case for the children. There was 
no significant difference between the mean proportions for the some (mean 
proportion .87) and all (mean proportion .88) statements, Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed ranks test, z = 0.58, p = .560, r = .07, or the true/felicitous (mean proportion 
.90) and false/infelicitous (mean proportion .84) statements, Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed ranks test, z = 1.85, p = .065, r = .22. 
The mean proportion of logical responses given to each type of statement 
was analysed using Friedman tests and was found to be significant for the adults, χ2 
(3) = 19.94, p < .001, but not for the children, χ2 (3) = 4.16, p = .245. A follow up 
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Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test for the adults revealed that they gave 
fewer logical responses to the infelicitous some statements than any other statement 
type, all p’s ≤ .001, all r’s ≥ .42 (see Appendix BVIII, Table 1, for individual 
statistics). 
The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data for both age 
groups can be seen in Figure 4.6. In both age groups the majority response was to be 
consistently logical, with this being more pronounced in the children. There was 
evidence of responding right across the scale for both age groups, although this was 
more pronounced in the adult group. 
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Figure 4.6. Distribution of participants according to the proportion of logical responses given to the infelicitous some statements by both age 
groups in Experiment 8 
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 With regards to the mean proportion of logical responses given to the 
infelicitous some statements between the age groups, the adults gave significantly 
fewer than the children, Mann-Whitney test, U = 344, p = .020, r = .29.  
Reaction time data. The mean reaction times for logical responses to the 
control statements were analysed using unrelated t tests, which revealed that for each 
type of control statement the children were significantly slower than the adults, all 
p’s < .001, all r’s  ≥ 0.58 (see Appendix BVIII, Table 2, for the analysis of each type 
of control statement). To take this difference into account, reaction times were 
considered to be outliers if they were 3 standard deviations from the age group mean 
reaction time for each type of trial.  
Participants were divided into three groups depending on the type of 
responses they gave to the infelicitous some statements; all logical responses, all 
pragmatic responses, or a mixture of both responses. The number of each type of 
responder for each age group can be seen in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6  
The number of participants for each type of responder, for each age group, in 
Experiment 8 
Type of Responder Age Group 
 Logical Pragmatic Mixed 
Adult  9 3 17 
Children  21 0 14 
 
One of the experiment’s aims was to investigate whether pragmatic responses 
to infelicitous some statements take longer than logical responses. As there were so 
few pragmatic responders to compare with logical responders, the reaction times of 
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the logical and pragmatic responses of the mixed responders were compared. The 
mean reaction times of the mixed responders for each type of statement can be seen 
in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7  
Mean reaction time in milliseconds (and standard deviations) for the control and 
target statements of the adult and child mixed responders for Experiment 8 
Statement  
 True   All 
 
False All 
 
Felicitous 
Some 
Infelicitous 
Some 
(logical) 
Infelicitous 
Some 
(pragmatic) 
Adult 
(n = 17)   
1480 
(329) 
1438 
(300) 
1479 
(292) 
1707 
(566) 
2053 
(758) 
Children 
(n = 14)  
2446 
(422) 
2224 
(294) 
2436 
(515) 
2542 
(468) 
3160 
(738) 
 
Analysis of the reaction times of the infelicitous some statements for the 
mixed responders revealed that pragmatic responses took significantly longer than 
logical responses in both age groups, related t tests, adults, t (16) = 2.09, p = .053,     
r = .50, children, t (13) = 3.61, p = .003, r = .70. The proportional increase 
(pragmatic reaction time / logical reaction time) in pragmatic response times 
compared to the logical response times was compared between the age groups. An 
independent t test revealed that there was no significant difference between the 
groups, t (29) = 0.146, p = .885, r = .03.   
 A second aim of the experiment was to examine whether logical responses to 
both types of some statements differ. Amongst the mixed responders related t tests 
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revealed that there was no significant difference between the mean reaction times for 
the logical responses to the infelicitous and felicitous some statements for either age 
group, adults t (16) = 1.81, p = .089, r = .41 children t (13) = 0.73, p = .476, r = .20. 
The effect size in the adult age group coupled with the p value suggests that there is 
a moderate effect which the small sample size may be obscuring.   
The reaction times of the logical responders were also analysed. The mean 
reaction times for each type of statement for this group of responders can be seen in 
Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8 
Mean reaction time in milliseconds (and standard deviations) for the control and 
target statements of the adult and child logical responders for Experiment 8 
Statement  
 True   All 
 
False All 
 
Felicitous 
Some 
Infelicitous 
Some (logical) 
Adult 
(n = 9)   
1316 
(360) 
1340 
(316) 
1209 
(416) 
1393 
(321) 
Children 
(n = 21)  
2299 
(447) 
2256 
(413) 
2227 
(434) 
2370 
(535) 
 
The mean reaction times for the logical responses to the infelicitous and felicitous 
some statements were compared. Related t tests revealed that there was no difference 
in the reaction times of the children, t (20) = 1.61, p = .124, r = .33, but there was a 
difference for the adults, t (9) = 2.95, p = .019, r = .70, with the response times to the 
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infelicitous some statements being significantly slower than the response times to the 
felicitous some statements.  
 With regards to the pragmatic responders, the extremely small sample size,   
n = 3, negates the possibility of meaningful statistical analysis. However as can be 
seen from Table 4.9, the mean reaction times for their pragmatic responses to the 
infelicitous some statements were longer than for any of the control statements. 
Table 4.9 
Mean reaction time in milliseconds (standard deviations) for the control and target 
statements of the adult pragmatic responders for Experiment 8 
Statement  
 True   All 
 
False All 
 
Felicitous 
Some 
Infelicitous 
Some 
Adult 
(n = 3)   
1869 
(400) 
1587 
(199) 
1561 
(79) 
2263 
(442) 
 
  Individual differences. The mean counting span scores achieved by the two 
age groups was 3.80 (sd = .66) for the adults and 3.09 (sd = .66) for the children, and 
the difference between these two scores was statistically significant, Mann-Whitney 
test, U = 229, p ≤ .001, r = .48.  
The correlations between counting span and logical responses to the 
statements can be seen in Table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10 
The correlations between counting span and logical responses to the statements, 
according to age, for Experiment 8  
  True all False all Felicitous 
some 
Infelicitous 
some 
Adult 
 
-.076 
(.693) 
.240 
(.210) 
-.181 
(.348) 
-.211 
(.273) 
 
Counting 
span Child -.219 
(.207) 
-.131 
(.453) 
.166 
(.340) 
.017 
(.921) 
Note: Probabilities in parentheses 
As can be seen from Table 4.10 counting span does not significantly correlate with 
the number of logical responses given to any of the statement trials for either age 
group. 
 The counting span scores of the mixed responders were compared to those of 
the logical responders and were found not to be significantly different for either age 
group, all p’s > .296 (see Appendix BVIII, Table 3, for individual age group 
statistics).  
The counting span scores were also correlated with the mean reaction times 
for a pragmatic response to the infelicitous some statements in both age groups and 
were found not to be significant for either group, adults, Pearson’s r = .061, p = .797, 
children, Pearson’s r = -.268, p = .353. 
The correlation between the counting span scores of the adult logical 
responders and the mean reaction times for a logical response to the infelicitous some 
statements was also computed but there was no significant relationship, Pearson’s     
r = -.110, p = .778.  
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 4.4.4. Discussion 
 To summarise the results of this experiment: pragmatic responses to the 
infelicitous some statements took longer than logical responses in the mixed 
responders of both age groups; logical responses to the infelicitous some statements 
took longer compared to the felicitous some statements, but only in the adult 
participants, not in the children; and no relationship was found between WM 
capacity and the type of response given to the infelicitous some statements.  
 According to previous research (Bott & Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 
2007; Noveck & Posda, 2003) adults’ pragmatic responses to infelicitous some 
statements take longer than logical responses and the results of the adult mixed 
responders of this experiment support this idea. Interestingly, despite children’s 
apparent lack of difficulty with scalar implicatures in the previous experiment, the 
children’s pragmatic responses to the infelicitous some statements took longer than 
their logical responses. Furthermore the processing cost to the children was 
proportionally the same as that for the adults. These results provide evidence against 
Levinson’s (1983, 2000) default view that pragmatic interpretations are automatic.  
 However the results of the adult logical responders in this experiment suggest 
that processing is more complex than has previously been claimed. The responses of 
this group of adults to the infelicitous some statements took longer than the same 
response to the felicitous some statements. This finding suggests a number of 
possibilities: It could be seen as supporting Feeney et al.’s (2004) claim that a logical 
response can be the result of the cancellation of a scalar implicature and not 
necessarily an indication that the implicature has gone undetected. The difference 
could also be reflecting an awareness that there is more than one type of response 
available. Alternatively the slow-down could represent a choice in interpretation 
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with implicit conflict detection of the two responses taking place (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008) 
 The finding that there was no difference between the response times to the 
felicitous and infelicitous some statements for the children who were classed as 
logical responders, suggests that these children are neither detecting the implicature 
and cancelling it, nor have more than one response available.  
 So the picture that appears to emerge from this experiment is that in children 
the implicature either goes undetected, in which case they answer logically, or the 
implicature is detected and the children answer pragmatically. Adults also follow 
this processing course; however for some adults there is an additional source of 
difficulty, which is related to the availability of conflicting logical and pragmatic 
responses. 
 The lack of a significant relationship between counting span and the number 
of logical responses given to the infelicitous some statements fails to support Feeney 
et al.’s (2004) proposal that extra cognitive processing, of the kind required to cancel 
the implicature as opposed to that required to detect the implicature, is more likely to 
be found in individuals of higher cognitive capacity. However, there is a problem 
with this type of analysis. High logical response rates are also associated with failure 
to detect the implicature and as seen in the experiments in this thesis involving very 
young children, you do not have to be high in cognitive capacity to fail to detect a 
scalar implicature. There is no way of determining how a sample of logical 
responders is divided between those who are insensitive to the implicature and those 
who have cancelled it. In Feeney et al.’s study the sample consisted entirely of 
undergraduates and half of these were logical responders, just the type of person who 
might be expected to be high in cognitive capacity and capable of detecting the 
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scalar implicature and cancelling it. Whereas in this experiment the sample 
contained participants of varying educational levels, only a third of whom were 
logical responders. Therefore it might be expected that more of the participants in 
this study were insensitive to the implicature which would have an adverse effect on 
a correlational analysis. In addition the sample in this experiment was very small for 
such analysis.   
One surprising aspect of this experiment was the high number of logical 
responses given to the infelicitous some statements by the children. Given that 
universal pragmatic responding was seen in children aged not much older than these 
in Experiment 2, more pragmatic responding was expected. However the high 
logical response rate may be due to the methodology. The logical response rates for 
the control sentences were lower than would normally be seen; proportions in 
Experiment 2 were close to, if not, 1, however in this experiment they fell between 
.87 and .92. It could be that the children were trading speed for accuracy, and there is 
evidence that under conditions of speeded response people are less likely to detect 
scalar implicatures (Bott & Noveck, 2004). 
 
4.5. Chapter Discussion 
The two experiments presented in this chapter suggest that there are 
differences in adults and children’s processing of scalar terms and that for some 
adults effort is required for more than the detection of the implicature. However the 
nature of these effort-demanding processes is still somewhat unclear. 
One of the main findings of the experiments is the further evidence to support 
the view that a logical response in adults does not necessarily mean that the 
implicature has gone undetected. The use of a response strategy by adults in the dual 
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task paradigm of Experiment 7, and the longer mean reaction times to the infelicitous 
some statements as compared to the felicitous some statements in the adult logical 
responders in Experiment 8, suggest that a logical response can be effortful. If the 
implicature had not been detected by the adults it would not require processing, 
therefore one plausible explanation to account for the effort expended is that it is 
required to cancel the implicature. This proposal goes against the conventional view 
that a logical response is evidence that the implicature has not been detected (De 
Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001) and has implications for 
how responses are interpreted. Against this interpretation, however, is the finding 
that amongst mixed responders, logical responses to the infelicitous some statements 
took less time than pragmatic responses. The opposite finding would be predicted if 
participants were effortfully detecting and then effortfully cancelling the implicature. 
An alternative possibility is that some participants, aware that two responses are 
possible, make a choice, on a trial by trial basis about whether to respond 
pragmatically or logically. However, the order effects in Experiment 7 are 
problematic for this explanation as they suggest that participants adopt a response 
strategy early on. A final possibility is that some participants respond strategically 
but the presence of conflict between pragmatic and logical responses leads to a 
slowdown in reaction times. This account is consistent with the data in this 
experiment and consistent with recent findings of De Neys and colleagues (De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008; Franssens & De Neys, 2009).   
Another important finding concerns the processing of scalar implicatures by 
children. The finding that children are unaffected by load even though the pragmatic 
interpretation takes longer to process than a logical interpretation suggests that 
children have only one response once the implicature has been detected. Thus, 
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although the experiments support the standard view that the detection of scalar 
implicatures requires effort (Bott & Noveck, 2005; Noveck, 2001, Noveck & Posda, 
2003; Pouscoulous et al., 2007), how much effort is difficult to say.  
Taken together, the findings of the experiments go against the conventional 
view that the processing of implicatures is always more effortful for children than 
adults (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). Whilst it may be true that 
initial detection of implicatures is cognitively demanding for young children, it does 
appear that older children experience less difficulty in processing scalar implicatures 
than some adults do. 
 The results of these experiments have implications for default and relevance 
based accounts of scalar implicature processing. The reaction time study indicates 
that the scalar implicature associated with some is not an automatic interpretation; a 
pragmatic interpretation takes longer to produce than a logical interpretation that 
represents failure to detect the implicature. This goes against Levinson’s (1983, 
2000) default account. However both studies show that logical responding can cause 
adults additional processing problems in terms of time and effort and the best 
explanation of this is that the logical response represents a cancellation of the 
implicature. This would be in keeping with the default view that the undoing of the 
implicature requires time and effort. However this type of processing is not 
necessarily ruled out by a relevance theory view. RT allows for expectations of 
relevance to be readjusted during the comprehension process (Sperber & Wilson, 
2002), which appears to not discount the idea that once an implicature has been 
computed it can be revaluated and cancelled. However what is ruled out by RT is the 
idea that conflict could cause a slow down in reaction times. For RT two 
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interpretations should never be activated at once as the effort of having to choose 
between them goes against the principle of optimal relevance.    
One problem with the reaction time methodology employed in Experiment 8 
is that it may lead to a trade off between speed and accuracy. Clearly, for the 
reaction time data to reflect underlying processes, participants need to answer as 
soon as they have processed the statement. However if the participants put 
themselves under a time constraint, in that they think that they should answer as 
quickly as possible, then there is the possibility that this will result in an increased 
number of scalar implicatures going undetected (Bott & Noveck, 2005). The 
children’s poorer than expected correct response rates to the control statements and 
the high rates of logical responding to the infelicitous some statements suggests that 
they had traded speed for accuracy.  
  In summary, the processing of scalar implicatures is multifaceted. Logical 
responses in adults can indicate either the failure to detect the implicature or the 
cancellation of it. Logical responses in children however, appear to indicate that the 
scalar implicature has gone undetected. When children do detect scalar implicatures, 
then a pragmatic response takes longer to compute, but how effortful this processing 
is remains unclear given the finding that detection of scalar implicatures is 
ubiquitous for some age groups in previous experiments in this thesis. These 
findings have implications for theoretical accounts of scalar implicature processing 
as well as for proposals about the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures.   
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
 Although the implicature associated with the quantifier some has long been 
acknowledged (Mill, 1867, as cited in Horn, 2004; Wilkins, 1928), there exists only 
a limited empirical data base. An additional problem has been the difficulty in 
comparing existing studies because of differences in methodology, languages, and 
ages studied, or the manipulation of a number of variables within the same study. 
This has led to two problems, seemingly contradictory findings for a number of 
research questions and a reliance on untested assumptions to interpret new results. 
 The primary aim of this thesis was to clarify, and thus extend, our existing 
knowledge of the scalar implicature associated with some. To do this three research 
questions were asked relating to the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures, the role of context in facilitating sensitivity and contemporary 
pragmatic theories that seek to explain the phenomenon.  
 Eight experiments were conducted with a range of age groups, using a 
number of methodologies. A summary of the experimental results is presented in 
section 5.2., and they are interpreted in relation to the three research questions in 
subsections of 5.3.  The implications of the findings of this thesis in relation to 
current pragmatic theories of scalar implicature processing and the field of 
experimental pragmatics are covered in section 5.4., and the limitations of the 
experiments are discussed in section 5.5. Future lines of enquiry are mentioned 
throughout the General Discussion but three particular areas that warrant further 
investigation are discussed in section 5.6. Finally, concluding remarks are presented 
in section 5.7.      
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5.2. Summary of Results 
 Although the results of the experiments were presented in the relevant 
chapters, for ease of exposition a brief summary of the results for each experiment 
follows. 
 Experiment 1 examined interpretations given to the scalar terms some and or 
by children from Years 1 and 4, and a group of adults, using statement evaluation 
and storyboard methodologies. With regards to the quantifier results, the number of 
logical responses given to the target infelicitous some trials differed from the number 
given to the control trials for the Year 4 children and the adults, but not for the Year 
1 children. However in the storyboard task the logical response rate of the 
infelicitous some trials differed from that of the control trials for all age groups. Both 
groups of children gave more pragmatic responses in the storyboard task, but the 
adults showed no dissociation in context. Surprisingly, the Year 4 children had a 
higher pragmatic response rate for the infelicitous some trials in the storyboard task, 
than the adults. With regards to the results for or, although it appeared that the 
children were showing sensitivity to the scalar implicature in the storyboard task, 
poor logical response rates for the control trials meant that it was not possible to say 
whether the findings from some generalised to or. 
 Experiment 2 followed up the surprising finding from the initial experiment 
that children appeared to be more pragmatic than adults in the storyboard task. The 
experiment examined interpretations given to some in children from Years 1, 4, 7 
and 10, and a group of adults using the statement and storyboard tasks. Logical 
response rates in the statement task for the target infelicitous some trials differed 
from those of the control trials for all age groups except the Year 1 children. 
However in the storyboard task the number of logical responses given to the 
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infelicitous some trials was lower than the control trials for all the age groups. Once 
again the Year 4 children gave more pragmatic interpretations to the infelicitous 
some trials in the storyboard task compared to the adults. In addition, in the same 
task the Year 7 children also had a higher pragmatic response rate than the adults. 
Moreover, this group of children had a higher pragmatic response rate compared to 
the adults in the statement evaluation task. As in the previous experiment the Year 1 
and Year 4 children gave more pragmatic interpretations to the infelicitous some 
trials in the storyboard task compared to the statement evaluation task. 
 Experiment 3 expanded the age range of the previous experiments to look at 
rates of sensitivity in preschool children using the statement evaluation task and a 
novel pictureboard task. None of the children showed sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures in the statement task, whereas the results for the pictureboard task 
indicated that some of the children were sensitive to the implicature.  
 Experiment 4 followed up the findings of the previous experiment and, in 
addition to the pictureboard task, introduced a new bag methodology to the 
preschool children. Whilst the results of the pictureboard task remained 
inconclusive, the new methodology resulted in lower rates of logical responding to 
the infelicitous some trials compared with the control trials. An unexpected finding 
was the effect of a one week gap in the presentation of the second task. Children 
gave more pragmatic interpretations to the infelicitous some trials for the task they 
attempted second regardless of what that task was. 
 Experiment 5 took a different approach to investigating sensitivity by 
manipulating conditions within the storyboard methodology to examine the effect of 
context on Year1 and Year 4 children. The experimental manipulation was the 
explicit mention of an agent in one condition but not the other. Rates of logical 
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responding to the infelicitous some trials were lower than the control trials for both 
age groups in both conditions. The Year 1 children gave more pragmatic 
interpretations when the agent was explicitly mentioned, but no dissociation was 
seen in the Year 4 children, who had universal pragmatic responding. Effects of 
order were seen in both age groups and practice effects were observed in the Year 1 
children. 
 Experiment 6 followed up the results of the Year 1 children in the previous 
experiment to examine the effect of motivation to deceive on sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures. A new set of storyboards were introduced, which involved description 
of, rather than interaction with, a set of items. Both sets of storyboards had agent and 
non-agent conditions. Rates of logical responding to the infelicitous some trials were 
lower compared to the control trials in both conditions of the interactive set of 
storyboards, but not for the descriptive set. The children also gave fewer logical 
responses to the interactive set regardless of condition. Order and practice effects 
were observed in the interactive set but these did not occur in the descriptive set. 
 Experiment 7 followed up a finding from De Neys and Schaeken (2007) to 
look at the effect of cognitive load on interpretations given to some in a statement 
evaluation task by Year 6 children and a group of adults. The dual task methodology 
revealed that whilst there was no effect of cognitive load overall on adult’s 
interpretations, there was an effect of load order, with more logical responding being 
seen in both conditions for those adults who received the load condition first. 
Interestingly no effects of load or load order were seen in the children. In addition, 
when the effect of load order was taken into account, the adults who received the 
load condition first gave more logical responses in both conditions compared to the 
children.  
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 The final study, Experiment 8, measured reaction times in a statement 
evaluation task and examined the relationship between behavioural responses and 
working memory capacity in 10-12-year-olds and adults. With regards to the 
behavioural responses fewer logical responses were given to the infelicitous some 
trials compared to the control trials by the adults but not the children, and no 
relationship was found between counting span and the type of interpretation given to 
infelicitous some. Analysis of the reaction times revealed that for those participants 
who gave both logical and pragmatic responses to infelicitous some, pragmatic 
interpretations took longer regardless of age. For those participants who gave only 
logical responses to the infelicitous some trials, reaction times to these trials were 
longer than to the felicitous some trials, but only for the adult participants.                   
 
5.3. Interpretation of Findings 
 This thesis sought to answer three research questions. The findings from the 
experiments are interpreted and discussed in terms of those questions.    
5.3.1. What is the developmental trajectory of sensitivity to scalar implicatures? 
 The findings from a number of experiments in this thesis have shown that the 
answer to the above question is more complex than had previously been assumed. It 
appears from these experiments that sensitivity is not simply a case of logical 
interpretations being supplanted by pragmatic ones (Noveck 2001).  
Sensitivity to scalar implicatures appears to emerge around 3-years-of-age 
(Experiments 3 & 4), which is younger than has previously been documented in the 
literature for tasks that set up conditions of under-informativeness and where 
interpretations of the scalar term can be evaluated against control trials. However 
sensitivity at this age is very much context and task dependent, and whilst children 
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are usually consistent in their interpretations within tasks this is not the case across 
tasks. Thus if a scalar term is set in a pragmatically enriched context which directly 
involves, and has implications for, the child participant (Experiment 4) then 
sensitivity is much more likely to be seen than if the context is pragmatically 
impoverished, such as the statement evaluation task, where the cognitive effects to 
be gained are minimal (Experiments 1, 2 & 3). Indeed in such impoverished 
contexts, sensitivity to scalar implicatures is not always seen in older children 
(Experiment 8) and some adults (Experiments 1, 2 & 8), which is consistent with 
previous research (Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001, 
Pouscoulous et al., 2007)  
Children up to the age of 11 often show a dissociation in context 
(Experiments 1, 2, 3 & 5) indicating that whilst sensitivity to scalar implicatures is 
developing it is not an all or nothing matter, and shows the reliance of children on 
other pragmatic cues to detect the implicature, rather than just the mere presence of 
the scalar term. However, the same could also be said of some adults, whose ability 
to detect scalar implicatures would be considered to be developed. Whilst a 
dissociation in context was not observed for the adults as a group (Experiment 2), 
individual patterns of responding show that there are some adults whose 
interpretation of the scalar term changes according to the context in which it appears.     
Sensitivity to scalar terms appears to develop in a non-linear manner, which 
is contrary to the assumptions in the literature (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003). One of the most important findings of this thesis has been the 
discovery that the development of sensitivity to scalar implicatures appears to be U-
shaped, and in opposition to the popular belief that children should never be more 
pragmatic than adults (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), lower rates of 
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logical responding in children, as compared with adults, were seen in three 
experiments in this thesis (Experiments 1, 2 and 7). This finding raises a number of 
questions in relation to what a logical response actually represents and has 
implications for theoretical accounts of scalar implicatures, which are discussed in 
sections 5.3.3 and 5.4, and the interpretation of previously published findings. 
5.3.2. What contexts facilitate sensitivity to the implicature associated with some? 
 The initial focus on context in this thesis was specifically on the facilitating 
effect of deception contexts in implicature detection. However in considering those 
contexts a number of factors that had previously been implicated in aiding sensitivity 
were also examined. Although Feeney et al.’s (2004) claim for the facilitatory nature 
of deception in relation to the detection of scalar implicatures gained support from a 
number of experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 4 & 5), it also became apparent that 
deception alone is not enough to elicit sensitivity. The findings from Experiment 6 
indicated that a scalar implicature will not necessarily be detected if an utterance is 
under-informative or if someone is attempting to deceive their interlocutor. Another 
important factor appears to be that there are benefits to be gained from the deception. 
This finding, considered alongside Feeney et al.’s proposal, led to the suggestion of 
another possible facilitating factor; the consequences of a particular interpretation. In 
other words, maybe sensitivity is facilitated by any scenario where the participant 
has reason to give a pragmatic interpretation. Although some of the storyboard 
contexts studied in this thesis contain very good examples of such scenarios, there 
may be other examples in the literature. For example in the Guasti et al. (2005) study 
participants see a scenario where the mode of transport is discussed in relation to 
cost. Therefore the expectation could be set up in participants that they should be as 
informative as possible because how many soldiers chose which particular mode of 
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transport is important. It is interesting that 75% of the 7-year-old children in this 
experiment detect the scalar implicature compared to 13% of 7-year-olds in a 
statement evaluation task in another experiment in this study.  
The claim of Guasti et al. (2005) that shared background knowledge 
facilitates sensitivity to scalar implicatures appears to be supported by higher 
pragmatic response rates in the younger children in the storyboard/pictureboard task 
(Experiments 1, 2 & 3), when compared to their rates of pragmatic responding in the 
statement evaluation task. However, this feature alone is not enough for sensitivity to 
be seen in some children (Experiment 6), supporting Hurewitz et al.’s (2006) claim 
that children do not always make use of the visual scene.  
 Hurewitz et al.’s (2006) claim for the benefits of strong discourse support, as 
opposed to visual scene or situational support, also receives some support from the 
findings in this thesis. This feature is present in the storyboards where Charlotte is in 
conversation with her mother (Experiments 1 & 2) and where the researcher is in 
conversation with the participants (Experiment 4). In both experiments clear 
informativeness expectations are set up. However it could be argued that the agent 
conditions of the interactive and descriptive storyboards (Experiment 6) contain the 
same discourse support, and yet there is a significant difference in the rates of 
pragmatic responding between the two conditions. Therefore it may be the case that 
whilst discourse support helps sensitivity, the dialogue needs to contain something in 
addition to the flouting of conversational principles. 
 One thing that is apparent from the findings of the thesis is that no single 
contextual feature that has been proposed in the literature is guaranteed to result in 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures. It seems likely that contexts that are based on 
naturalistic conversations, where there are clear informativeness expectations, with 
202 
 
readily available background knowledge, and where the interpretation of the scalar 
term carries consequences, will result in more pragmatic interpretations than 
contrived pragmatically impoverished contexts, where the background is not 
established and there is nothing to motivate a particular interpretation. However, it 
remains to be seen whether a context can ever be supportive enough to produce 
sensitivity in children younger than 3-years-of-age.       
5.3.3. Which contemporary theory, default or relevance, best captures the 
processing of the scalar term some? 
 Experiments 7 and 8 tested predictions made by two current pragmatic 
theories of scalar implicature; the default account of Levinson (1983, 2000), and 
Sperber and Wilson’s (1985/1995) Relevance Theory. The findings from these 
experiments, as well as others in the thesis, lead to the conclusion that neither theory 
in their present form can adequately account for the empirical data.  
The theories of Levinson (1983, 2000) and Sperber and Wilson (1985/1995) 
both give an account of adult processing of scalar terms therefore the evidence from 
adults and children will be considered separately.  
Levinson’s (1983, 2000) proposal that the default interpretation of some is 
not all and that this interpretation is triggered automatically whenever the scalar term 
appears regardless of context is not borne out by the reaction times of the adult 
mixed responders in Experiment 8. For this group of participants a pragmatic 
response took longer than a logical response. There is however support from the 
same experiment for his proposal that the cancellation of the implicature requires 
time and effort. Logical responses to infelicitous some took longer than the same 
response to felicitous some in the logical responders, suggesting that for some adults 
a logical response can be a late arriving process. 
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The findings from the children also present mixed support for Levinson’s 
1983, 2000) default account. It appears from the findings of the younger children 
that the initial interpretation of some is logical, and children will give this 
interpretation for a number of years in pragmatically impoverished contexts. This 
finding alone is not problematic for Levinson’s theory as it could be argued that the 
inference has not yet become automatic, however the finding of a dissociation in 
context is. For Levinson (2000, p. 22), the inference is triggered by the structure of 
the utterance rather than the context of the utterance. It is difficult to explain why 
children can detect the implicature in the storyboard/bag task and not the statement 
evaluation task (Experiments 1, 2, 5 & 6) without reference to the context of the 
utterance. In addition the developmental trajectory would suggest that the children 
are using context to make pragmatic inferences rather than to cancel them. 
The practice effects seen in the children could be accounted for by Levinson 
(1983, 2000). The repeated presentation and structured nature of the stimulus 
materials may have made the children more aware of the structure of the language 
and expectations of how the language is used, allowing them to make more 
pragmatic inferences. However the lack of practice effects in the descriptive set of 
storyboards (Experiment 6) weakens this proposal as the structure is essentially the 
same as in other experiments.   
The findings from some of the experiments in this thesis (Experiments 2, 5 & 
7) suggested that there may be a point in development where some is the automatic 
interpretation. Universal pragmatic responding and pragmatic responding seemingly 
unaffected by cognitive load, suggested that the detection of scalar implicatures in 
these children did not appear to be an effortful process. However the reaction times 
of children (Experiment 8) revealed that a pragmatic interpretation took longer to 
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arrive at than a logical interpretation. Horn (2009) points out though, that not all 
default accounts posit effortless processing for a pragmatic interpretation. He draws 
attention to the fact that Grice’s view of conversational inferences always involved 
additional processing to go from what is said to what is meant. Horn, using the 
example of his regular mode of transport, identifies that his default status, Monday to 
Friday, is to drive to work. This does not mean though that the procedure is 
automatic, he still has to carry out the actions of driving; thus, “an implicature may 
arise in a default context without thereby constituting a default or automatic 
inference” (p. 23). 
Relevance Theory’s account of adults’ processing of scalar terms receives 
mixed support. The reaction times (Experiment 8) support the predictions of Noveck 
and Sperber (2007) that enriching the literal meaning of some takes time. However, 
this thesis’s proposal that adults can experience a conflict in choosing an 
interpretation goes against RT’s proposal that there can never be more than one 
interpretation available otherwise the principle of optimal relevance would be 
violated.  
Anecdotal findings from the adults also suggest problems for RT’s proposed 
three levels of interpretation strategy. According to Sperber (1994), a sophisticated 
interpretation, where the hearer assumes neither competence nor benevolence on the 
part of the speaker, involves the hearer stopping not at the first relevant 
interpretation that comes to mind, but at the first interpretation they think the speaker 
would have thought relevant. These complex meta-representations do not have to be 
conscious or involve difficulty. Yet some adults in Experiment 2 consciously 
deliberated over interpretations, systematically thinking through what interpretation 
they should give. In this case it would appear that Noveck and Sperber’s criticism of 
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Levinson (1983, 2000) that the benefit of deriving the inference by default would be 
offset by the frequency of cancellation could be used against RT. That is, if 
interpretations are often revised by adults what is the benefit of optimal relevance? 
The principle of optimal relevance states that every ostensive stimulus (a stimulus 
worth the hearer’s attention) carries the presumption that its processing is not only 
relevant enough to be worth the effort but that it is more relevant than any other 
available stimulus. The point of optimal relevance is that effort is not required to 
choose between stimuli. But if hearers can, and do, revise their interpretations then 
the benefits of optimal relevance appear to be offset by the effortful revisions.  
In terms of children’s processing then RT can handle most of the findings. It 
can explain the dissociation in context and practice effects in terms of the pay off 
between effect and effort. It can also explain the lack of practice effects in the 
descriptive set of storyboards (Experiment 6) with reference to the same principal; 
less effort is required to process the second presentation of the materials but the 
cognitive effect to be gained does not warrant the extra processing.  
What neither theory seems to capture is the complex dynamic nature of scalar 
implicature processing: Scalar implicatures can be detected by 3-year-olds and 
missed by 10-year-olds, and they appear to be easier to process for 10-year-olds than 
for some adults. Some age groups will be homogenous in their interpretations of 
scalar terms on certain tasks, other age groups will be homogenous regardless of 
task, whilst for other age groups interpretation seems to be a matter of individual 
preference. It seems that the interpretation of scalar terms can be unconscious or 
require deliberation. Inference pervades language understanding and is the “core of 
the understanding process” (Shank, 1976, p.168), and because of this, it must for the 
most part be quick and relatively effortless so that successful communication can 
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take place. Scalar inferences on the other hand appear to go beyond this. Moshman 
(1998, pp. 952-953) identifies three qualitatively different cognitive processes; 
inference (typically automatic and unconscious), thinking (the deliberate co-
ordination of inferences to serve a purpose) and reasoning (constraining one’s 
thinking on the basis of epistemic constraints). These would seem to apply to the 
processing of scalar implicatures. What we need is a developmental theory that can 
account for the dynamic changes not only at the semantic/pragmatics interface but at 
the inference/reasoning border.                
 
5.4. Implications 
The findings of this thesis have major implications for the current pragmatic 
theories that are used to explain the processing of scalar implicatures, but there are 
also more general implications for the area of experimental pragmatics.  
The ability of Levinson’s (1983/2000) default account and Sperber and 
Wilson’s (1985/1995) Relevance Theory to adequately account for the empirical 
data was discussed in detail in section 5.3.3. and therefore the main arguments will 
not be reiterated here. However the main conclusion of this thesis in relation to the 
theories is that the empirical data presents problems for both camps. One of the main 
problems for both theories is the failure to give an adequate account of the 
interpretational strategies that appear to be available to adults. Each theory also 
neglects to give any account of the development of processing. Findings from 
children and adults cannot be adequately accounted for by recourse to suppositions 
about how they might behave. The complex developmental picture of sensitivity that 
is evident in this thesis suggests that both theories need serious revision to cope with 
the dynamic changes that occur. 
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The general implications for experimental pragmatics relate mainly to the 
interpretation of findings based on untested assumptions, without empirically testing 
those assumptions to be confident that they hold. Within any new field there is a 
need to establish an empirical data-base in order to further our knowledge of the 
topic under investigation. Whilst there have been undeniable methodological 
advances made in the study of scalar implicature it is unclear that assumptions made 
in interpreting recent experimental results are justified. For example, De Neys and 
Shaeken (2007) interpreted their findings based on the assumption of a two-step 
model, i.e. that a logical response only represents failure to detect the implicature 
rather than detection and subsequent cancellation of the implicature. The results 
described in Chapter 4 suggest that this assumption may not be justified. Thus, 
before further progress can be made, researchers may wish to question the 
assumptions against which they interpreted their experimental findings, and consider 
alternative explanations of their data.    
The developmental findings also have methodological implications for the 
study of scalar implicature. The experiments indicate that many factors affect 
sensitivity to scalar terms and also show how susceptible interpretations can be to 
change when sensitivity is emerging. One point to bear in mind for future research is 
that there may be periods in development that are more unstable than others and 
therefore experimental manipulations may have a greater effect on one age group 
than another. It is also difficult to make comparisons between studies at the present 
time because of the manipulation of a number of experimental variables or the 
failure to control for different variables. This thesis has shown that it does not seem 
safe to assume that findings will generalise across languages or even similar 
contexts, and given that individual scalar terms can result in unique interpretation 
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problems, i.e. the interpretation of disjunction as conjunction, there does not appear 
to be homogeneity in the derivation of scalar terms. In order to establish reliability 
and validity, systematic investigation of individual variables needs to be carried out 
to ascertain what contribution each variable makes to the detection of scalar 
implicatures.  
   
5.5. Limitations 
Problems within individual experiments were raised and discussed in the 
relevant chapters, therefore this section focuses on more general methodological 
issues. 
One limitation of the research carried out in this thesis is the sole use of the 
experimental method. Given that this thesis investigates an aspect of language, and 
language is primarily used for communication between people, then the controlled 
artificial nature of experimentation may seem an inappropriate method. However, as 
Noveck and Sperber (2004) point out, pragmatics has a long history of philosophical 
and linguistic theories developed from individual intuitions of how an utterance 
would be uttered in hypothetical situations, and of comparing these intuitions against 
corpora, but what linguistics has lacked is the rigour of scientific methods to test 
these intuitions. Therefore the experimental method has much to offer the study of 
scalar implicatures as long as an interpretation of the experimental findings is 
tempered with an appreciation that this might not be how people would respond 
outside the laboratory. 
The reliance on behavioural responses to ascertain participants’ 
interpretations is also a limitation. This has been the method of choice for existing 
experimental investigations into scalar implicatures. However this thesis has shown 
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that, particularly in relation to logical responses, the same response from different 
participants may not mean the same thing or reflect the same processing. There has 
been a move to examine on-line processing with the use of eye-tracking, evoked 
potentials, and reaction time studies, however the field may benefit from a multi-
method approach. Studies which combine behavioural responses, with the on-line 
methods described above, and are complimented by data from verbal protocols or 
people’s reflections on why they chose a particular response would help us 
understand how scalar implicatures are processed and how particular methods affect 
participants interpretations (for example the use of the storyboard methodology with 
adults in Experiment 2 and the button box with children in Experiment 8). 
Another limitation is the use of a dichotomous forced choice response. In all 
experiments participants were required to answer true or false. Given what this thesis 
is proposing in relation to adults’ processing, it is difficult to know whether a 
response reflects a definite answer, or a participant’s preferred interpretation for a 
particular context. In other words does the response reflect unconscious inferencing 
or deliberative reasoning? It could be said if a participant is using a logical reasoning 
strategy then there will be only one interpretation for infelicitous some, a logical 
interpretation. However, reasoning does not always take place according to logical 
norms, and reasoning according to pragmatic principles could be seen as attempt to 
come up with the best interpretation for a particular situation. The use of open ended 
responding may help clarify this issue and also help discover whether there are 
points in development where children experience any conflict in interpretation.  
The use of cross-sectional studies also provides a limited picture of changes 
in development. Whilst this method can be used to highlight age related differences 
and developmental trends, it does not provide us with a picture of how change 
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unfolds. One way to examine the dynamics of change would be to employ the 
microgentic method (for an introduction to this method see Flynn, Pine & Lewis, 
2007) with the appropriate analysis (Cheshire, Muldoon, Francis, Lewis & Ball, 
2007). The microgenetic method has examined developmental change in a number 
of different domains, such as theory of mind and inhibitory control (Flynn, 2006, 
2007), and language development (van Dijk & van Geert, 2007). Its ability to 
investigate spontaneous change through the repeated presentation of tasks over the 
period of change, and to induce change by providing different forms of intervention, 
could help to uncover the dynamics of the developmental change we see in the U-
shaped trajectory.  
 
5.6. Future Directions 
 Although follow up experiments and ways to increase the reliability and 
validity of the results are mentioned in the discussion sections of the individual 
experiments as well as in other sections of this General Discussion, this section 
identifies three lines of enquiry where future research could make valuable 
contributions to our understanding of some and where findings from some could aid 
understanding in other fields.  
5.6.1. Investigation of the U-shaped trajectory 
 The first line of enquiry is to follow up the U-shaped developmental 
trajectory. U-shaped trajectories are interesting not only because they are unusual, 
but also because they stimulate process level explanations (Siegler, 2004). To this 
end two further experiments are suggested; a replication of Experiment 2, to 
establish that the U-shaped finding is reliable, and a follow up of the result of 
Experiment 5. Experiment 5 employed the storyboard methodology, where the 
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experimental manipulation was the presence/absence of an agent, and universal 
pragmatic responding was seen in the Year 4 children. It would be interesting to 
extend the age range upwards in this experiment for two reasons; firstly to see if the 
developmental trajectory of sensitivity to the scalar implicature is U-shaped, and 
secondly, if the trajectory is U-shaped, to see when logical responding re-emerges. If 
the re-emergence of logical responding seen in Experiment 2 is linked to the 
development of a formal reasoning system then it would be expected that logical 
responding would re-emerge around early adolescence (Piaget, 2001; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 2000). However if it is not linked to the development of reasoning 
processes but is related to the development of pragmatic ability or meta-pragmatic 
knowledge then it may be observed much earlier in childhood (Anderson-Wood & 
Smith, 1997; Bernicot, Laval & Chaminaud, 2007). Further investigation of the 
trajectory could help determine whether the U-shape distribution represents a change 
from language processing to reasoning. 
5.7.2. Investigation of the relationship between scalar inferences and other 
pragmatic inferences 
 The last point of the previous paragraph brings us to the second line of 
enquiry, namely investigating the similarities and differences between scalar 
inferences and other pragmatic inferences. Most of the research into pragmatic skills 
has tended to investigate them in isolation (Adams, 2002), though there have been 
attempts to investigate a number of phenomena together (Bucciarelli, Colle & Bara, 
2003; Loukusa, Leinonen & Ryder, 2007; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003) and to see how 
pragmatic skills relate to pragmatic knowledge (Bernicot et al., 2007). In addition 
there is no single theory or protocol that covers the development of pragmatic 
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capacity and identifies ages at which children are expected to produce and 
comprehend different speech acts (Adams, 2002; Bara, Bosco & Buccarelli, 1999).  
Separate pieces of research on individual pragmatic skills which are 
component characteristics of scalar implicatures, indicate that they occur at different 
ages. For example, the ability to infer information from stories develops between 4 
and 6 years of age (Paris & Upton, 1976), as does the transition from literal to non-
literal interpretations of speech (Eson & Shapiro, 1982). Children can provide 
enough information for an interlocutor to decide what the point of reference is by the 
age of seven, but the ability to detect ambiguity is not complete for another two 
years (Lloyd, Camaioni & Ercolani, 1995). Furthermore, meta-pragmatic knowledge 
can be present from the age of 6 (Andersen-Wood & Smith, 1997), but not fully 
developed until adolescence (Gombert, 1992) (for a summary of results on the 
development of pragmatic abilities see Adams, 2002). In addition, as is the case for 
scalar implicatures, pragmatic skills and meta-pragmatic knowledge are affected by 
context (Laval, 2003; Ninio & Snow, 1996; Tomasello, 2000). This line of enquiry 
would help to establish whether pragmatic responses to scalar implicatures develop 
in-line with expectations from other pragmatic research and also whether a U-shaped 
development trajectory is seen with other inferences. 
5.6.3. Investigating sensitivity to scalar implicatures in people with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders  
 The third line of enquiry is the investigation of atypical populations to 
understand scalar implicatures. The use of atypical populations to understand 
development is a standard psychological paradigm and has been used to investigate 
other pragmatic abilities (Bara et al., 1999; Bishop, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). 
People whose disorders fall within the autism spectrum would be ideal candidates as 
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pragmatics is seen as a core deficit of this disorder (Tager-Flusber, 1981). It might 
be expected that people with autism would be insensitive to scalar implicatures given 
their tendency to interpret utterances literally (Attwood, 1998; Bogdashina, 2005; 
Happé, 1993), the difficulties they have with non-literal speech such as irony, jokes 
and metaphors (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Dennis, Lazenby & Lockyear, 2001; Happé, 
1994), and their disregard for Grice’s maxims (Surian, Baron-Cohen & Van der 
Lely, 1996). However, in a review of pragmatic abilities in people with Asperger’s 
syndrome or high functioning autism, Loukusa and Moilanen (in press) concluded 
that whilst the pragmatic abilities of such people may be less developed than those of 
the typically developing population, as they were still able to answer many different 
kinds of pragmatic questions their pragmatic abilities should be seen as inefficient 
rather than deficient (Loukusa & Moilanen, in press; Loukusa et al., 2007).  
To date there appears to be only one published study that has investigated 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures in an atypical population13. Pijnacker, Hagoort, 
Buitelaar, Teunisse & Geurts (2009) looked at sensitivity to scalar implicatures in 
adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), using a statement evaluation task. The 
authors found that there was no difference in logical responses rates to the 
infelicitous some sentences between the adults with ASD and matched controls. The 
adults with ASD had a logical response rate of 24% whilst the matched controls’ 
response rate was 29%, indicating high levels of sensitivity in both groups. 
There appear to be no published studies investigating sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures in children with autism. However, data ere collected for an investigation 
for this thesis, but for reasons beyond the control of the author could not be 
                                                 
13 Noveck, Guelminger, Georgieff and Labruyere (2007) investigated interpretations given to 
ambiguous every…not sentences, such as every horse did not jump over the fence, in adults with 
autism. However the authors themselves point out that whilst there may be a strong overlap with the 
work on scalar implicatures, there are important differences regarding the ambiguity and strength of 
the terms.   
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completed. Thirteen children, age range 9-16-years-of-age, with autism as part of 
their diagnosis were presented with statements and storyboards similar to those used 
in the rest of the thesis, and measures of IQ (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence [Psychological Corporation, 1999]) and language (British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale-II [Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997]) were also taken (see 
Appendix CI for the methodology and results of this study). The children had low 
logical response rates to the infelicitous some trials in both tasks, 36.5% in the 
statement task and 9.5% in the storyboard task. The individual measures taken 
suggested that language ability was marginally associated with logical response rates 
to infelicitous some, whilst IQ was negatively associated with it. These findings, 
though involving a small number of participants, indicate that children with autism 
can detect scalar implicatures, despite associated research suggesting that they may 
have difficulties.  
Studying sensitivity to scalar implicatures in atypical populations would not 
only be beneficial for our understanding of the nature of scalar implicatures, but 
there has also been a call for studies to enhance our understanding of developmental 
traits in pragmatic inferencing (Loukusa & Moilanen, in press). In addition, the 
statement and storyboard methodologies are suitable for studying the effect of 
context on interpretations of words, an area that is much debated within the autism 
literature (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; López & Leekam, 
2003).  Furthermore there has been a call for more research on individual types of 
inference in order to help clinical assessments of pragmatic abilities determine the 
source of inference failure in particular individuals (Adams, 2002).   
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5.7. Concluding Remarks 
 The eight experiments contained in this thesis present a number of novel 
findings which contribute to our understanding of the scalar implicature associated 
with the quantifier some. Using existing methodologies, as well as developing new 
ones, the experiments revealed that some of the previous assumptions in the 
literature regarding the phenomena appear to be incorrect; sensitivity to scalar 
implicatures is not linear, children can give more pragmatic interpretations than 
adults on the same task, in some cases scalar implicatures can be more effortful for 
adults than for children, and a logical response is not necessarily indicative of failure 
to detect a scalar implicature. The findings also indicated that there are many factors 
that contribute to scalar implicature detection whilst sensitivity is developing; age, 
context, method of eliciting response, shared conversational background, order of 
presentation and practice. Interpretations of the findings have implications for 
current pragmatic theories that seek to explain the processing of scalar implicatures, 
in that they suggest that these theories need to be revised in order to accommodate 
the empirical data and raise the possibility that reasoning processes are also involved 
in the interpretation process. The way in which the field of experimental pragmatics 
carries out investigations of scalar implicature may also need to be revised to provide 
reliable valid findings that are able to be replicated.  Overall this thesis indicates that 
the phenomenon of scalar implicature is more complex and multifaceted than had 
previously been assumed.   
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Appendix AI 
Statement Materials Used in Experiments 1 and 2 
Trial Quantifier 
Statements 
Trial Connective Statements Trial 
TA/ IS All/some snow is 
cold 
TA/IO Snow is cold 
and/or white 
Snow is cold 
and/or green 
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  
elephants have 
trunks 
TA/IO An elephant has a 
trunk and/or ears 
An elephant has a 
trunk and/or socks  
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/ some books 
have pages 
TA/IO A book has pages 
and/or a title 
A book has pages 
and/or a nose  
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  giraffes 
have long necks 
TA/IO A giraffe has a 
long neck and/or a 
tongue 
A giraffe has a 
long neck and/or a 
jumper  
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  cats 
have ears 
TA/IO A cat has fur 
and/or eyes 
A cat has fur 
and/or wings 
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  pennies 
are round 
TA/IO A penny is round 
and/or brown 
A penny is round 
and/or blue 
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  schools 
have teachers 
TA/IO A school has 
classrooms and/or 
teachers 
A school has 
classrooms and/or 
spaceships 
FA/FO 
TA/ IS All/some  
airplanes have 
wings 
TA/IO An aeroplane has 
wings and/or an 
engine 
An aeroplane has 
wings and/or 
slippers 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/ some flowers 
are yellow 
TA/IO A flower has 
petals and/or a 
stem 
A flower has 
petals and/or a 
piano 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/some birds 
live in cages 
TA/IO A bird has 
feathers and/or a 
beak 
A bird has 
feathers and/or a 
computer 
FA/FO 
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FA/FS All/some dogs 
have spots 
TA/IO A dog has a tail 
and/or a nose 
A dog has a tail 
and/or an 
umbrella 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/some  children 
are blonde 
TA/IO A child has toes 
and/or fingers 
A child has toes 
and/or a beak 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/some  animals 
have stripes  
TA/IO An animal 
breathes and/or 
eats 
An animal 
breathes and/or 
sings  
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/ some bicycles 
are pink 
TA/IO A bicycle has 
handle bars and/or 
pedals 
A bicycle has 
handle bars and/or 
gloves 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/some  houses 
have a garage 
TA/IO A house has doors 
and/or windows 
A house has doors 
and/or wheels 
FA/FO 
FA/FS All/ some cars are 
red 
TA/IO A car has wheels 
and/or doors 
A car has wheels 
and/or feathers 
FA/FO 
Absurd All/ some mice eat trains    
Absurd All/some  garages sing    
Absurd All/some  peas wear shorts    
Absurd All/some  bubbles breath fire    
Absurd All/ some policemen are 
made of jelly 
   
Absurd All/some  crayons have 
noses 
   
Absurd All/ some teapots are fluffy    
Absurd All/  computers are made of  
chocolate 
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Appendix AII 
Storyboard themes for Experiments 1 and 2 
Quantifier    Connective 
Eating biscuits    Eating biscuits   
Eating chocolate   Eating chocolate   
Breaking tiles    Breaking tiles 
Picking flowers   Picking petals off flowers 
Putting salt in tea   Put vinegar in tea   
Pulling doll’s heads off  Cut legs off toys   
Pulling children’s hair  Pulling children’s hair    
Tying shoelaces together  Putting Cheerioes in the shoes   
Letting tyres down   Puncturing tyres  
Eating sweets    Eating sweets 
Putting pepper in sandwiches  Pepper in sandwich  
Dirtying towels   Dirtying towels 
Eating cake    Eating cakes 
Putting worms in lunch box  Spider in lunch box  
Drawing on books   Tearing books 
Spilling pop    Spilling bottles 
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Appendix AIII 
Statement Materials Used in Experiments 3 
Universal Existential Absurd 
Airplanes have wings Bicycles are blue Chairs laugh 
Books have pages Cars are red Clocks cry 
Rabbits have ears Clothes have zips Mice eat trains 
Elephants have trunks Flowers are pink Spoons wear hats 
Giraffes have long necks Paint is white Doors dance  
Schools have teachers Animals have stripes Plates run 
Snow is cold Birds live in cages Carrots wear shorts 
Fish swim Drinks are made of  
chocolate 
Policemen are made of    
jelly 
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Appendix AIV 
Toys used in Bags task in Experiment 4 
Bouncy balls 
Yo-yos 
Musical pipes 
Kazoos 
Purses 
Whistles 
Bats and balls 
Cars 
Chocolate buttons 
Chomps 
Lollies 
Caramel Freddos 
Milky bars 
Fudges 
Chocolate Freddos 
Dairy milks 
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Appendix AV 
Storyboard themes for Experiments 5 and 6 
The objects and method of interaction  
Eating lollies 
Pulling dolls heads off 
Spilling glasses of juice 
Cereal in slippers 
Eating chocolate eggs 
Crushing cans 
Knocking paint pots over 
Putting food colouring in water 
Eating cakes 
Popping balloons 
Knocking vases over 
Dirtying towels 
Eating boiled sweets 
Breaking tiles 
Spilling mugs of tea 
Putting worms in containers 
 
Eating crisps 
Breaking Lego houses 
Drinking pop in bottles 
Drawing on books 
Eating chocolate biscuits 
Breaking eggs 
Drinking juice in glasses 
Tying shoelaces together 
Eating chocolate bars 
Tearing magazines 
Drinking juice in cartons 
Drawing on posters 
Eating cheeses 
Cutting fruit 
Drinking milk in glasses 
Putting grass in sandwiches 
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Appendix AVI 
Descriptive storyboard themes for Experiment 6 
Objects that were described: 
Birthday cards 
Teddies  
Photoframes 
Playing cards 
Plates 
Tarts 
Easter eggs 
Paint cards 
Tiles 
Beans 
Socks 
Medals 
Oranges 
Fruit  
Travel brochures 
Mugs 
Buns 
Jigsaws 
Trophies 
Pick ’n’ mix 
Videos 
Receipts 
Uno cards 
Postcards 
Biscuits 
Wooden spoons 
Kitchen utensils 
Chocolate mousses 
Digestives 
Newspapers 
Ornaments  
Toys  
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Appendix AVII 
Sentences used in Experiment 7 
Set 1 
Infelicitous some 
Some books have pages 
Some schools have teachers 
Some elephants have trunks 
Some snow is cold 
Some rabbits have ears  
Some airplanes have wings 
Some giraffes have long 
necks 
Some fish swim 
Felicitous some 
Some paint is white 
Some animals have stripes 
Some birds live in cages 
Some houses have a garage 
Some children have blonde 
hair 
Some bicycles are pink 
Some dogs have spots 
Some cars are red 
Absurd 
All chairs laugh 
All clocks cry 
All policemen are made of 
jelly 
All spoons wear hats 
 
 
Some doors dance 
Some plates run 
Some carrots wear shorts 
Some mice eat trains 
True all 
All fire is hot 
All rain is wet 
False all 
All dresses have pockets  
All drinks are fizzy 
 
Set 2 
Infelicitous some 
Some feathers are light 
Some babies breathe 
Some people have faces 
Some zebras have stripes 
Some hedgehogs have 
spikes 
Some cats can purr 
Some authors write 
Some dogs can bark 
Felicitous some 
Some shoes are black 
Some women wear glasses 
 
 
Some books have colour 
pictures 
Some toys are dolls 
Some dogs are brown 
Some chalk is white 
Some bags are pink 
Some men have beards 
Absurd 
All teapots are fluffy 
All spoons tell jokes 
All forks giggle 
All fruit have legs 
Some windows dream 
Some peas wear jumpers 
Some garages sing 
Some cups shout 
True all 
All cows can moo 
All winds blow 
False all 
All pets are cats 
All food is chocolate 
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Appendix AVIII 
Sentences used in Experiment 8 
 
Universal  Existential  Absurd 
snails have shells  men have hats   books have legs 
 ducks have beaks  shoes are black  pies have ears 
owls have wings  bags are pink   chairs have eyes 
 days have hours  cars are red   doors have feet 
grapes are fruit  tools are saws   doors are dogs 
cod are fish   pets are mice   hats are fruit 
swans are birds  sweets are mints  plums are fish 
shirts are clothes  toys are dolls   cats are trees 
snow is cold   bikes are blue   books have legs 
drinks are wet   clothes have zips  pies have ears 
fire is hot   skirts are grey   doors have feet 
months have days  leaves are brown  chairs have eyes 
 beef is meat   food is bread   doors are dogs 
drills are tools   shapes are cubes  hats are fruit 
twigs are wood  meat is pork   plums are fish 
squares are shapes  fish are pets   cats are trees 
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Appendix BI 
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 1 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the all 
statements compared to the some statements for each age group   
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 2.03 2.47 3.56 
p .042 .013 .000 
r .31 .36 .51 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
quantifier statements compared to the false quantifier statements for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 2.62 3.20 3.56 
p .009 .001 .000 
r .40 .42 .51 
 
Table 3 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each quantifier 
statement type for each age group    
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
χ2 7.67 16.41 35.22 
df 3 3 3 
p .053 .001 .000 
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Table 4 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the quantifier statement task, for each 
age group 
  Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 2.53 2.83 3.56 
p .011 .005 .000 
True all/ 
Infelicitous 
some r .38 .41 .51 
z 1.56 2.62 3.59 
p .119 .009 .000 
False all/ 
Infelicitous 
some r .24 .38 .52 
z 1.79 2.85 3.59 
p .074 .004 .000 
Felicitous some/  
Infelicitous 
some  r .27 .41 .52 
 
Table 5 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the all 
storyboards compared to the some storyboards for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 3.99 4.29 3.63 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .60 .62 .52 
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Table 6 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
quantifier storyboards compared to the false quantifier storyboards for each age 
group 
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 3.54 4.16 3.76 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .53 .60 .54 
 
Table 7 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each quantifier 
storyboard subgroup for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
χ2 33.07 54.43 37.84 
df 3 3 3 
p .000 .000 .000 
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Table 8 
 Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the quantifier storyboard task 
  Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 3.95 4.46 3.75 
p .000 .000 .000 
True all/ 
Infelicitous some 
r .60 .64 .54 
z 3.96 4.36 3.71 
p .000 .000 .000 
False all/ 
Infelicitous some 
r .60 .63 .54 
z 3.26 4.16 3.71 
p .001 .000 .000 
Felicitous some/  
Infelicitous some  
r .50 .60 .54 
 
Table 9 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the and 
statements compared to the or statements for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 4.21 3.65 4.22 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .63 .53 .61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
Table 10 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
connective statements compared to the false connective statements for each age 
group 
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 4.19 2.75 .29 
p .000 .006 .774 
r .63 .40 .04 
 
Table 11 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each connective 
statement type for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
χ2 56.73 32.73 54.54 
df 3 3 3 
p .000 .000 .000 
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Table 12 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the comparison of the number of logical 
responses given to the target trials compared to the control trials in the connective 
statement task for each age group 
  Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 2.67 2.39 4.20 
p .008 .017 .000 
True and/ 
Infelicitous or 
r .40 .34 .61 
z 3.05 1.44 4.20 
p .002 .150 .000 
False and/ 
Infelicitous or 
r .46 .21 .61 
z 4.22 3.28 0.35 
p .000 .001 .73 
Felicitous or/  
Infelicitous or  
r .64 .47 .05 
z 4.52 3.87 4.01 
p .000 .000 .000 
True and/   
Felicitous or 
r .68 .56 .58 
z 4.60 3.56 4.06 
p .000 .000 .000 
False and/  
Felicitous or  
r .69 .51 .59 
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Table 13 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the and 
storyboards compared to the or storyboards for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 4.12 3.64 4.23 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .62 .53 .61 
 
Table 14 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
connective storyboards compared to the false connective storyboards for each age 
group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 0.93 2.17 3.01 
p .367 .030 .003 
r .14 .31 .43 
 
Table 15 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each connective 
storyboard type for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
χ2 51.21 37.74 53.81 
df 3 3 3 
p .000 .000 .000 
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Table 16 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the connective storyboard task for each 
age group 
  Year 1 Year 4 Adult 
z 3.86 3.15 4.29 
p .000 .002 .000 
True and/ 
Infelicitous or 
r .58 .45 .62 
z 3.79 3.37 4.27 
p .000 .001 .000 
False and/ 
Infelicitous or 
r .58 .49 .62 
z 0.99 1.46 2.99 
p .321 .144 .003 
Felicitous or/  
Infelicitous or  
r .15 .21 .43 
z 4.16 3.45 3.74 
p .000 .001 .000 
True and/ 
Felicitous or 
r .63 .50 .54 
z 4.01 3.69 3.71 
p .000 .000 .000 
False and/  
Felicitous or  
r .60 .53 .54 
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Appendix BII 
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 2 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the all 
statements compared to the some statements for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 1 3.38 4.35 3.26 2.83 
p 3.17 .001 .000 .001 .005 
r .15 .51 .66 .56 .49 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
statements compared to the false statements for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 1.39 3.48 4.31 3.26 2.92 
p .166 .000 .000 .001 .003 
r 0.21 .52 .65 .56 .51 
 
Table 3 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each statement type 
for each age group  
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
χ2 5.71 31.53 62.23 28.46 29.734 
df 3 3 3 3 3 
p .127 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 4 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the statement task for each age group 
  Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 3.40 4.31 3.26 2.96 
p .001 .000 .001 .003 
True all/ 
Infel some 
r .51 .65 .56 .51 
z 3.30 4.46 3.27 2.96 
p .001 .000 .001 .003 
False all/ 
Infel some 
r .49 .67 .56 .51 
z 3.38 4.40 3.27 3.09 
p .001 .000 .001 .002 
True some/  
Infel some  
r .51 .66 .56 .53 
 
Table 5 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the all 
storyboards compared to the some storyboards for each age group 
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 4.04 4.18 4.40 3.13 2.77 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .006 
r .61 .63 .66 .54 .48 
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Table 6 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the true 
storyboards compared to the false storyboards for each age group 
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 3.92 4.12 4.46 3.23 3.45 
p .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 
r .59 .62 .67 .55 .59 
 
Table 7 
Friedman analysis of the number of logical responses given to each storyboard type 
for each age group    
 Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
χ2 48.89 56.38 63.39 29.36 30.00 
df 3 3 3 3 3 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 8 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the storyboard task for each age group 
  Year 1 Year 4 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z 4.13 4.28 4.46 3.24 3.34 
p .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 
True all/ 
Infel some 
r .62 .65 .67 .56 .57 
z 4.01 4.35 4.40 3.27 2.81 
p .000 .000 .000 .001 .005 
False all/ 
Infel some 
r .60 .66 .66 .56 .48 
z 3.89 4.22 4.46 3.21 3.36 
p .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 
True some/  
Infel some  
r .59 .64 .67 .55 .58 
 
Table 9 
Mann-Whitney analysis of the number of logical responses to the infelicitous some 
storyboards for adjacent age groups 
 Year 1 and  Year 
4 
Year 4 and  Year 
7 
Year 7 and  Year 
10 
Year 10 and 
Adult 
U 185 218.5 126.5 138.5 
z 1.62 0.82 2.24 0.23 
p .104 .410 .025 .821 
r .24 .12 .36 .03 
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Table 10 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
infelicitous some trials between tasks for each age group 
 Year 7 Year 10 Adult 
z .45 .00 1.85 
p .655 1.00 .064 
r .07 0 .32 
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Appendix BIII 
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 3 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trial and control trials in the statement task 
 True all/ 
False all 
True all/ 
Fel some 
True all/ 
Infel some 
False all/ 
Fel some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
Fel some/ 
Infel some 
z 3.37 1.61 1.10 2.91 3.17 1.63 
p .001 .107 .271 .004 .002 .102 
r .58 .28 .19 .50 .54 .28 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target and control trials in the pictureboard task 
 True all/ 
False all 
True all/ 
Fel some 
False all/ 
Fel some 
True all/ 
Infel some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
Fel some/ 
Infel some 
z .38 1.77 1.50 2.91 2.87 1.82 
p .705 .077 .136 .004 .004 .069 
r .07 .30 .26 .50 .50 .31 
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Appendix BIV  
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 4 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the pictureboard task 
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 2.85 1.38 1.58 
p .004 .169 .114 
r .50 .24 .28 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the bag task 
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 2.88 2.35 2.96 
p .004 .019 .003 
r .51 .42 .52 
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Table 3 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials, by order of presentation 
 True all/ 
Infel some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
First task    
z 2.39 0.81 0.81 
p .017 .419 .421 
r .60 .20 .20 
Second Task 
z 3.31 2.91 3.22 
p .001 .004 .001 
r .59 .51 .57 
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Appendix BV  
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 5 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials in the agent condition for the Year 1 children  
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 3.91 3.89 3.29 
p .000 .000 .001 
r .62 .62 .52 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials in the agent condition for the Year 4 children 
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 4.92 4.87 4.92 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .67 .66 .67 
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Table 3 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials in the non-agent condition for the Year 1 
children 
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 3.53 2.78 3.16 
p .000 .005 .002 
r .56 .44 .50 
 
Table 4 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials in the non-agent condition for the Year 4 
children  
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 5.11 5.04 5.11 
p .000 .000 .000 
r .70 .69 .70 
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Appendix BVI  
Additional statistical analysis for Experiment 6 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials for both conditions of the interactive set of 
storyboards  
 True all/      Infel 
some 
False all/      
Infel some 
True some/   
Infel some 
z 4.17 4.10 3.92 
p .000 .000 .000 
 
Agent condition 
r .63 .62 .59 
z 4.09 3.98 3.30 
p .000 .000 .001 
 
Non-agent condition  
r .62 .60 .50 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses to the target 
trials compared to the control trials for both conditions of the descriptive set of 
storyboards  
 True all/      Infel 
some 
False all/      
Infel some 
True some/   
Infel some 
z 3.49 3.19 1.51 
p .000 .001 .132 
 
Agent condition 
r .48 .44 .21 
z 2.77 2.39 1.22 
p .006 .017 .222 
 
Non-agent condition  
r .38 .33 .17 
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Appendix BVII 
Additional analysis for Experiment 7 
Additional analysis was carried out on all the participants, taking the post-test 
data into account. One participant was excluded as he responded false to all the 
statements in the post-test.  
Control Statements 
Analysis of the control statements revealed that both sets of participants 
answered these well. The means (and standard deviations) can be seen in Table 1.  
Table 1 
The mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) for the control 
statements, according to age and condition, for Experiment 8 
Age  Condition 
 No Load Load 
Adult 
 
19.71 
(0.64) 
19.78 
(0.46) 
Child 
 
19.80 
(0.64) 
19.77 
(0.43) 
Note. The maximum score in each cell is 20 
There was no significant difference in the mean number of logical responses given to 
the control statements between the adults and children for either condition, Mann 
Whitney U tests, no load, U = 744.00, p = .772, r = .03, load, U = 740.00, p = .729,  
r = .03. Nor was there any difference in the number of logical responses given to the 
control statements between the load and no load condition within either age group, 
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Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests, adults, z = .83, p = .405, r = .04, 
children, z = .33, p = .739, r = .04. 
Infelicitous some statements  
In order to take into account the results of the post test, that is those 
infelicitous some statements that the participants considered to be felicitous, the 
infelicitous some scores were converted into a proportion of the number of 
statements the participants considered to be true of all. The mean proportion of 
logical responses (and standard deviations) for the infelicitous some statements for 
each age group can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean proportion of logical responses (and standard deviations) to the infelicitous 
some statements, according to age and condition, for Experiment 8  
Condition Age 
No Load Load 
Adult 
 
.66 
(.43) 
.70 
(.40) 
Child 
 
.58 
(.45) 
.55 
(.47) 
 
Adult responses. The distribution of the adult data was unimodal in both 
conditions. The majority response, within each condition, was consistent logical 
responding. There was little pragmatic responding over all and very little consistent 
pragmatic responding within each condition. With regards to the number of logical 
responses given to the infelicitous some statements between conditions there was no 
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significant difference, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.83, p = .405,  
r = .04. Analysis of the effects of order of presentation of the experimental 
conditions revealed that the adults who received the load condition first gave 
significantly more logical responses to the infelicitous some statements in both the 
load condition, Mann Whitney test, U = 221.50, p = .030, r = .30, and the subsequent 
no load condition, Mann Whitney test, U = 191.5, p = .006, r = .39 compared to 
those adults who received the no load condition first. Analysing the rates of logical 
responding for the condition that was presented first revealed that adults who 
attempted the load condition first gave significantly more logical responses to the 
infelicitous some trials compared to those adults who attempted the no load condition 
first, Mann-Whitney test, U = 194.5, p = .007, r = .38.   
Children’s responses. The distribution of the infelicitous some data for the 
children was unimodal in both conditions, with the majority of children giving 
consistent logical responses, although a quarter of the children were consistently 
pragmatic in the no load condition and there was a similar number in the load 
condition. With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some statements between conditions there was no significant difference, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 0.33, p = .739, r = .04. However, unlike the 
adults, there was no effect of order of presentation in either the no load condition, 
Mann Whitney test U = 88.50, p = .290, r = .19, or the load condition, Mann 
Whitney test U = 94.50, p = .417, r = .15. Analysing the rates of logical responding 
to the infelicitous some trials for the condition that was presented first revealed that 
there was no significant difference, between conditions, Mann-Whitney test,            
U = 85.5, p = .239, r = .21.   
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Comparison of adult and children’s results 
Although the adults gave more logical responses than the children to the 
infelicitous some statements in both conditions, see Table 2, these differences were 
not significant, Mann Whitney tests, no load, U = 684.50, p = .394, r = .09, load,     
U = 635.50, p = .162, r = .16. This is not the case though if load order is taken into 
account. The adults and children who received the no load condition first did not 
differ significantly in the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some 
trials in this condition, Mann Whitney test U = 160.5, p = .252, r = .18, or the 
subsequent load condition, Mann Whitney test U = 192.50, p = .778, r = .04. 
However, there was a significant difference in the mean number of logical responses 
given to the infelicitous some sentences between the adults and children who 
received the load condition first. The adults gave significantly more logical 
responses in both the load condition, Mann Whiney test, U = 108.50, p = .018,          
r = .38, and the no load condition, Mann Whitney test, U = 115.50, p = .029, r =.35.  
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Appendix BVIII 
Additional analysis for Experiment 8 
Table 1 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the adults mean proportions of logical responses 
for the infelicitous some trials compared to the control trials  
 True all/ Infel 
some 
False all/ 
Infel some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 3.42 3.18 3.79 
p .001 .001 .000 
r .45 .42 .50 
 
Table 2 
Unrelated t test analysis of children’s mean reaction times (m/s) to the control trials 
compared to the adults 
 True All False All Absurd All Felicitous 
Some 
Absurd 
Some 
Adult reaction 
time  
1514 1471 1292 1485 1423 
Child reaction 
time  
2497 2380 2236 2392 2202 
df 58.51 62 56.04 62 62 
t 7.58 7.92 6.95 7.48 5.61 
p .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
r .70 .71 .68 .69 .58 
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Table 3 
Unrelated t test analysis of mixed responders counting span scores compared to 
logical responders for both age groups 
Age group Mean counting span 
score 
t df p r 
mixed 3.81 .05 Adult 
logical 3.74 
0.25 24 .807 
 
mixed 3.23 .18 Child 
logical 2.99 
1.06 33 .296 
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Appendix CI 
Sensitivity to scalar implicatures in children with autism 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirteen children participated in the experiment. They were recruited from 
two specialist schools in the North East of England. The children were aged between 
9 years 8 months and 16 years 3 months (mean age 14 years 1 month). All the 
children had autism as a part of their diagnosis.  Consent for the experiment was 
obtained from one of the children’s parents or the head teacher of the school.  
Materials 
 The children heard a list of 24 statements and saw a series of 16 picture 
books. 
Statements. The statements were the same as those used in Experiment 3 (see 
Appendix CII Table 1 for statements used). Each statement was presented with both 
all and some preceding it, although each participant received only one form, which 
resulted in two sets of materials. The statements within each set were randomly 
ordered. 
Picture books. The picture books were based on the storyboards used in 
previous experiments in this thesis and featured Charlotte and the three objects that 
she interacts with. An example of a picture book can be seen in the Figure C1. 
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Page 1      Page 2 
Here is a story about a girl called Charlotte Charlotte finds three sandwiches 
    
Page 3      Page 4 
She puts grass in the first sandwich  She puts grass in the second sandwich 
 
Page 5 
She puts grass in the third sandwich.  
Charlotte’s Mum says to Charlotte, “Charlotte what have you done to the 
sandwiches? 
Figure C1. An example of a picture book, with accompanying dialogue. 
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As can be seen in Figure C1 each picture book contained five pages; each page was a 
single laminated photograph. The first photograph in each picture book was the 
same, showing Charlotte and her mother. The second photograph introduced the 
three objects, whilst the third and fourth photographs showed the result of 
Charlotte’s interaction with the first and second objects respectively. The last 
photograph depicted either the result of Charlotte’s interaction with the third object 
or was a repeat of the previous photograph, depending on which trial it was 
representing. There was a different set of objects in each of the picture books. Each 
photograph was accompanied by dialogue which followed a similar format to the 
storyboards used in the previous experiments of this thesis. There were 16 themes 
for the picture books (see Appendix CII Table 2 for themes used) and each theme 
appeared with the quantifiers all and some, although each child received only one 
form. This resulted in two sets of storyboards. There were two pairings of statements 
and picture book materials and order of presentation was counterbalanced amongst 
the children resulting in four groups. 
In addition to the receiving the experimental materials the children were 
tested on measures of language and IQ: 
The language measure used was the British Picture Vocabulary Scale-II 
(BPVS-II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997). This individually administered, 
multi-choice test measures a participant’s receptive vocabulary. This particular test 
was chosen for a number of reasons; ease of administration, and the relatively short 
testing time, both of which are important considerations when testing children with 
autism. An additional reason was the BPVS-II’s links with the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1981, 1997). The PPVT is the most widely 
used measure for matching children with autism to control groups of typically 
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developing children (Tager-Flusberg, 1999) and the second edition was adapted to 
provide the original BPVS (Dunn, Dunn & Whetton, 1981). For the test each 
participant was presented with a spoken word stimulus, they then had to pick from a 
group of four black and white illustrations, the one that best represented the meaning 
of the stimulus item. The items in the BPVS are arranged into 14 sets, with 12 items 
in each set, and each set gets progressively harder. For each child a basal set was 
established, this is the set in which they made only one error, and testing continued 
until the ceiling set was reached, a set where the participant made eight or more 
errors. A raw score was obtained by subtracting the number of errors made by the 
participant in the sets from the basal through to the ceiling, from the last item 
number of the ceiling set. This raw score was then converted to a standardised score, 
and an age equivalent score was then obtained.  
The IQ measure used was the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Psychological Corporation, 1999). This individually administered test is 
designed to tap into various facets of intelligence. It was chosen as it provides a short 
reliable measure of intelligence and is linked to the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children- III (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997), the most commonly used intelligence tests (Long, 
2000; Mackintosh, 1998). The WASI yields three traditional IQ scores; verbal, 
performance, and full scale, and consists of four subtests; vocabulary, block design, 
similarities and matrix reasoning. Each child was tested on all four subtests. A raw 
score was obtained for each of the subtests, which was converted into a T score, and 
these were converted into WASI IQ age equivalent scores.                                                                  
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Results 
As in the previous experiments of this thesis the children’s responses were 
coded according to their logical correctness. Each child scored 8 on the absurd 
statements and this data was not included in any further analysis. The mean scores 
and the standard deviations for the children, according to truth, term and task can be 
seen in Table C1. 
Table C1 
Mean number of logical responses (and standard deviations) according to truth, 
term and task  
  Statements Picture books 
True/Felicitous All 3.92 
(0.28) 
4.00 
(0.00) 
 Some 3.54 
(0.78) 
3.69 
(0.86) 
False/Infelicitous All 3.85 
(0.38) 
3.92 
(0.28) 
 Some 1.46 
(1.77) 
0.38 
(0.87) 
Note: The maximum number of correct logical responses for each statement type 
was 4. 
Statement task 
In the statement task significantly fewer logical responses were given to the 
some trials than to the all trials, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, z = 2.97,  
p = .003, r = .58, and to the false/infelicitous trials compared to the true/felicitous 
trials, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tes,t z = 2.56,  p = .009, r = .50.  
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A Friedman test was used to analyse the number of logical responses given to 
the control and target trials, and this was significant, χ2 (3) = 19.94, p > .001. Follow 
up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that the children gave significantly fewer 
logical responses to the infelicitous some trials compared to any of the control trials, 
all p’s ≤ .008, all r’s ≥ .52 (see Appendix CII, Table 3, for statistics showing the 
comparison of each control trial to the target trials).  
Picture book task 
The picture book task followed the same pattern of results. The children gave 
significantly fewer logical responses to the some trials compared to the all trials, 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test z = 3.27, p = .001, r = .64, and to the 
false/infelicitous trials compared to the true/felicitous trials, Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed ranks test, z = 3.17, T = 0, p = .002, r = .62. 
The infelicitous some trials also received significantly fewer logical 
responses compared to any of the control trials, Friedman test, χ2 (3) = 34.01, p > 
.001, follow up Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, all p’s = .001, all r’s ≥ .63 (see 
Appendix CII, Table 4, for statistics showing the comparison of each control trial to 
the target trials).  
Infelicitous some trials 
The nature of the distribution of the infelicitous some data for both tasks can 
be seen in Figure C2. 
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Figure C2. Distribution of participants according to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous some trials for both tasks. 
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In the statement task, seven children never gave a logical response, three children 
always gave one, one child gave one most of the time, whilst two were equivocal. In 
the picture book task, ten children never gave a logical response, two children almost 
never did and one child gave a logical response the majority of the time. The nature 
of the pattern of responding between tasks was that six children gave more logical 
responses in the statement task, six gave the same number in both tasks, which was 
zero, whilst only one child gave more logical responses in the picture book task. 
With regards to the number of logical responses given to the infelicitous 
some trials between tasks, although fewer logical responses were given in the picture 
book task this difference was not significant, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks 
test, z = 1.64,  p = .101, r = .32. The medium effect size suggests that the lack of 
significance may be due to the small number of participants, rather than there being 
no real effect. There was no significant difference in the total number of logical 
responses based on the order the children received the tasks, Mann Whitney test,     
U = 20.00, p = .880, r = .04, nor was there a practice effect, Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed ranks test, z = 0.17, p = .863, r = .03. 
The data from the infelicitous some trials was also analysed with regards to 
the language and IQ measures. Summary statistics for the measures can be seen in 
Table C2 (see Appendix CII, Table 5, for each participant’s individual measures).  
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Table C2 
Descriptive statistics for the language and IQ measures  
 Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Range 
Chronological Age 161 
(20.90) 
119 - 195 
Age Equivalent WASI 143.08 
(21.66) 
109 - 183 
Age Equivalent BPVS 135.85 
(29.75) 
97 - 204 
Note: Each measure is given in months 
 The scores for the infelicitous some trials were correlated with the 
participant’s chronological age, their WASI equivalent age, and their BPVS 
equivalent age. Within each task there were no significant correlations, all p’s ≥ 
.068, however there were a number of weak to moderate relationships (see Appendix 
CII, Table 6, for correlation statistics). Collapsing across the tasks revealed that there 
was a significant relationship between the total number of logical responses and 
chronological age, Kendall’s taub, τ = -.25, p = .269, there was a weak/moderate 
relationship between the number of logical responses and the BPVS equivalent age, 
Kendall’s taub, τ = -.44, p = .051, and a moderate relationship between the number of 
logical responses and WASI equivalent age, Kendall’s taub, τ = -.53, p = .019. 
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Appendix CII 
Additional material for Appendix CI  
Table 1 
Statements used in autism study 
Universal Existential Absurd 
airplanes have wings bicycles are blue chairs laugh 
books have pages cars are red clocks cry 
rabbits have ears clothes have zips mice eat trains 
elephants have trunks birds live in cages spoons wear hats 
fish swim flowers are pink doors dance 
snow is cold paint is white plates run 
schools have teachers animals have stripes carrots wear shorts 
giraffes have long necks drinks are made of 
chocolate 
 
policemen are made of jelly 
 
 
Table 2 
Themes used for picture books  
Eating lollies  Spilling juice  Drinking pop  Popping balloons  
Ripping magazines Breaking tiles  Dirtying towels 
 
Worms in 
containers 
Putting cereal in 
slippers  
Eating chocolate 
eggs 
Breaking Lego 
houses 
Eating chocolate 
bars 
Pulling toys heads 
off 
Knocking paint 
pots over 
Spilling mugs of 
tea 
Putting grass in 
sandwiches 
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Table 3 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the statement task 
 True all/    Infel 
some 
False all/    Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 2.87 2.84 2.63 
p .004 .004 .008 
r .56 .56 .52 
 
Table 4 
Wilcoxon signed ranks analysis of the number of logical responses given to the 
target trials compared to the control trials in the picture book task  
 True all/    Infel 
some 
False all/    Infel 
some 
True some/ 
Infel some 
z 3.35 3.31 3.21 
p .001 .001 .001 
r .66 .65 .63 
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Table 5 
Participant’s individual age, IQ and language measures 
Participant number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Age                             
(in months) 
119 
 
138 
 
151 155 156 156 157 158 161 176 186 188 195 
WASI 
Age equivalent  
138 109 127 152 138 120 160 145 116 143 162 167 183 
BPVS 
Age equivalent 
149 135 102 173 142 121 117 204 97 109 150 123 144 
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Table 6 
Kendall’s tau correlations for the number of logical responses given to the 
infelicitous some trials for each task and the combined total of each task, and the 
age, IQ and language measures 
 Chronological age WASI equivalent 
age 
BPVS    equivalent 
age 
Statement task -.094 
.685 
-.423 
.068 
-.327 
.157 
Picture book task -.363 
.131 
-.242 
.314 
-.360 
.132 
Both Tasks -.250 
.269 
-.530* 
.019 
-.439 
.051 
     
 
